> (EW) > >If you go to http://members.eisa.com/~ec086636/coping.htm on my website, > >you'll see that I do recognize the tremendous impact which indigenous > >invention and industrialization had on Europe. Nevertheless, I would > >maintain that the contribution of the colonies to European wealth was also > >huge, and the reverse impact, that of Europe on colonized people, was often > >devastating. > >(KH) > as far as I could see you haven't answered my point that the vast > proportion of trade (at the time of maximum European colonisation in Africa > and Asia) was not with undeveloped 'exploited' countries but was > intra-European and between Europe and America. 'Non-exploitative' trade > between 'equals', if you like. > > I've been trying to find figures to back this up, but the best I could find > was Claus Moser's "Vital World Statistics" of 1987-88. On the reasonable > assumption that the pattern of trade quoted in the book is very similar to > that of 100-150 years ago then, of its export volume, the UK exported 13% > to America and 50% to the EEC. That comes to 63%. Those are the only > figures I have but it would be reasonable to add a further 15-20% of > exports to countries of equivalent standard of living in non-EEC Europe and > other non-European countries such as Japan. This means that only about 20% > -- at the very most -- of UK exports go to poor 'exploited' countries > (with, of course, roughly the same value of imports coming from them -- > stuff such as cocoa, coffee, and some food).
Keith, I can't accept that it is reasonable to assume that figures quoted for 1987-88 are "very similar" to those of 100 to 150 years ago. There has been far too much change in the global economy over that period. Colonial empires and the gold standard have disappeared, technology has changed enormously, new tastes and preferences have emerged, political revolutions have occurred, the bloodiest wars in history have been fought, and new alliances have been formed. All such things would have affected patterns of trade. Yet I would grant that patterns of trade, as officially recorded, may not have changed that greatly. Most trade, as registered on the books a hundred years ago, would likely have occurred between equals. I suggest, however, that much would depend on how trade was recorded. For example, would something traded that originates in a colony, say the Belgian Congo, be recorded on Belgium's books or those of the Congo? Perhaps on both within the internal Belgian record keeping system, but perhaps only on those of Belgium in international statistics. But on the whole you are probably right, most trade would probably have taken place between countries that had the capacity to produce the trade goods in demand at the time. I would suggest, however, that we are talking about two different things. In international affairs, trade is only a very small part of the overall impact that countries have on each other. It is one of the final outcomes of a number of preceding events. The relations between European powers and their colonies were defined earlier than 150 years ago, back in the 16th,17th and 18th centuries. As I argued in my previous posting, both the impacts on Europe and on the colonies were enormous at the time, and were major factors in bringing about the transformations that continue to define the modern world. Try to picture where the modern world would be if the vast resources of the colonies (gold, metals of various kinds, forests, fish, spices, "corn", slaves, and of course "empty" lands for the settlement of surplus European populations) had not been available. Try to picture where Asia, Africa and the Americas would be if they had not been colonized. It's nonsensical, of course, to try to do that, but I hope you can see what I'm getting at. > (EW) > >The costs to the colonies were enormous. Lines were drawn on > >maps dividing peoples. Indian populations in the Americas were decimated > >(that is, reduced by a factor of ten). > >(KH) . . . but his was not due to exploitation as such but to the accidental > import of European diseases against which the indigenous Americans had no > natural immunity. Disease played an enomous role in the Americas, but was not a major factor in Asia and Africa. > (EW) > Large numbers of people were moved > >from Africa to the New World as slaves. Forests were cleared and huge > >plantations established. Wars were fought over access to trade. The > >process continues. > > (KH) Once again, in terms of value to the economic growth of the UK and Europe, > I suggest that all this was relatively minor compared with 'non-exploitive' > trade. I would again suggest that we are talking about two different things and two different periods. > (EW) > >It is difficult to imagine where America and Europe > >would be today without access to Middle East oil. > > (KH) Yes, this has been a terrific bonanza to the economic growth of America and > Europe. There's no doubt about this. However, if the oil hadn't been there > at all then Europe and America would still have been prosperous -- after > all there's still plenty of coal -- though the relative prices of goods and > services within the domestic economy would have been very different. I doubt very much that Europe and America would be anywhere near as prosperous as they now are without access to Middle East oil. > (EW) > >Poor countries are not "maturing". They are having to deal with growing > >populations, accelerating urbanization (escape from the hardships of trying > >to work the land), falling water tables, and sectarian and ethnic conflict. > >What you are arguing suggests something like WW Rostow's "Stages