She weasels about the basis for consciousness, so pretty much all the other claptrap at the end flows from that.
-----Original Message----- From: Friam <[email protected]> On Behalf Of glen Sent: Tuesday, November 3, 2026 8:33 AM To: [email protected] Subject: [FRIAM] types of truth (was A field theory of understanding) DaveF lays into yet another lost in the deep end influencer like Hossenfelder, Weinstein, etc: https://youtu.be/HXMi_lyQQLM?si=1MkaM0uK2VcXpQmu So what? Well, the 1st thing treated is Tyson's (?) 3 types of truth: Personal, Political, and Objective. Similar to my last post, *charitable* people will tolerate the abuse of the token "truth", there. I'm a bit like Dave, uncharitable in that way. Personal Truth is a terrible moniker for "lived experience" - and it's why I'm forking off this thread. That a "science communicator" like Tyson would allow that usage is ... uh ... interesting. Political Truth is just a tiny bit better, I think, because it approaches something like intersubjectivity or consensus. Objectively, we can talk about it terms of assertions, claims, memes, or whatever. We can take data on transmission, infection, etc. It *almost* doesn't even matter whether the claims are True outside of their [in]formal inference machine. Objectively, do I really care whether the assertions Flat Earthers (or Catholic Bishops, or whatever batsh¡t mythology) make are true? No. What's more interesting is the layering of the ecology in which the claims move around, from physiological to sociocultural. But it's still an abuse of the term "truth", similar to Tarski's (failed?) attempt to lift a coherent binding out of the morass. Anyway, it strikes me that both of these types are intensely path dependent (at least in part agreeing with Jochen). The important difference, I think, lies in the role the path dependence plays. One thing that seems to be missing from Jochen's book is predictive processing (except perhaps the Clark citation). Lived experience differs from ... uh ... memetics by virtue of jumping up, out of the inferential system. When we study the organism and it's particular trajectory, we're doing something different from studying shared or transmitted properties across particular individuals. That's not to say that higher order units/groups don't exist or that we can't identify and study them. But that the path dependence is studied *differently* in the two different types. The important role played by path dependence is to compose the defeasible reasoning in both of them. I think a book like Jochen's has to model he ability of either an organism or a collective to change its "mind". On 11/2/26 2:39 PM, Jochen Fromm wrote: > It is about the holy grail, who gets there first, and who cheated and stole > or not. As you know the hard problem of consciousness is the holy grail of > philosophy. Of course everybody tries to get it. In Indiana Jones and the > last Crusade Harrison Ford has to overcome three major obstacles and traps to > get the holy grail. > > The 1st obstacle of the hard problem is IMHO to understand elementary > emotions like pleasure and pain, for example as described here. This > is the biological and ethological part, why pain and pleasure feel the > way they do > https://github.com/JochenFromm/PhilosophyBook/blob/main/GeometryOfActi > onReadiness.pdf > <https://github.com/JochenFromm/PhilosophyBook/blob/main/GeometryOfAct > ionReadiness.pdf> > > Then there is the 2nd obstacle how similar the species and their sensory > organs are for the pair where we try to achieve an understanding. As Lars > Chittka writes in "The Mind of a Bee" all information goes through the > sensory organs and "in a sense, all experiences are subjective [...] organs > never send an obiective veridical reflection of the world to the brain, but > always one that is filtered by the sensors that have been acquired over > evolutionary time to suit the needs of the particular animal." He writes > "Before we understand what is in the mind of any organism […] we first need > to understand the gateways, the sense organs, through which information from > the outside world is filtered". The similarity of sense organs sets a natural > limit to the degree we can understand each other as species. > > The 3rd obstacle is the cultural and personal part. The key to this > obstacle is IMHO path dependence - which leads us to cinemas that > narrow this gap. I have tried to describe the 2rd and 3rd obstacle > here, inspired by our discussions and the books in the references > https://jochenfromm.github.io/PhilosophyBook/TheEdgeOfThought.pdf?vers > ion=0.4.1 > <https://jochenfromm.github.io/PhilosophyBook/TheEdgeOfThought.pdf?ver > sion=0.4.1> > > We could try to turn this into 2 or 3 papers - if somebody is > interested. Personally I think the path I tried to sketch is the way > we could solve it, but I am not sure if there are more obstacles and > if we could get it published anywhere. Maybe a chance of 10% ? Perhaps > one of these would fit: PNAS, PLOS Complex Systems or Nature Human > Behaviour > > -J. > > > On November 2, 2026 4:08:55 PM GMT+01:00, Prof David West > <[email protected]> wrote: > > I seem to have missed some entries in this thread (mockery?? > successor??), but I want to make a very specific comment about Wittgenstein. > > Reducing a theory to an aphorism almost always leads to misunderstanding. > Wittgenstein did not mean, IMHO, don't speak; he merely said it is pointless > to try to force fit something into a language that has been formally defined > to exclude expressions of that thing. > > Or another way of