I heard they were roommates in college. Frank Wimberly 140 Calle Ojo Feliz Santa Fe, NM 87505 505 670-9918
Research: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Frank_Wimberly2 On Mon, Nov 2, 2026, 11:35 AM glen <[email protected]> wrote: > FWIW, I agree, though I like my phrasing better than yours: "if your > language/formalism is inadequate for its target, then it's useless for > talking about that target." > > The problem with natural languages like English is that you *can* express > anything (or non-thing) in them. [⛧] And I'd argue without nonsense, > paradox, or "non-truth". This is because it's not the *language* that > forces those outcomes but the inferential system to which the language is > bound. Most people in my network are very metaphorical thinkers, which > allows them to slip and slide all over the place when they hear/read an > expression whose bindings are ambiguous or unregistered. More literal > thinkers like me aren't incapable of metaphorical flex-and-slop. But we > tend to resist it, complain when we spot unregistered slippage. > > More cognitively powered people than me, have at their "fingertips" a > suite of possible bindings they can don and doff as the tokens come in, > setting the context. Those in this class who are charitable, either ask you > helpful questions to choose which inferential system to bind to. > Uncharitable ones (e.g. Wittgenstein?) balk and shunt, usually because they > feel like their time would be better spent elsewhere (as Eric & Nick say in > the blurb below). I'm OK with either type. I grew up with all sorts yelling > RTFM at me. 8^D > > But it's important to place the blame where it belongs, at the inferential > system, not the slippery language atop it. So I applaud Jochen's attempt(s) > to whatever extent I can. "ὅτε oi μὲν ἄλλοι κύνες τοὺς ἐχϑροὺς δάκνουσιν, > ἐγὰ δὲ τοὺς φίλους, ἵνα σώσω." > > > [⛧] A friend of mine is fond of asking "Why is there something rather than > nothing?" It's a bit of a litmus test for a crowd's charitability. E.g. > Sean Carroll is very charitable <https://arxiv.org/abs/1802.02231>. I'm > not. To me, it's a nonsense question and demonstrates the extent to which > the asker is confused. But you can *still* express it. And if you're > amongst a crowd of charitable people, especially if they're cognitively > endowed, tokens like "nothing" can be well-defined if you bind to the right > inferential system. I wonder if Wittgenstein ever met Dr. Seuss? >8^D > > On 11/2/26 7:08 AM, Prof David West wrote: > > I seem to have missed some entries in this thread (mockery?? > successor??), but I want to make a very specific comment about Wittgenstein. > > > > Reducing a theory to an aphorism almost always leads to > misunderstanding. Wittgenstein did not mean, IMHO, don't speak; he merely > said it is pointless to try to force fit something into a language that has > been formally defined to exclude expressions of that thing. > > > > Or another way of thinking about it: if you define a language game with > strict, formal, rules, and want to make a play in that game that is > contravenes those rules you either have to cheat or not make the play. > > > > If our language game is English, with the verb 'to be' at its core, > there are all kinds of things—keeping the context of > psychology—"experiences" that are not, keeping with the rules, expressible > in that language without creating nonsense, paradox, or "non-truth." > > > > A simple example" 'Nothing" is at least a concept, that, in English is > necessarily a paradox because simply expressing the word makes it > "Something." > > > > Wittgenstein never said, "shut up." > > > > davew > > > > > > On Sun, Nov 1, 2026, at 7:25 AM, [email protected] wrote: > >> Eric, > >> > >> I am still a bit speechless about this reply. My impression is that > >> behind the mockery there seems to be a feeling of outrage that someone > >> else may try to cut the line in which you and others have been waiting > >> patiently (to become Nick's successor as a psychology professor at an > >> university) by unfair means of cheating and stealing. This was and is > >> not my intention. > >> > >> My idea of solving is the hard problem is probably different than > >> yours. > >> For me the hard problem can be solved by path dependence and the > >> cinemas > >> I mentioned earlier. There remains an irreducible, biological residue. > >> This article which I wrote in the last days with the help of our new AI > >> friends should help to understand it (I like the saddle node > >> bifurcations in section 3.2). We could try to publish it together if it > >> looks interesting to you or you could you reuse some of the ideas and > >> write your own paper. Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group > >> solves hard problem. How does this sound? Maybe it would help you to > >> get > >> that academic position too. > >> > https://github.com/JochenFromm/PhilosophyBook/blob/main/GeometryOfActionReadiness.pdf > >> > >> Best wishes, > >> Jochen > >> > >> On 2026-10-04 16:40, Eric Charles wrote: > >>> As some of you know, I recently finished a draft of The Book (the one > >>> I have been writing for around 15 years now, with a foundation in > >>> Nick's writing, but extended beyond that). I have circulated drafts to > >>> some readers... so if any of you are interested.... > >>> > >>> This appears in the epilogue and speaks directly to the question here: > >>> > >>> > >>> Wittgenstein laid down a gauntlet to 21st century philosophers, > >>> “Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen,” > >>> which is often translated to, “About what one can not speak, one > >>> must remain silent.” This has been broadly taken to indicate that we > >>> should shut the heck up about a wide range of topics regarding the > >>> mind, under the assumption that _all_ such talk is a prime example of > >>> that-about-which-we-cannot-speak. _If_ mind-body dualism is true, > >>> either in its classical form or its modern neural form, then your > >>> “feeling of anger” or “experience of blue” is something that > >>> exists only in your mental space, that only you could access, and my > >>> “feeling of anger” or “experience of blue” is something that > >>> exists only in my mental space, that only I could access. And _if_ > >>> that is how minds work, then we can try to talk about such things all > >>> we want, but ultimately it is _impossible_ for us to talk about them > >>> sensibly. Wittgenstein’s various thought experiments demonstrated > >>> this repeatedly. Understood in this fashion — understood in > >>> combination with a _separate_ commitment to dualism — many people > >>> have understood Wittgenstein to be one more philosopher offering proof > >>> that a science of psychology is impossible. > >>> > >>> However, given [William] James’s influence on Wittgenstein, we do > >>> not see his dictum as pointing to a fatal flaw. Instead, we understand > >>> his dictum as pointing out a dilemma faced by the field of psychology: > >>> Those interested in psychology must _decide_ whether the phenomena > >>> they are discussing are, inherently, an example of > >>> that-of-which-we-_cannot_-speak, or if the phenomena they are > >>> discussing might very well be the types of thing we _can_ speak about > >>> sensibly. > >>> > >>> We assume, if you got this far, that you are the type of person deeply > >>> interested in psychological happenings. If, after all the scrutinizing > >>> you can muster, you believe you are interested in something that > >>> cannot be talked about sensibly, then you should find a way to deal > >>> with the inevitable sadness and disappointment of that situation, and > >>> then you should try to find other things to be interested in. We, > >>> however, prefer the other option. We believe psychological phenomena > >>> are the types of things that _can_ be talked about sensibly, and we > >>> have endeavored to show that such a position can work, in practice. We > >>> believe there is nothing within our attempt to understand > >>> psychological terms that is fundamentally different than Lavoisier’s > >>> attempt to understand the elements. Like Lavoisier, we may be right or > >>> wrong about particular details, but only in the types of ways that can > >>> be readily corrected over time… because the things we are talking > >>> about can be investigated readily, with no magic or vital essence, or > >>> other mystical factors having been included. > >>> > >>> We believe that psychological phenomena are the types of things that > >>> _can_ evolve, that _can_ develop, and that _can_ be studied. They are > >>> aspects of behavioral design. And that design deserves to be > >>> recognized and accounted for, to be both described accurately and > >>> explained well. > >>> > >>> Best, > >>> Eric > >>> > >>> On Sun, Oct 4, 2026 at 4:40 AM <[email protected]> wrote: > >>> > >>>> If this is a polite way to say shut up then please ignore the rest. > >>>> What Wittgenstein wants to say by "whereof one cannot speak, thereof > >>>> one must remain silent" is apparently that things like anxiety, > >>>> pain, nothingness, religion, the meaning of life, subjective > >>>> experience or feelings lie outside the logical world and cannot be > >>>> meaningfully described in words. That is one way to see it. I see it > >>>> differently. The problem is if we remain silent we will never > >>>> understand it. I prefer Karl Popper's optimistic view to the > >>>> depressive pessimism of Wittgenstein. Popper argued that > >>>> substantial, real-world problems exist in philosophy, not just > >>>> linguistic puzzles as Wittgenstein claims. > >>>> > >>>> For me the things we cannot describe meaningful (yet) are the > >>>> interesting ones. We just need to find the right languages, > >>>> theories, perspectives or metaphors. One useful metaphor for pain is > >>>> as you said "an emergency organization of behavior in which the > >>>> agent deploys physical and social defenses of various sorts". If we > >>>> describe pain as a mechanism to protect a person it is personal by > >>>> definition. And yet we all can understand what it is like to feel > >>>> pain in