Hi Ed, I'm cropping a lot where we agree or only disagree slightly in what follows:
At 11:43 09/10/01 -0400, you wrote: (EW) >If you go to http://members.eisa.com/~ec086636/coping.htm on my website, >you'll see that I do recognize the tremendous impact which indigenous >invention and industrialization had on Europe. Nevertheless, I would >maintain that the contribution of the colonies to European wealth was also >huge, and the reverse impact, that of Europe on colonized people, was often >devastating. Yes, I'm much impressed with your Web page -- a superb piece of work. But as far as I could see you haven't answered my point that the vast proportion of trade (at the time of maximum European colonisation in Africa and Asia) was not with undeveloped 'exploited' countries but was intra-European and between Europe and America. 'Non-exploitative' trade between 'equals', if you like. I've been trying to find figures to back this up, but the best I could find was Claus Moser's "Vital World Statistics" of 1987-88. On the reasonable assumption that the pattern of trade quoted in the book is very similar to that of 100-150 years ago then, of its export volume, the UK exported 13% to America and 50% to the EEC. That comes to 63%. Those are the only figures I have but it would be reasonable to add a further 15-20% of exports to countries of equivalent standard of living in non-EEC Europe and other non-European countries such as Japan. This means that only about 20% -- at the very most -- of UK exports go to poor 'exploited' countries (with, of course, roughly the same value of imports coming from them -- stuff such as cocoa, coffee, and some food). (EW) >The costs to the colonies were enormous. Lines were drawn on >maps dividing peoples. Indian populations in the Americas were decimated >(that is, reduced by a factor of ten). . . . but his was not due to exploitation as such but to the accidental import of European diseases against which the indigenous Americans had no natural immunity. (EW) Large numbers of people were moved >from Africa to the New World as slaves. Forests were cleared and huge >plantations established. Wars were fought over access to trade. The >process continues. Once again, in terms of value to the economic growth of the UK and Europe, I suggest that all this was relatively minor compared with 'non-exploitive' trade. (EW) >It is difficult to imagine where America and Europe >would be today without access to Middle East oil. Yes, this has been a terrific bonanza to the economic growth of America and Europe. There's no doubt about this. However, if the oil hadn't been there at all then Europe and America would still have been prosperous -- after all there's still plenty of coal -- though the relative prices of goods and services within the domestic economy would have been very different. (EW) >Poor countries are not "maturing". They are having to deal with growing >populations, accelerating urbanization (escape from the hardships of trying >to work the land), falling water tables, and sectarian and ethnic conflict. >What you are arguing suggests something like WW Rostow's "Stages of Economic >Growth" of a few decades ago, and not the world as it is. Yes, you're right. I was idealising the situation too much in the case of many poor countries in the world. For many of them, saddled as they are with huge population hang-overs, I cannot see any answer -- for example, Nepal, where I went on holiday three years ago. As far as products are concerned, the Nepalese have got nothing to offer by way of trade. Even if, by some miracle, they had sufficient resources and know-how to develop manufacturing industries, then the transportation costs from such an interior country would prevent profitable trade. The only advantage they have is tourism -- which is gradually developing. Meanwhile, the tourist attractions they have -- such as the fantastic medieval-type timbered buildings -- are falling down in disrepair because the Nepalese still haven't acquired the commercial culture to appreciate this. (By coincidence -- see my other FW posting of today regarding Phil Watts' speech [The Day The World Came To Its Senses?] -- Nepal is a good example of the limitations of the hydrogen economy. Even though it's the second poorest country in the world, they've had solar power for years. Large numbers of even the poorest houses have solar panels on their roofs. But apart from giving the farmers some hot water it's not otherwise of much use. This modern technology hasn't given them any sort of economic lift-off.) (KH) >>Free trade by itself won't solve these problems (though it helps at the >> margins) -- only time will -- but preventing free trade only makes the >> situation far worse. (EW) >I agree. Having both agreed on this, the question to ask is: What is the best way to help? I don't think there's anything that can be done in the short term, no matter how much debt-forgiveness is granted, or how much government aid is given. It's a matter of building up the sort of social capital and innovative culture which we, in the West, were fortunate in having enough of at around the turn of the 18th century -- itself a sort of byproduct of a very special era before it, the Enlightenment. This intangible type of thing can't be built up quickly. Two modern authors, David Landes (in "The Wealth and Poverty of Nations") and Francis Fukuyama (in "The Great Disruption" and "Trust") are closest to putting their fingers on it. In many of the poorest countries it is the men who are the reactionaries and, in practical terms, I think the approach of those charities which are concentrating on women's education is the best one. Even so, it's a long difficult job. When I was in Khatmandu three years ago, a crowd of us holidaymakers were having dinner in a garden restaurant when a man came in trying to sell a magazine. He approached one or two tables but was turned away. The restaurant owner then came out and chased him away. I was sufficiently intrigued by the dignified bearing of this man to follow him outside and he told me of his own private charity -- to start a hospital for women, particularly for poor women who frequently died in child-birth. There was no such hospital, even in the capital city of Nepal. I bought his little, home-produced magazine, and then he invited my wife and me to his house, where we went the next evening. Even though he (a bank clerk) was a very liberal, intelligent man, his wife and daughter were obviously not allowed out of the kitchen while we were there but darted in and out bringing us delicacies. It took me more than an hour to persuade the man to let his wife and daughter come and join us. I even went so far as to say that I didn't want to talk any more about his hospital plans until I heard the views of his wife and daughter. He finally relented. They were petrified for a while, even though they were probably well-educated for Nepalese. The daughter was even taking a diploma in business studies and could speak English quite well. But here was a sensitive, well-meaning man, trying to do his best for the women in his city, yet even he found it difficult to grant equality to his own womenfolk at home. He probably realised, intellectually, that it would have to happen one day but, emotionally, he couldn't still couldn't adjust to it. It impressed me just how deep and enduring one's religious and social culture is. It is this sort of intractability which Landes and Fukuyama are writing about. Keith ___________________________________________________________________ Keith Hudson, General Editor, Calus <http://www.calus.org> 6 Upper Camden Place, Bath BA1 5HX, England Tel: +44 1225 312622; Fax: +44 1225 447727; mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] ________________________________________________________________________