of Economic > >Growth" of a few decades ago, and not the world as it is. > >(KH) Yes, you're right. I was idealising the situation too much in the case of > many poor countries in the world. For many of them, saddled as they are > with huge population hang-overs, I cannot see any answer -- for example, > Nepal, where I went on holiday three years ago. As far as products are > concerned, the Nepalese have got nothing to offer by way of trade. Even if, > by some miracle, they had sufficient resources and know-how to develop > manufacturing industries, then the transportation costs from such an > interior country would prevent profitable trade. The only advantage they > have is tourism -- which is gradually developing. Meanwhile, the tourist > attractions they have -- such as the fantastic medieval-type timbered > buildings -- are falling down in disrepair because the Nepalese still > haven't acquired the commercial culture to appreciate this. Ever so much depends on culture and traditions. The indigenous development of tourism resources would, IMHO, seem to depend greatly on the extent to which a national population identifies with a particular site. In Ireland, some twenty years ago, I became totally ecstatic over an old ruin and asked a passer-by what it was. His response: "I dunno, it's before my time!" Spanish Town, the old capital of Jamaica, is crumbling away because the people who live in the area see it as someone else's history. The Taliban blew up the Bhuddas because it saw them as offensive to Islam. Etc. etc. etc. > (KH) (By coincidence -- see my other FW posting of today regarding Phil Watts' > speech [The Day The World Came To Its Senses?] -- Nepal is a good example > of the limitations of the hydrogen economy. Even though it's the second > poorest country in the world, they've had solar power for years. Large > numbers of even the poorest houses have solar panels on their roofs. But > apart from giving the farmers some hot water it's not otherwise of much > use. This modern technology hasn't given them any sort of economic lift-off.) > > (KH) > >>Free trade by itself won't solve these problems (though it helps at the > >> margins) -- only time will -- but preventing free trade only makes the > >> situation far worse. > (EW) > >I agree. > > (KH) Having both agreed on this, the question to ask is: What is the best way to > help? I don't think there's anything that can be done in the short term, no > matter how much debt-forgiveness is granted, or how much government aid is > given. It's a matter of building up the sort of social capital and > innovative culture which we, in the West, were fortunate in having enough > of at around the turn of the 18th century -- itself a sort of byproduct of > a very special era before it, the Enlightenment. This intangible type of > thing can't be built up quickly. Two modern authors, David Landes (in "The > Wealth and Poverty of Nations") and Francis Fukuyama (in "The Great > Disruption" and "Trust") are closest to putting their fingers on it. In > many of the poorest countries it is the men who are the reactionaries and, > in practical terms, I think the approach of those charities which are > concentrating on women's education is the best one. Even so, it's a long > difficult job. Good points. I've just been thumbing through Landes, trying to find support for my rather strange views. The only thing I've read by Fukuyama is "The End of History". I didn't think much of it, so I gave it away. Perhaps I should give him another try. But I think Sept 11th demonstrated that history has not ended, and that we are into another round of it. >(KH) When I was in Khatmandu three years ago, a crowd of us holidaymakers were > having dinner in a garden restaurant when a man came in trying to sell a > magazine. He approached one or two tables but was turned away. The > restaurant owner then came out and chased him away. I was sufficiently > intrigued by the dignified bearing of this man to follow him outside and he > told me of his own private charity -- to start a hospital for women, > particularly for poor women who frequently died in child-birth. There was > no such hospital, even in the capital city of Nepal. > > (KH) I bought his little, home-produced magazine, and then he invited my wife > and me to his house, where we went the next evening. Even though he (a > bank clerk) was a very liberal, intelligent man, his wife and daughter were > obviously not allowed out of the kitchen while we were there but darted in > and out bringing us delicacies. It took me more than an hour to persuade > the man to let his wife and daughter come and join us. I even went so far > as to say that I didn't want to talk any more about his hospital plans > until I heard the views of his wife and daughter. He finally relented. They > were petrified for a while, even though they were probably well-educated > for Nepalese. The daughter was even taking a diploma in business studies > and could speak English quite well. But here was a sensitive, well-meaning > man, trying to do his best for the women in his city, yet even he found it > difficult to grant equality to his own womenfolk at home. He probably > realised, intellectually, that it would have to happen one day but, > emotionally, he couldn't still couldn't adjust to it. It impressed me just > how deep and enduring one's religious and social culture is. It is this > sort of intractability which Landes and Fukuyama are writing about. Good for you, Keith! If I had been in that situation, I don't know if I would have had the nerve to do what you did. I would have wanted to, but I'm not sure I could have done it. Best regards, Ed
