Mixing-up is-a and has-a is a fundamental software design error.  It is so 
consequential that some languages don’t even allow subtyping of concrete types. 
  Now it seems essential, but just wait…

On Apr 1, 2022, at 9:42 PM, David Eric Smith <[email protected]> wrote:


On Mar 31, 2022, at 3:24 AM, Roger Critchlow 
<[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:

And I suppose the back side of the trap is that we have an innate essentialist 
heuristic which we use for organizing essentially everything we encounter in 
the world.

You know, in reading this now, I am suddenly put back in mind of Vygotsky’s 
Thought and Language, and a category distinction he makes between “family 
resemblances” and “predicates”.  (Not that there is any privilege to this 
reference; only that I have seen so few things that I often come back to it.)

If “family resemblance” and “predicate” are even categories, maybe one should 
add to them “essences” as a third category.

What would any of those categories be?  Postures toward perceiving?  Or 
“experiencing”?

The language that philosophers seem to like that “it is like” something “to be 
alive” (or whatever; to be a bat) — I have sympathy for their need to have some 
verbal locution, though I have no impulse to follow them in using that one — 
seems to have an origin something like the origin of terms like “quailia”. Or 
to be off somehow in the same general quadrant.  So okay, we can do a lot, and 
we want verbal conventions for signals to put each other into various states of 
mind or frames of reference.  The language isn’t analytic in any sense, but if 
people think they mostly agree on it, maybe it does whatever we put weight on 
language to do, to some degree.  Cues to coordinate states of mind.

When Vygotsky uses the term “predicate”, he doesn’t mean it only (or maybe at 
all) in the logician’s sense of existence of a partition of a collection into 
non-overlapping classes.  He is referring to something somehow perceptual, so 
that from an early “family resemblance”, where maybe most of the blocks in a 
set are the red ones, or maybe most of them are the triangles, etc., we settle 
on taking “red” as a “property” on the basis of which to assign set membership. 
 Somehow it is that investing of things with properties or aspects, as a 
cognitive-developmental horizon, that he means as the shift to assigning them 
predicates.

Is it a mode of perception?  A cast of mind, among many in which perceptions 
might take place or be enacted?  Is “experiencing something” as “being of some 
essence” then, in any similar sense, a mode of perception or an orientation, 
disposition, or posture toward things that partly forms what we take from the 
interaction with them?  That is my attempt to re-say REC’s “innate essentialist 
heuristic”.  Is perceiving-in-essences a distinct disposition from 
perceiving-as-having-properties?  Or are they two names for the same thing?  
Linguistically, we seem to use them differently.  At least in English, one is 
strongly attached to the verb “is” and the other to the verb “has”, and there 
seem to be few instances in which we would regard the two as substitutes.  
(Though I can think of constructions involving deictics and existential where 
apparently the same usage can shift which verb carries it across languages.)  
Would the linguistic form strongly prejudice the semantic domain, or does it 
entrain on a semantic domain that is mostly language- and culture-invariant?

I guess the psychologists and the philosophers have all this worked out.  Or 
maybe the contemplatives have systems for it.  But those are literatures I 
don’t cover.

Eric





So in certain contexts -- mechanics, chemistry, thermodynamics, electronics, 
computation -- we have refined our naive essentialism into categories and 
operations which essentially solve or are in the process of solving the 
context.  And in other contexts, we have lots of enthusiastic application of 
naive essentialist theories, lots of ritualistic imitations of the procedures 
employed in the contexts which are succeeding, and lots of proposals of ways 
that the unresolved contexts might be reduced to instances of the solved.

EricS's dimensional analysis in a nutshell, which is an essential description 
of a successful essential analysis of a context, leaves a lot of problems for 
the reader to work out if taken as a recipe for action.   How do you identify 
the units of aggregation?   What are the rules for forming larger aggregates 
from smaller and vice versa?  What is entropy, anyway, and what is the correct 
entropy (*dynamic potential) in this context?

Thermodynamic state functions as derivatives with respect to entropy are all 
over JW Gibb's On the Equilibrium of Heterogeneous Substances.  It is the 
point.  PW Bridgman's Dimensional Analysis essentially summarizes all of 
physics up to 1922 as a problem of combining and factoring units of 
measurement, one of my favorite library discoveries as an undergraduate.  Both 
available in the internet archive.

-- rec --


On Wed, Mar 30, 2022 at 12:12 PM Marcus Daniels 
<[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
Here is a situation I frequently experience with software development where I 
try to adopt some code, even my own.  I stare at the code and..

1) It becomes clear how to assemble it into to what I want

2) I become confused or frustrated.   As a ritual, I remove it from my sight 
and open a blank editor window to start over.  Sometimes I must walk away from 
the screen to think, until I want to type.

I think the reason I dwell in #2 space is because I believe in #1.   That is, 
when I have just the right combinator library things just snap into place.   I 
seem to spend a lot of time trying to convince myself of why it can't work, and 
whether it is a bad fit or something that needs to be fixed in the platform.  
What is important, in this value system, is that platforms are good, not that 
this or that problem gets solved.   I think it is basically the Computer 
Science value system in contrast to the Computational Science value system.

