Right. Even though I agree with Jon that limits are evil (not so evil as negation, but evil still), I can dissemble behind the idea well enough. So, you're pointing to a horizon, an unreachable thing that may still at least *bound* our discourse. Metaphysics. Fine.
But everything you say seems to hinge on your phrase "belief in the reality of something". Our question is not about beliefs. It's about the targets of those beliefs. Sure, you can simply ignore the slice of us that rely on there being an objective true, True out there, regardless of whether there's anybody there to observe it, believe in it. You can cliquishly stick to a coherence conception of truth, which is what I bitch about when I talk of over reliance on consistency with little consideration of completeness. But when/if you do that, you lose the majority of people. Whatever it is you're talking about is *irrelevant* to that large slice of people you've left out. And this is why I accused Nick of being cult-like in saying Harris doesn't "get it". Yeah, OK. So Harris can't cap with the masters. And persnickety gatekeeping may work on him. But the rest of us will just toss up our hands and think "Fvck Peirce. I've got better things to do with my time than worm my way into the twisted reasoning of yet another bizarre cult." It reminds me of the aphorism "If I'd had more time, I would have written a shorter letter." I'm squarely on Dave's side, I think. *If* experience is a critical path requirement for what is real, then only one experience gets us over the bar. Anything else defies the monist gist. Any creature/thing that is similar to us in that self-reflective way (robots, organisms on Titan, whatever) will have direct access to reality. No induction is necessary. (Of course, I think I'd disagree with Dave and Nick by saying that experience is not important to reality. It may be a marker of some kind, but not necessary, and certainly not sufficient. But I'm probably equivocating on "experience".) On 6/1/22 09:11, Eric Charles wrote:
So, like, exactly what you just said. That is a serious empirical question. Let's say that you believe something to be real, or not-real. Are there */any/* subsequent interactions in the world that would lead you to re-evaluate that belief? If we could, ever, get at /*all*/ the subsequent interactions that might lead you to re-evaluate that belief, we would have a very good idea what "real" meant to you. If we just do you, then it is solid "idiographic" science. We */might/* also hypothesize that if we did that with a lot of people, across a lot of beliefs, that we would see some similarities emerge. If so, we */could* /abstract those similarities and try to create prescriptive guidance for word usage, a "definition" if you will. If we did a cross-cultural study, we could examine the accuracy of whatever word we might translate as "real" by seeing if it actually maps on to the same re-evaluation criteria that "real" does in our culture. Etc. It is also important to note that the subsequent interactions don't have to be limited in the way conventional Western science would like them to be. For example, if someone said "I wouldn't believe some particular God was real unless I died and found myself before him" that is a totally viable criteria for the purposes of our study. Note also that in practice we will likely run into the usual problems with self-report, but that is a different discussion altogether. The question is whether there are conditions under which your belief in the reality of something could change, not whether you can */perfectly/* self-report on what those conditions are. (And, as a final note: When Peirce gives the "pragmatic definition of truth", he is making an assertion about what the result of the above study would be, if we could run it as comprehensively as possible. Peirce is great, IMHO, when he admits that's what he's doing, and he's a jackass when he just asserts his definition without that context.) <mailto:[email protected]> On Tue, May 31, 2022 at 9:42 PM ⛧ glen <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: How many subsequent experiences are needed? 2? A google? And is reality defeasible? Eg if some experience is 'real' to me, then I get some brain damage and no longer get repeats, is the now unexperienced experience real? On May 31, 2022 6:05:40 PM PDT, Nicholas Thompson <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >Dave, I think I disagree. Not all experiences have a character of being real. Only those that are confirm or subsequent experiences. > >Sent from my Dumb Phone > >On May 31, 2022, at 8:27 PM, Prof David West <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > > >At the risk of becoming a poster boy for glen's comments about cult maintenance and othering; > >It is the body and brain that are Illusion, the self Real. > >The mirage, the rainbow illustrate the emergence of Illusion. Raindrops and neurons are posited as ex post facto "explanations" and "causes" for very real, 'perceptions,' 'apprehensions,' 'experiences' of rainbows and mirages. > >davew > >On Tue, May 31, 2022, at 12:59 PM, Jochen Fromm wrote: >> Interesting episode. Yes, Garfield apparently uses it to advertise his book. I like the mirage example he uses (at 11:00) to illustrate an illusion which is real as an experience and as a dynamic refraction process but unreal as a physical substance. >> https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691220284/losing-ourselves <https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691220284/losing-ourselves> >> >> Daniel Dennett recently posted on Twitter a link to an article which contains the same idea, but for a rainbow instead of a mirage: perceiving a rainbow is a real experience of a colored arc, but also an illusion because there is of course no real physical arc at the place where we see it. >> https://www.keithfrankish.com/2022/05/like-a-rainbow/ <https://www.keithfrankish.com/2022/05/like-a-rainbow/> >> >> Maybe the illusion of the self works indeed in the same way? As whole persons who have bodies and brains we are real, just as raindrops in the sky are real. But when the billions of neurons start to sparkle in the light of conscious thoughts, the experience of a self emerges for a short time like a rainbow which emerges shortly from a million raindrops that bend the light towards the observer. >> >> I believe Jay Garfield is right when he says that we are able to construct ourselves as embedded beings. It is as if we are 6, 7 or 8 dimensional beings in a 4 dimensional spacetime where the additional dimensions are embedded in the others. This additional dimensions come through language and enable to specify a personality. If we consider a person from a 3rd person point of view, then the personality of a person certainly determines the behavior. This means everyone has a self in form of a character or personality. Even if it is illusionary or an unreachable ideal to be a certain type of person, such a type can be approximated. Our personalities can be considered as embedded abstract person types that we acquire and approximate in the course of time. In this sense we can say we have a self that guides our actions. And the abstract type is independent from us, since it could also be implemented in a sophisticated robot, android or AI. >> >> -J. >> >> >> -------- Original message -------- >> From: [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> >> Date: 5/31/22 11:04 (GMT+01:00) >> To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> >> Cc: 'Mike Bybee' <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>>, [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>, 'Grant Franks' <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> >> Subject: [FRIAM] Peirce, Buddhism, Monism, Behaviorism, oh my! >> >> https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/282-do-you-really-have-a-self/id733163012?i=1000563340865 <https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/282-do-you-really-have-a-self/id733163012?i=1000563340865> >> >> >> >> Jay Garfield promotes his book Losing the Self on the Sam Harris Podcast. I can see no evidence that Garfield ever read a word of Peirce, but It’s fascinating how closely he tracks Peirce’s monism. Fascinating, also, to see how Harris never quite gets it, repeatedly trying to drag the outside/inside distinction back into the conversation, while slathering praise on Garfield for eliminating it. Reminds me of James’s failure to ever quite “get” Peirce. But then it was James who died a neutral monist. Oh well. >> >> >> >> Reminded me of all the times that Dave West has accused me of being a closet Buddhist. >> >> >> >> Nick >> >> >> >> Nick Thompson >> >> [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>
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