Carl Tollander once told me that he saw an article about automated programming with the title, "Do What I Meant Not What I Said. No Not That!"
Did I get that right, Carl? --- Frank C. Wimberly 140 Calle Ojo Feliz, Santa Fe, NM 87505 505 670-9918 Santa Fe, NM On Mon, Apr 4, 2022, 11:57 AM Prof David West <[email protected]> wrote: > *"I want to see a full round-trip"* > > The claim was made, and "proof of claim" was demonstrated, that > Rationale's (Now IBM's) Rose provided exactly that. You could start with > undocumented code and Rose would produce accurate and complete UML diagrams > and templates. The Diagrams could be altered and Rose would then generate > 'correct' and executable code that incorporated the changes. Or you could > create a complete UML specification (models and templates) and Rose would > generate 'correct' and executable code. You could make changes to the code, > and Rose would generate the UML so you could verify the 'correctness' of > the altered code. > > Problem was it only worked on a certain kind of program—one directed at a > formally describable system, like a device driver or low level OS > component. And even within this category of program, it did not scale > beyond programs of tens to a few hundred lines of code. > > It was totally parallel to the massive efforts expended on formal proof of > programs. This effort could not scale beyond programs of 100 LOC, or so. > > Roughly the same time frame, massive effort was invested in AI assisted > natural language translation. It was deemed extremely difficult to > translate from NL to NL, because a computer could not understand or deal > with NL of any kind—too much ambiguity, context sensitivity, and > metaphor.So an effort was made to find a "perfect language" that could be > implemented in a computer and then translate from NL1 to PL to NL2. > > Two candidate PLs were proposed: Sanskrit and Aymaran. This effort broke > down because it proved impossible to map any NL to either candidate PL > beyond some very specific, somewhat formally defined, NL subsets— a > business letter for example, or a technical paper. > > [I have no clue how Google Translate does such a good job at translation. > Nor have I tried Google on things like poetry that is extremely difficult > for humans to translate.] > > In the realm of software development the ropund-trip is not just from > UML-->code-->UML, it is Domain Experts model to Business Analyst's model, > to Architects model, to UML model, to code, to "limbo." Limbo, because no > effort exists to close the loop back to the Domain Expert's model. Models, > and language employed, at each step of this round-trip is idiosyncratic to > that step and, although similar in some minor ways concerning definition > and syntax, requires some fairly sophisticated translation. This > translation is never made specific and the result is massive > miscommunication (total absence of communication) across the silos. > > One more complication, the idiosyncratic variation among human individuals > within a 'silo'—glen's example of senior and junior programmer, for example. > > There is a reason that the multi-billion dollar CASE effort failed. The > problem is too complex and too reliant on human abilities to deal with > ambiguity, incompleteness, and metaphor—abilities that a computer and AI > will, IMO, never be able to duplicate. My elementary-level understanding of > current AI efforts has yet to reveal an idea that seems novel or promising > enough to merit a full blown investigation of the technology and my opinion > about the possibility of significant automation of the software development > effort remains pretty much intact. > > While I have focused on the narrow domain of software and the round-trip, > there is a general argument to be made. Beginning with glen's restatement > of my question,* "how far can our formal structures go *toward* that > ambiguity?"* I would not deny that significant progress is possible, but > I would assert that it will always parallel the efforts to apply perfect > circles and spheres to planetary orbits—a never ending recursive > application of more and more sophisticated epicycles. > > There will *always* be a loss of 'information' when reality is filtered > by any formalism. Formalists of every stripe address this fact with nothing > more than "whistling while passing the graveyard," i.e., self-comforting > hand-waving while ignoring the issue. > > davew > > > > On Mon, Apr 4, 2022, at 9:41 AM, glen wrote: > > I think what we're seeing there is simply that we're getting close > > enough with big data to constraining the space of concretization an > > automated system can arrive at. To see the context I'm trying to lay > > out, consider one junior programmer telling another junior programmer > > what to implement, declaratively. Then consider a junior programmer > > telling a senior programmer what to implement. Then consider, say, a > > literature or history buff explaining to a senior programmer what to > > implement. > > > > With each case, the space of possible programs the implementer might > > implement will change. Requirements flow and satisfaction is > > concretization. And with examples like these, we're showing vast > > improvement on such automation. > > > > But the preemptive nature is still there. The difference between a > > junior and senior programmer (as implementors) should be obvious. It'll > > carry things like "Well, I've been the Singleton Pattern for years. So > > there will be a Singleton in there somewhere!" And "Well, the only > > framework I know is NetLogo. So I guess I'll use NetLogo." > > > > A more interesting problem, I think, is abstraction. Automatic > > *reading* of programs. We've seen a lot of progress there, too, of > > course, perhaps the kerfuffle between xML and iML being fairly tightly > > focused. But what I want to see is a full round-trip. I don't > > particularly