't Hooft mentions the possible implications for quantum computing.   This model 
brings to mind the old lattice gas architecture designs as a possible 
simulation approach.[1]
Also being interested in artificial atoms in a highly isolated environment 
instead of "real" ones, some of the objections like impossible to understand or 
control initial conditions as in pilot wave interpretations might not apply.   
I guess I got distracted from the free will topic.   Regarding that, I can't 
help myself!

[1] And it makes me wonder if my old boss Chris was inadvertently writing 
quantum programs, back in the day!   Later, there was a community around 
quantum cellular automata for a while, but I think the field decohered.  

-----Original Message-----
From: Friam <[email protected]> On Behalf Of David Eric Smith
Sent: Friday, April 9, 2021 3:41 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Free Will in the Atlantic

Hi Marcus,

Yes, this gets to the nut of it for me:

> On Apr 10, 2021, at 6:48 AM, Marcus Daniels <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> Anyway, 't Hooft doesn't say QM is flawed, just that QM isn't an explanation. 
>   He makes the distinction between the value of his idea as an interpretation 
> vs. the possibility it (CAT) is how the universe works.   He's got nothing to 
> prove, so I guess he has the luxury of expecting people to be reasonable 
> about him daring to offer a suggestion.

I don’t understand what status “interpretations” of QM have in science.  To the 
extent that an interpretation is another activity one performs that must align 
with all the data-correspondences one has already checked, it doesn’t affect 
them.  If, sometime later, the interpretations one chose in the past affect the 
course of proposals for what to build next, then they do have a role, with 
respect to inference.  But the way they are discussed now is all for the period 
when they haven’t yet affected anything more.

After browsing Wikipedia on these questions to try to get a feel for what the 
society considers a stable condition for this discussion, I went to the 
Stanford Encyclopedia to see what the philosophers are comfortable with, and 
that made things even worse.  In particular, the people who believe there is a 
role for measurement as a primitive which is not simply a reference to 
decoherence phenomena completely lose me.  I don’t understand what is left for 
“measurement” to do if one is trying to provide a quantitative account of 
phenomena in terms of decoherence of correlation functions.

Similarly, the formulation of spooky action at a distance is one that feels to 
me like an artifact from an antique language, but not one we would be forced to 
create today if we had not inherited it from smart and uneasy people of the 
past.  I know how they arrive at this language, but since within QM the same 
phmena do not appear as action at a distance, but simply as the existence of 
some correlations and the absence of others, within the structure of the state 
vector, it doesn’t seem like there was anything within the science that ever 
required arriving at that language.  

As for what probabilities “are”?  I don’t know.  If one took that they are a 
property of correlation functions of observables that satisfy a certain set of 
axioms for composition and conditioning (kind of like Jaynes constructs them in 
his book The Logic of Science, but due to somebody else whom he cites but whose 
name I don’t recall), then again we aren’t taking our notion of probability as 
a primitive we have always “known” and are now trying to formalize, but rather 
as a phenomenal pattern, the properties of which we want to account for from 
some structure in a formalism as a way of assessing the formalism's validity.  
Then again, to me, it sounds as if we are saying that our objection to 
probabilities is that they aren’t things that aren’t probabilities.  It is 
consistent, but doesn’t feel obligatory to me.  

I think I am very stupid in not being able to “get” this.  That doesn’t 
surprise me.  I don’t understand string theory.  I never even tried to 
understand twistors, or loop quantum gravity.  When a paper by a philosopher 
lands on my desk asking for a review, about the foundations of “reality” that 
fall prior to empirical observations, with applications to the nature of life, 
but drawn from twistor theory and loop quantum gravity, I don’t even know how 
to distinguish between something by a profound person and a hoax by a 
Sokal-bot.  So it isn’t strange that I wouldn’t understand this either. 

I guess the Clint Eastwood line is the best off-route to get on with the day: a 
man’s gotta know his limitations.  Gets easier year by year, and failure by 
failure.

Eric




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