Keeping the plain for clients option was part of getting some of the larger players like Google, and DT to implement it.
For known attacks plain is fine. As a datapoint I had one of the Azure people tall me last night that they get push back by developers on doing the base64url encoding. Nothing surprises me about developers. There are some extensions to other specs that may use PKCE where S256 would be required, so having it as MTI on the server is a good thing. John B. > On Jun 9, 2015, at 6:11 AM, Barry Leiba <[email protected]> wrote: > >> In the majority of situations (the ones currently exploited) on iOS the >> attacker only has access to the response coming back from the >> AS and not the request with the code_challenge. This is to do with >> the way custom scheme redirects work in the OS. > > Ack; thanks for that explanation. > >> The feedback was that there are some developers that would rather >> ignore the risk than do S256. > > I find that curious, as it's very little code involved. > > I'm still not certain that we should publish a standard protocol that > allows this weakness, rather than requiring that it be robust. > > But I'll let my Sec AD colleagues weigh in, and will go with their > opinions on it. > > Barry _______________________________________________ Gen-art mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/gen-art