care which side it starts on, whether abstracting a > > concrete thing, then reconcretizing the abstraction or vice versa. But > > comparing and contrasting the initial thing with the iterated thing is > > the interesting part ... and targets, say, EricS' conception of > > identity as temporal inter-subjectivity (or "diachronicity" or > > "narrativity"). > > > > > > On 4/4/22 08:54, Marcus Daniels wrote: > >> Is that natural language that is more contextualized? When I look at, > say, Open AI Codex, I start see the beginnings of systematic mappings > between vague languages and precise ones. > >> > >> https://youtu.be/Zm9B-DvwOgw > >> > >> -----Original Message----- > >> From: Friam <[email protected]> On Behalf Of glen > >> Sent: Monday, April 4, 2022 7:53 AM > >> To: [email protected] > >> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] To repeat is rational, but to wander is > transcendent > >> > >> But this is the point, right? That cultural language retains its power > at least in part *because* of its ambiguity, it's facilitating role in > [re]abstracting and [re]concretizing. Jon's pointing out that we can design > formal structures that *approach* such ambiguity (wandering vs periodic > domains - or here with programming language design) targets that ambiguity. > Nick's targeted it by questioning intelim rules in natural deduction. I > guess we've all targeted it at some point. > >> > >> Under the paradigm that cultural language follows/reflects something > about the human animal, which follows/reflects something about the world, > then the question Dave asks, I think, is how far can our formal structures > go *toward* that ambiguity? Can our ideal/formal/rigorous structures follow > the world and "jump over" the cultural language and human animal connection > ... i.e. follow the world *better*? Or do our formal structures need the > animal for a high fidelity following? > >> > >> We've seen this same question in many other forms (e.g. Penrose's > suggestion that human mathematicians do something computer mathematicians > can't do, Rosen's suggestion that math/logic/algorithms can't realize a > "largest model", Chalmer's "hard problem", etc.). So, perhaps its old hat. > But in the spirit of parallax, rewording it helps those of us who (think > they) have solved it in their pet domain communicate their solution to > those of us struggling in other domains. > >> > >> On 4/2/22 13:50, David Eric Smith wrote: > >>> It’s nice having Marcus's answer and Frank’s juxtaposed. > >>> > >>> Conflating essences and attributes is logically and structurally > incoherent in software design. > >>> > >>> Whatever process of ratification leads to human language conventions, > these assignments get made and may even seem rigid within languages (do not > confuse j'ai finis and j’suis finis in French, though the ambiguity in > English is important to Daniel Day Lewis’s line in the bowling alley in > There Will be Blood), the semantic field is ambiguous enough to the process > of language generation that the verb scopes get drawn differently in > different lineages. > >>> > >>> Hmm. > >>> > >>> Eric > >>> > >>> > >>>> On Apr 3, 2022, at 12:31 AM, Marcus Daniels <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > >>>> > >>>> Mixing-up is-a and has-a is a fundamental software design error. It > >>>> is so consequential that some languages don’t even allow subtyping of > >>>> concrete types. Now it seems essential, but just wait… > >>>> > >>>>> On Apr 1, 2022, at 9:42 PM, David Eric Smith <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> On Mar 31, 2022, at 3:24 AM, Roger Critchlow <[email protected] <mailto: > [email protected]>> wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> And I suppose the back side of the trap is that we have an innate > essentialist heuristic which we use for organizing essentially everything > we encounter in the world. > >>>>> > >>>>> You know, in reading this now, I am suddenly put back in mind of > >>>>> Vygotsky’s Thought and Language, and a category distinction he makes > >>>>> between “family resemblances” and “predicates”. (Not that there is > >>>>> any privilege to this reference; only that I have seen so few things > >>>>> that I often come back to it.) > >>>>> > >>>>> If “family resemblance” and “predicate” are even categories, maybe > one should add to them “essences” as a third category. > >>>>> > >>>>> What would any of those categories be? Postures toward perceiving? > Or “experiencing”? > >>>>> > >>>>> The language that philosophers seem to like that “it is like” > something “to be alive” (or whatever; to be a bat) — I have sympathy for > their need to have some verbal locution, though I have no impulse to follow > them in using that one — seems to have an origin something like the origin > of terms like “quailia”. Or to be off somehow in the same general > quadrant. So okay, we can do a lot, and we want verbal conventions for > signals to put each other into various states of mind or frames of > reference. The language isn’t analytic in any sense, but if people think > they mostly agree on it, maybe it does whatever we put weight on language > to do, to some degree. Cues to coordinate states of mind. > >>>>> > >>>>> When Vygotsky uses the term “predicate”, he doesn’t mean it only (or > maybe at all) in the logician’s sense of existence of a partition of a > collection into non-overlapping classes. He is referring to something > somehow perceptual, so that from an early “family resemblance”, where maybe > most of the blocks in a set are the red ones, or maybe most of them are the > triangles, etc., we settle on taking “red” as a “property” on the basis of > which to assign set membership. Somehow it is that investing of things > with properties or aspects, as a cognitive-developmental horizon, that he > means as the shift to assigning them predicates. > >>>>> > >>>>> Is it a mode of