I don't understand why it matters that the reducing function is also a function. Why keep harping on that? It's machines everywhere. Big deal. But as Steve and Gary point out re: dancing robots, the reducing function is also complicated. When someone who's used to seeing CGI-animations *or* people trying to dance awkwardly because there's social pressure to do so but don't *feel* whatever they're dancing to, the reflective layer is, following Ashby, at least as complicated as the machine doing the thing.
So, the reflective layer truly is a covariate and can't be approximated out. The task is to build a machine that acts sufficiently like the extant machines (people) in exhibiting what we're calling free will. On 4/5/21 9:48 AM, Marcus Daniels wrote: > That agency could be reflective and be correlated with different social > outcomes is just another curious covariance matrix. It’s the attribution of > causation from that reflective layer that is pulled out of thin air, because > that reflective layer is just another machine. -- ↙↙↙ uǝlƃ - .... . -..-. . -. -.. -..-. .. ... -..-. .... . .-. . FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn GMT-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ archives: http://friam.471366.n2.nabble.com/
