Stephen Straker wrote:
>
> Brad McCormick, Ed.D. wrote:
> > ... I think Habermas's main point is that any project of
> > predictive "social science" can
> > succeed only on condition that the persons whose behavior it is
> > attempted to predict *be kept in ignorance of the experimental setup*. . . .
> > In other words, in principle, causal prediction cannot be
> > successfully applied to persons who are included in the
> > dialogical space of the experimenter ... . . .
> > Habermas's argument is that we can either have
> > empirical/predictive social sciences or we can have a human
> > community ... . . .
> > ... The project of empirical/predictive social
> > science logically depends (as a necessary but not
> > sufficient condition!) on keeping the persons about which the
> > predictions are made *in the dark* ...
>
> I certainly see the point of this critique of "social science" (or, perhaps,
> its pretensions or intentions). But even in the most desirable human
> community, we will still have, indeed, require a set of reasonably reliable
> *expectations* about each other's conduct in various circumstances. Doesn't
> this knowledge about each other and the life of our community constitute a
> "social science" or the elements of such? Wouldn't at least some of it
> resemble empirical (even causal) "laws" about us, granting the reflexivity
> (and thus time & place boundedness) I was pointing to?
This is an [obviously] important issue.
I have yet to see any proof that the project of humanity is capable of
realization in the world in any but a partial and perhaps parasitic way.
As far as *our world* (of exponential capitalism, pollution, population,
etc.)
is concerned, I have already yielded that a benign fascism may be the
last best hope for the 5+*10**9.... I honestly do not see how the
social coordination of 5+*10**9 can be accomplished other than through
some kind of "laws" -- more likely juridical than causal, however
(contrast
with the notion of the classical Greek polis advanced by Arendt,
Castoriadis,
et al.) --> although it is just imaginable that we are approaching the
level of computational power that might enable us to accomplish this
if we really want to.
But let us return to the "here and now" of our immediate social
surround.
Do friends base their coordination of (at least largely) congenial
gregariousness on empirical laws? No. They base it on promises
and other discursively negotiated interaction. I will not
meet you at the train station at 3 PM
due to any psycho/socio/...logical law, but because we *agree* to do
that.
And, if I (or you) fail to show up, we won't attribute it to any
socio/psycho/...logical law, but to duplicity ("You lied to me. Why?"),
disaster ("Oh my God! Has he gotten into an accident or something?"),
etc.
The humanity of the human world (insofar as it *is* human and not
inhuman...) is based primarily on the reasons-for and not the
causes-of things. A fully human world would be as saturated with
reasons as the Newtonian/etc. universe is saturated with causes.
Imagine
a social suround in which every thing you looked at "spoke", with
"rich polysemous overdetermination" of how it was there to nurture
you, should you *wish* to avail yourself of the opportunities it
offers! (But,
of course, some persons will find this idea repugnant, since
it does not provide enough opportunities to help us build character
through unnecessary suffering...)
>
> An example occurs to me. Couldn't I perfectly well *participate* in the
> discovery that I act within a number of social roles -- teacher, father,
> husband, etc. -- and that my conduct with respect to these is reasonably
> predictable? That this is so does not make me a passive unknowing *object* of
> an alienating social science.
I think social roles may be OK so long as they are all on a kind of
"circuit rider"'s itinerary -- i.e., providing that, on a regular and
neither
too frequent or too infrequent basis, we critically revisit each, and
ask whether it is what we wish to be doing, or whether some modification
/
replacement (or just discarding it and going on to something else) might
be better. Also, we need to reflect on what roles are and how much we
want/require to participate in them (or do something else...). If we
find useful the oversimplification that "The sun rises in the East",
then we may also find useful the oversimplification "Mary is John's
wife"....
>
> What is Habermas's (or whoever's) view about this sort of (let's call it)
> "self-constituting" social knowledge?
"Man makes himself on a basis which he has not made." (Karl Marx). All
"constitution" is reconstruction. We live in a house which we cannot
move out of for a different one, but which we maybe can remodel to
become more to our liking than the condition in which we found ourselves
dumped into it (Heidegger's "thrownness", again). One of Habermas's
concerns
is that our reasonable co-constitution of the human world,
on which our existence
ultimately depends, is being forgotten about in a fascination with
"instrumental reaionality". I think Habermas is concerned (with
many others) that
"we" may succeed in making ourselves become what "we" think we are,
and his philosophy is an attempt (along with many others') to try to
call "us" to caring for our being-human, lest we lose it.
I think Habermas believes that substantive democracy is both possible
and
desirable, where "substantive deomocracy" is a lot more than
representative "democracy" of political parties and labor unions,
although he would see these as positive steps along the path of
not instrumental (predictive/manipulative)
or even practical (conformist ethical),
but, further, *emancipatory* reason.
\brad mccormick
--
Mankind is not the master of all the stuff that exists, but
Everyman (woman, child) is a judge of the world.
Brad McCormick, Ed.D. / [EMAIL PROTECTED]
(914)238-0788 / 27 Poillon Rd, Chappaqua, NY 10514-3403 USA
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