general. If we watch the movie "Marley & Me" for instance we > >>>> can understand what it is like to lose a loved dog because most of > >>>> us have experienced such a loss of a cat or dog or hamster or horse > >>>> ourselves ( by the way we have a new horse now named Mack which > >>>> looks like this https://www.youtube.com/shorts/VDyNyTsMccg ). > >>>> > >>>> This is in my opinion the solution to the hard problem: the film > >>>> maker turns a 1st-person view in a 3rd-person view, the cinema > >>>> conveys the 3rd-person view to the persons in the audience, and they > >>>> are able to understand roughly what-it-is-like-to-be the lead actor > >>>> because they see and hear what it goes through and they know what it > >>>> feels like to experience pain, loss, and suffering. According to > >>>> Wittgenstein cinemas should not be allowed to exist ("one must > >>>> remain silent"). But people like them because they want to know > >>>> what-it-is-like-to-be someone else. Cinemas help to solve the hard > >>>> problem. > >>>> > >>>> -J. > >>>> > >>>> On 2026-10-04 03:35, Nicholas Thompson wrote: > >>>>> You can say that. But you end by reasserting the privacy of pain. > >>>> And > >>>>> … > >>>>> > >>>>> Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen > >>>>> > >>>>> You just cannot have it both ways. > >>>>> > >>>>> N > >>>>> > >>>>> Sent from my Dumb Phone > >>>>> > >>>>> On Oct 3, 2026, at 2:26 PM, [email protected] wrote: > >>>>> > >>>>> Claude was not happy about the theorem proofs that Gemini > >>>> created. > >>>>> And Jon also mentioned that they are not waterproof. So I asked > >>>> Claude > >>>>> and Gemini if they could write a new proof. They could. I asked > >>>> them > >>>>> if we could use gauge theory to explain subjective experience - > >>>> gauge > >>>>> invariance to describe objectivity, and symmetry breaking for > >>>>> subjectivity. Both Claude and Gemini said yes, and Claude was able > >>>> to > >>>>> formulate a proof that both could agree on (combining two AIs > >>>> which > >>>>> have different personalities often gives better results than just > >>>>> using one). Gemini is curious and creative, Claude is accurate and > >>>>> precise. The result was a proof for a theorem of a new "field > >>>> theory > >>>>> of understanding". I understand only half of the mathematics, but > >>>> the > >>>>> physicist who use gauge theory for quantum field theories also > >>>>> understand only half of it. > >>>>> > >>>>> I have uploaded the new proofs here. The theorems are named the > >>>> same, > >>>>> only the proofs are different. If they are more convincing than > >>>> the > >>>>> old ones, then the idea is to replace the proofs in the appendix > >>>> with > >>>>> this version. In my opinion the solution to the hard problem looks > >>>>> similar to this - in combination with the other things written in > >>>> the > >>>>> rest of the book. > >>>>> https://jochenfromm.github.io/PhilosophyBook/QualiaTheorems.pdf > >>>>> > >>>>> Paradoxically the qualia part that is most mysterious for some > >>>>> researchers is not a problem for others at all. Nick for example > >>>> wrote > >>>>> he does not believe in qualia and sees emotions as regulations. In > >>>> a > >>>>> post he argued "To me, pain is an emergency organization of my > >>>>> behavior in which I deploy physical and social defenses of various > >>>>> sorts.... To me, the question, “What is it like to be X?”, has > >>>>> been fully answered when you have said where X-like people can be > >>>>> found and what they will be doing there... for me, feeling is a > >>>> kind > >>>>> of doing, an exploring of the world". I would agree to most of it > >>>> but > >>>>> for me what an animal is doing alone gives us only a hint what it > >>>>> feels. If a horse for example is injured and feels pain, it does > >>>> not > >>>>> scream or cry, and you see no tears. Only if you know the animal > >>>> well > >>>>> you realize that the behavior is slightly different, for example > >>>> by > >>>>> the things it is not doing. I am certain animals feel pain just as > >>>>> intense as we do, but it is hard to recognize from th > >>>>> eir behavior alone. If it would be better visible, would we still > >>>> eat > >>>>> pigs and cows in large amounts (this reminds me of "Why We Love > >>>> Dogs, > >>>>> Eat Pigs, and Wear Cows" from Melanie Joy)? > >>>>> > >>>>> -J. > >>>>> > -- > 8647 ⊥ ɐןןǝdoɹ ǝ uǝןƃ > ὅτε oi μὲν ἄλλοι κύνες τοὺς ἐχϑροὺς δάκνουσιν, ἐγὰ δὲ τοὺς φίλους, ἵνα > σώσω. > > > .- .-.. .-.. / ..-. --- --- - . .-. ... / .- .-. . / .-- .-. --- -. --. / > ... --- -- . / .- .-. . / ..- ... . ..-. ..- .-.. > FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv > Fridays 9a-12p Friday St. Johns Cafe / Thursdays 9a-12p Zoom > https://bit.ly/virtualfriam > to (un)subscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com > FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ > archives: 5/2017 thru present > https://redfish.com/pipermail/friam_redfish.com/ > 1/2003 thru 6/2021 http://friam.383.s1.nabble.com/ >
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