perception? A cast of mind, among many in which > >>>>> perceptions might take place or be enacted? Is “experiencing > something” as “being of some essence” then, in any similar sense, a mode of > perception or an orientation, disposition, or posture toward things that > partly forms what we take from the interaction with them? That is my > attempt to re-say REC’s “innate essentialist heuristic”. Is > perceiving-in-essences a distinct disposition from > perceiving-as-having-properties? Or are they two names for the same > thing? Linguistically, we seem to use them differently. At least in > English, one is strongly attached to the verb “is” and the other to the > verb “has”, and there seem to be few instances in which we would regard the > two as substitutes. (Though I can think of constructions involving > deictics and existential where apparently the same usage can shift which > verb carries it across languages.) Would the linguistic form strongly > prejudice the semantic domain, or does it entrain on a semantic domain that > is mostly language- and culture-invariant? > >>>>> > >>>>> I guess the psychologists and the philosophers have all this worked > out. Or maybe the contemplatives have systems for it. But those are > literatures I don’t cover. > >>>>> > >>>>> Eric > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>> > >>>>>> So in certain contexts -- mechanics, chemistry, thermodynamics, > electronics, computation -- we have refined our naive essentialism into > categories and operations which essentially solve or are in the process of > solving the context. And in other contexts, we have lots of enthusiastic > application of naive essentialist theories, lots of ritualistic imitations > of the procedures employed in the contexts which are succeeding, and lots > of proposals of ways that the unresolved contexts might be reduced to > instances of the solved. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> EricS's dimensional analysis in a nutshell, which is an essential > description of a successful essential analysis of a context, leaves a lot > of problems for the reader to work out if taken as a recipe for action. > How do you identify the units of aggregation? What are the rules for > forming larger aggregates from smaller and vice versa? What is entropy, > anyway, and what is the correct entropy (*dynamic potential) in this > context? > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Thermodynamic state functions as derivatives with respect to > entropy are all over JW Gibb's On the Equilibrium of Heterogeneous > Substances. It is the point. PW Bridgman's Dimensional Analysis > essentially summarizes all of physics up to 1922 as a problem of combining > and factoring units of measurement, one of my favorite library discoveries > as an undergraduate. Both available in the internet archive. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> -- rec -- > >>>>>> > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On Wed, Mar 30, 2022 at 12:12 PM Marcus Daniels < > [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Here is a situation I frequently experience with software > development where I try to adopt some code, even my own. I stare at the > code and.. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> 1) It becomes clear how to assemble it into to what I want > >>>>>> > >>>>>> 2) I become confused or frustrated. As a ritual, I remove it > from my sight and open a blank editor window to start over. Sometimes I > must walk away from the screen to think, until I want to type. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> I think the reason I dwell in #2 space is because I believe in > #1. That is, when I have just the right combinator library things just > snap into place. I seem to spend a lot of time trying to convince myself > of why it can't work, and whether it is a bad fit or something that needs > to be fixed in the platform. What is important, in this value system, is > that platforms are good, not that this or that problem gets solved. I > think it is basically the Computer Science value system in contrast to the > Computational Science value system. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> To [re]abstract and [re]concretize can be expensive and those > who don't do it have a productivity advantage, as well as the benefit of > having particulars to work from. I don’t think it is a case of confusing > the sign for the object. It is a question of what kind of problem one > wants to solve. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> In contrast, I have met several very good computational people > that hate abstraction and indirection. They want code to be greppable even > if it that means it is baroque and good for nothing else. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> -----Original Message----- > >>>>>> From: Friam <[email protected] <mailto: > [email protected]>> On Behalf Of glen > >>>>>> Sent: Wednesday, March 30, 2022 8:40 AM > >>>>>> To: [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> > >>>>>> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] To repeat is rational, but to wander is > >>>>>> transcendent > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Of all the words being bandied about (quality, property, > composition, domain, continuity, intensity, general, special, iteration, > etc.) EricC's "contextless" stands out and reflects EricS' initial target > of dimension analysis. The conversation seems to be about essentialism. > Maybe that's a nice reflection that we're sticking to the OG topic > "analytic idealism". But maybe it's Yet-Another example of our pareidolia > to see patterns in noise and then to *reify* those patterns. > [Re]Abstracting and [re]concretizing heuristics across contexts may well be > what separates us from other life forms. But attributions of the > "unreasonable effectiveness" of any body of heuristics is the most > dangerous form of reification. The superhero ability to [re]abstract and > [re]concretize your pet heuristics convinces you they are "properties" or > "qualities" of the world, rather than of your anatomy and physiology. > Arguing with myself, perhaps Dave's accusation is right. Maybe this is an > >>>>>> example of swapping the sign for the object, or reworded > prioritizing for the description over the referent, confusing the structure > of the observer with the structure of the observed. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Those of us with less ability tend to attribute (whatever > haphazard heuristics they've landed on) to the world *early*. Those of us > with more ability continue the hunt for Truth, delaying attribution to the > world until we get too old to play that infinite game any more. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> I think Possible Worlds helps, here, too: > https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/possible-worlds/ < > https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/possible-worlds/> Patterns are simply > (non-degenerate) quantifiers over possible worlds. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Regardless, I'd like to ask whether the formulation of > intensive properties as derivatives of entropy w.r.t. extensive properties > is formalized somewhere? If so, I'd be grateful for pointers. I'm used to > the idea that the intensives divide out the extensives. But I haven't seen > them formulated as higher order derivations from entropy. > >>>>>> > >>>>>> Thanks. > >>>>>> -glen > >>>>>> > >>>>>> On 3/29/22 14:37, David Eric Smith wrote: > >>>>>> > [snip] > >>>>>> > 1. One first has to have a notion of a macrostate; all these > terms > >>>>>> > only come into existence with respect to it. (They are > predicates of > >>>>>> > what are called “state variables” — the intensive ones and > the > >>>>>> > extensive ones — and that is what the “state” refers to.) > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > 2. One needs some criterion for what is likely, or stable, > which in general terms is an entropy (extending considerably beyond the > Gibbs equilibrium entropy, but still to be constructed from specific > principles), and on the macrostates _only_, the entropy function (which may > be defined on many other states besides macroststates as well) becomes a > _state function_. > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > 3. Then (actually, all along since the beginning of the > construction) > >>>>>> > one needs to talk about what kind of aggregation operator we > can apply > >>>>>> > to systems, and quantities that do accumulate under > aggregation become > >>>>>> > the arguments of the state-function entropy, and the > extensive state > >>>>>> > variables. (I say “accumulate” in favor of the more > restrictive word > >>>>>> > “add”, because what we really require is that they are what > are termed > >>>>>> > “scale factors” in large-deviation language, and we can > admit a > >>>>>> > somewhat wider class of kinds of accumulation than just > addition, > >>>>>> > though addition is the extremely common one.) > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > 4. Once one has that, the derivatives of the entropy with > respect to the extensive variables are the intensive state variables. It > is precisely the duality — that one is the derivative of a function with > respect to the other, which is the argument of that function — that makes > it not bizarre that both exist and that they are different. But as EricC > rightly says, if one just uses phenomenological descriptions, why any of > this should exist, and why it should arrange itself into such dual systems, > much less dual systems with always the same pair-wise relations, seems > incomprehensible. For some of the analogistic applications, there may not > be any notions of state, or of a function doing what the entropy does, or > of aggregation, or an associated accumulation operation, or gradients, or > any of it. Some of the phenomenology may seems to kinda-sorta go through, > but whether one wants to pin oneself down to narrow terms, is less clear. > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> > [snip] > >>>>>> > > >>>>>> >> On Mar 30, 2022, at 5:04 AM, Eric Charles < > [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> > <mailto:[email protected] <mailto: > [email protected]>>> wrote: > >>>>>> >> > >>>>>> >> That is a bizarre distinction, that can only be maintained > within some sort of odd, contextless discussion. If you tell me the number > of atoms of a particular substance that you have smushed within a given > space, we can, with reasonable accuracy, tell you the density, and hence > the "state of matter". When we change the quantity of matter within that > space, we can also calculate the expected change in temperature. > >>>>>> >> > > > > -- > > Mɥǝu ǝlǝdɥɐuʇs ɟᴉƃɥʇ' ʇɥǝ ƃɹɐss snɟɟǝɹs˙ > > > > .-- .- -. - / .- -.-. - .. --- -. ..--.. / -.-. --- -. .--- ..- --. .- - > . > > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > > Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn UTC-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam > > un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ > > archives: > > 5/2017 thru present https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/ > > 1/2003 thru 6/2021 http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/ > > .-- .- -. - / .- -.-. - .. --- -. ..--.. / -.-. --- -. .--- ..- --. .- - . > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Zoom Fridays 9:30a-12p Mtn UTC-6 bit.ly/virtualfriam > un/subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ > archives: > 5/2017 thru present https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/ > 1/2003 thru 6/2021 http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/ >
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