To [re]abstract and [re]concretize can be expensive and those who don't do it 
have a productivity advantage, as well as the benefit of having particulars to 
work from.   I don’t think it is a case of confusing the sign for the object.   
It is a question of what kind of problem one wants to solve.

In contrast, I have met several very good computational people that hate 
abstraction and indirection.  They want code to be greppable even if it that 
means it is baroque and good for nothing else.

-----Original Message-----
From: Friam <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> On 
Behalf Of glen
Sent: Wednesday, March 30, 2022 8:40 AM
To: [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] To repeat is rational, but to wander is transcendent

Of all the words being bandied about (quality, property, composition, domain, 
continuity, intensity, general, special, iteration, etc.) EricC's "contextless" 
stands out and reflects EricS' initial target of dimension analysis. The 
conversation seems to be about essentialism. Maybe that's a nice reflection 
that we're sticking to the OG topic "analytic idealism". But maybe it's 
Yet-Another example of our pareidolia to see patterns in noise and then to 
*reify* those patterns. [Re]Abstracting and [re]concretizing heuristics across 
contexts may well be what separates us from other life forms. But attributions 
of the "unreasonable effectiveness" of any body of heuristics is the most 
dangerous form of reification. The superhero ability to [re]abstract and 
[re]concretize your pet heuristics convinces you they are "properties" or 
"qualities" of the world, rather than of your anatomy and physiology. Arguing 
with myself, perhaps Dave's accusation is right. Maybe this is an example of 
swapping the sign for the object, or reworded prioritizing for the description 
over the referent, confusing the structure of the observer with the structure 
of the observed.

Those of us with less ability tend to attribute (whatever haphazard heuristics 
they've landed on) to the world *early*. Those of us with more ability continue 
the hunt for Truth, delaying attribution to the world until we get too old to 
play that infinite game any more.

I think Possible Worlds helps, here, too: 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/possible-worlds/ Patterns are simply 
(non-degenerate) quantifiers over possible worlds.

Regardless, I'd like to ask whether the formulation of intensive properties as 
derivatives of entropy w.r.t. extensive properties is formalized somewhere? If 
so, I'd be grateful for pointers. I'm used to the idea that the intensives 
divide out the extensives. But I haven't seen them formulated as higher order 
derivations from entropy.

Thanks.
-glen

On 3/29/22 14:37, David Eric Smith wrote:
> [snip]
> 1. One first has to have a notion of a macrostate; all these terms
> only come into existence with respect to it. (They are predicates of
> what are called “state variables” — the intensive ones and the
> extensive ones — and that is what the “state” refers to.)
>
> 2. One needs some criterion for what is likely, or stable, which in general 
> terms is an entropy (extending considerably beyond the Gibbs equilibrium 
> entropy, but still to be constructed from specific principles), and on the 
> macrostates _only_, the entropy function (which may be defined on many other 
> states besides macroststates as well) becomes a _state function_.
>
> 3. Then (actually, all along since the beginning of the construction)
> one needs to talk about what kind of aggregation operator we can apply
> to systems, and quantities that do accumulate under aggregation become
> the arguments of the state-function entropy, and the extensive state
> variables.  (I say “accumulate” in favor of the more restrictive word
> “add”, because what we really require is that they are what are termed
> “scale factors” in large-deviation language, and we can admit a
> somewhat wider class of kinds of accumulation than just addition,
> though addition is the extremely common one.)
>
> 4. Once one has that, the derivatives of the entropy with respect to the 
> extensive variables are the intensive state variables.  It is precisely the 
> duality — that one is the derivative of a function with respect to the other, 
> which is the argument of that function — that makes it not bizarre that both 
> exist and that they are different.  But as EricC rightly says, if one just 
> uses phenomenological descriptions, why any of this should exist, and why it 
> should arrange itself into such dual systems, much less dual systems with 
> always the same pair-wise relations, seems incomprehensible.  For some of the 
> analogistic applications, there may not be any notions of state, or of a 
> function doing what the entropy does, or of aggregation, or an associated 
> accumulation operation, or gradients, or any of it.  Some of the 
> phenomenology may seems to kinda-sorta go through, but whether one wants to 
> pin oneself down to narrow terms, is less clear.
>
> [snip]
>
>> On Mar 30, 2022, at 5:04 AM, Eric Charles 
>> <[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> 
>> <mailto:[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>>
>>  wrote:
>>
>> That is a bizarre distinction, that can only be maintained within some sort 
>> of odd, contextless discussion. If you tell me the number of atoms of a 
>> particular substance that you have smushed within a given space, we can, 
>> with reasonable accuracy, tell you the density, and hence the "state of 
>> matter". When we change the quantity of matter within that space, we can 
>> also calculate the expected change in temperature.
>>

--
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