thinking about it: if you define a language game with > strict, formal, rules, and want to make a play in that game that is > contravenes those rules you either have to cheat or not make the play. > > If our language game is English, with the verb 'to be' at its core, there > are all kinds of things—keeping the context of psychology—"experiences" that > are not, keeping with the rules, expressible in that language without > creating nonsense, paradox, or "non-truth." > > A simple example" 'Nothing" is at least a concept, that, in English is > necessarily a paradox because simply expressing the word makes it "Something." > > Wittgenstein never said, "shut up." > > davew > > > On Sun, Nov 1, 2026, at 7:25 AM, [email protected] wrote: > > Eric, > > I am still a bit speechless about this reply. My impression is that > behind the mockery there seems to be a feeling of outrage that someone > else may try to cut the line in which you and others have been waiting > patiently (to become Nick's successor as a psychology professor at an > university) by unfair means of cheating and stealing. This was and is > not my intention. > > My idea of solving is the hard problem is probably different than > yours. > For me the hard problem can be solved by path dependence and the > cinemas > I mentioned earlier. There remains an irreducible, biological residue. > This article which I wrote in the last days with the help of our new > AI > friends should help to understand it (I like the saddle node > bifurcations in section 3.2). We could try to publish it together if > it > looks interesting to you or you could you reuse some of the ideas and > write your own paper. Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group > solves hard problem. How does this sound? Maybe it would help you to > get > that academic position too. > > https://github.com/JochenFromm/PhilosophyBook/blob/main/GeometryOfActi > onReadiness.pdf > <https://github.com/JochenFromm/PhilosophyBook/blob/main/GeometryOfAct > ionReadiness.pdf> > > Best wishes, > Jochen > > On 2026-10-04 16:40, Eric Charles wrote: > > As some of you know, I recently finished a draft of The Book (the > one > I have been writing for around 15 years now, with a foundation in > Nick's writing, but extended beyond that). I have circulated > drafts to > some readers... so if any of you are interested.... > > This appears in the epilogue and speaks directly to the question > here: > > > Wittgenstein laid down a gauntlet to 21st century philosophers, > “Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen,” > which is often translated to, “About what one can not speak, one > must remain silent.” This has been broadly taken to indicate that > we > should shut the heck up about a wide range of topics regarding the > mind, under the assumption that _all_ such talk is a prime > example of > that-about-which-we-cannot-speak. _If_ mind-body dualism is true, > either in its classical form or its modern neural form, then your > “feeling of anger” or “experience of blue” is something that > exists only in your mental space, that only you could access, and > my > “feeling of anger” or “experience of blue” is something that > exists only in my mental space, that only I could access. And _if_ > that is how minds work, then we can try to talk about such things > all > we want, but ultimately it is _impossible_ for us to talk about > them > sensibly. Wittgenstein’s various thought experiments demonstrated > this repeatedly. Understood in this fashion — understood in > combination with a _separate_ commitment to dualism — many people > have understood Wittgenstein to be one more philosopher offering > proof > that a science of psychology is impossible. > > However, given [William] James’s influence on Wittgenstein, we do > not see his dictum as pointing to a fatal flaw. Instead, we > understand > his dictum as pointing out a dilemma faced by the field of > psychology: > Those interested in psychology must _decide_ whether the phenomena > they are discussing are, inherently, an example of > that-of-which-we-_cannot_-speak, or if the phenomena they are > discussing might very well be the types of thing we _can_ speak > about > sensibly. > > We assume, if you got this far, that you are the type of person > deeply > interested in psychological happenings. If, after all the > scrutinizing > you can muster, you believe you are interested in something that > cannot be talked about sensibly, then you should find a way to > deal > with the inevitable sadness and disappointment of that situation, > and > then you should try to find other things to be interested in. We, > however, prefer the other option. We believe psychological > phenomena > are the types of things that _can_ be talked about sensibly, and > we > have endeavored to show that such a position can work, in > practice. We > believe there is nothing within our attempt to understand > psychological terms that is fundamentally different than > Lavoisier’s > attempt to understand the elements. Like Lavoisier, we may be > right or > wrong about particular details, but only in the types of ways > that can > be readily corrected over time… because the things we are talking > about can be investigated readily, with no magic or vital > essence, or > other mystical factors having been included. > > We believe that psychological phenomena are the types of things > that > _can_ evolve, that _can_ develop, and that _can_ be studied. They > are > aspects of behavioral design. And that design deserves to be > recognized and accounted for, to be both described accurately and > explained well. > > Best, > Eric > > On Sun, Oct 4, 2026 at 4:40 AM <[email protected]> wrote: > > If this is a polite way to say shut up then please ignore the > rest. > What Wittgenstein wants to say by "whereof one cannot speak, > thereof > one must remain silent" is apparently that things like > anxiety, > pain, nothingness, religion, the meaning of life, subjective > experience or feelings lie outside the logical world and > cannot be > meaningfully described in words. That is one way to see it. I > see it > differently. The problem is if we remain silent we will never > understand it. I prefer Karl Popper's optimistic view to the > depressive pessimism of Wittgenstein. Popper argued that > substantial, real-world problems exist in philosophy, not just > linguistic puzzles as Wittgenstein claims. > > For me the things we cannot describe meaningful (yet) are the > interesting ones. We just need to find the right languages, > theories, perspectives or metaphors. One useful metaphor for > pain is > as you said "an emergency organization of behavior in which > the > agent deploys physical and social defenses of various sorts". > If we > describe pain as a mechanism to protect a person it is > personal by > definition. And yet we all can understand what it is like to > feel > pain in general. If we watch the movie "Marley & Me" for > instance we > can understand what it is like to lose a loved dog because > most of > us have experienced such a loss of a cat or dog or hamster or > horse > ourselves ( by the way we have a new horse now named Mack > which > looks like this https://www.youtube.com/shorts/VDyNyTsMccg > <https://www.youtube.com/shorts/VDyNyTsMccg> ). > > This is in my opinion the solution to the hard problem: the > film > maker turns a 1st-person view in a 3rd-person view, the cinema > conveys the 3rd-person view to the persons in the audience, > and they > are able to understand roughly what-it-is-like-to-be the lead > actor > because they see and hear what it goes through and they know > what it > feels like to experience pain, loss, and suffering. According > to > Wittgenstein cinemas should not be allowed to exist ("one must > remain silent"). But people like them because they want to > know > what-it-is-like-to-be someone else. Cinemas help to solve the > hard > problem. > > -J. > > On 2026-10-04 03:35, Nicholas Thompson wrote: > > You can say that. But you end by reasserting the privacy > of pain. > > And > > … > > Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man > schweigen > > You just cannot have it both ways. > > N > > Sent from my Dumb Phone > > On Oct 3, 2026, at 2:26 PM, [email protected] wrote: > > Claude was not happy about the theorem proofs > that Gemini > > created. > > And Jon also mentioned that they are not > waterproof. So I asked > > Claude > > and Gemini if they could write a new proof. They > could. I asked > > them > > if we could use gauge theory to explain subjective > experience - > > gauge > > invariance to describe objectivity, and symmetry breaking > for > subjectivity. Both Claude and Gemini said yes, and > Claude was able > > to > > formulate a proof that both could agree on > (combining two AIs > > which > > have different personalities often gives better results > than just > using one). Gemini is curious and creative, Claude is > accurate and > precise. The result was a proof for a theorem of a > new "field > > theory > > of understanding". I understand only half of the > mathematics, but > > the > > physicist who use gauge theory for quantum field theories > also > understand only half of it. > > I have uploaded the new proofs here. The theorems > are named the > > same, > > only the proofs are different. If they are more > convincing than > > the > > old ones, then the idea is to replace the proofs > in the appendix > > with > > this version. In my opinion the solution to the hard > problem looks > similar to this - in combination with the other > things written in > > the > > rest of the book. > > https://jochenfromm.github.io/PhilosophyBook/QualiaTheorems.pdf > <https://jochenfromm.github.io/PhilosophyBook/QualiaTheorems.pdf> > > Paradoxically the qualia part that is most mysterious for > some > researchers is not a problem for others at all. > Nick for example > > wrote > > he does not believe in qualia and sees emotions as > regulations. In > > a > > post he argued "To me, pain is an emergency organization > of my > behavior in which I deploy physical and social defenses > of various > sorts.... To me, the question, “What is it like to be > X?”, has > been fully answered when you have said where X-like > people can be > found and what they will be doing there... for me, > feeling is a > > kind > > of doing, an exploring of the world". I would > agree to most of it > > but > > for me what an animal is doing alone gives us only a hint > what it > feels. If a horse for example is injured and feels > pain, it does > > not > > scream or cry, and you see no tears. Only if you > know the animal > > well > > you realize that the behavior is slightly > different, for example > > by > > the things it is not doing. I am certain animals feel > pain just as > intense as we do, but it is hard to recognize from th > eir behavior alone. If it would be better visible, > would we still > > eat > > pigs and cows in large amounts (this reminds me of > "Why We Love > > Dogs, > > Eat Pigs, and Wear Cows" from Melanie Joy)? > > -J. > -- 8647 ⊥ ɐןןǝdoɹ ǝ uǝןƃ ὅτε oi μὲν ἄλλοι κύνες τοὺς ἐχϑροὺς δάκνουσιν, ἐγὰ δὲ τοὺς φίλους, ἵνα σώσω.
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