Two comments: 1. The discontinuation argument is generally based on there having been a relatively large, initial start-up injection to rapidly bring global average temperature down a good bit--so a 'wait and react approach.' In addition to potential impacts from sudden discontinuation after being implemented, starting up with a sudden cooling is likely to have major unintended consequences and impacts, even if, and this is not at all clear, such a sudden start-up could reverse the emergency situation (like methane release, ice sheet loss, etc.) that prompted the taking of action.
2. It seems to me that a much more plausible, if still quite unlikely, intervention might well be one that starts up slowly intending to offset one year's forcing increment and then the next as well, etc.--so an 'act to prevent approach.' There would thus be a number of years of a relatively small influence to determine if the approach were leading to overwhelmingly serious unintended consequences, and at that point, the discontinuation would not lead to a very large and significant rebound. While I agree it might be hard to convince the public to continue the intervention when the climate does not seem to be changing (this being because of the intervention), the discontinuation issue does not seem to me to be a central aspect of the consideration. What matters more, in my view, is whether this type of intervention would weaken the rate and resolve for mitigation efforts, for the rationale for this type of approach to implementation is to keep impacts from being too severe (including not triggering emergency situations) while the transition to carbon-free energy is being made. Mike On 8/18/11 1:10 PM, "Dan Whaley" <[email protected]> wrote: > On the discontinuation argument: > > "we contend that intergenerational justice requires the present > generation to ensure that future generations have access to food, > water, shelter, and > education. If SAG is implemented and then discontinued, future > generations¹ access to > these benefits could be compromised. Thus, any generation that > implements SAG accepts > the risk that it might later be discontinued, but the subjects of this > risk are the future > generations who would suffer the harmful effects if SAG should be > discontinued > abruptly" > > Clearly the whole argument (including the appropriateness of the > dialysis analogy) revolves around the notion that discontinuation > might be substantially more harmful than not ever having done > anything. > > This single assumption seems highly uncertain (I do see the three > references that are provided, Alley, 2002; Lempert et al., 1994; > Nordhaus, 1994 but am unqualified myself to appraise whether they're > the appropriate ones or make the sufficient case). Others here are > much more qualified to weigh in. What is the extent to which this > notion has been explored by the community? > > Dan > > > > > On Aug 18, 12:38 am, Toby Svoboda <[email protected]> wrote: >> Thank you all for the interesting and helpful feedback. >> >> Michael mentions a case (a methane tipping point) in which deployment of SAG >> might satisfy requirements of justice. Perhaps in certain scenarios, SAG >> would be (or would be part of) a just climate policy, or at least a policy >> that is less unjust than other policies available in those scenarios. Our >> paper is rather preliminary in the sense that it raises some ethical worries >> about SAG but does not take a position on whether it ought to be deployed. >> Perhaps, even with certain ethical imperfections, in some likely scenarios >> SAG would be the best option from a justice perspective. I don't know >> whether this would be the case. It seems that further work would be needed >> to get clear on that. >> >> As for unilateralism, our paper does not argue that there is a high >> probability of unilateral deployment but rather that such deployment would >> be unjust. As you know, there are a number of papers in the literature that >> discuss unilateral deployment. Josh's paper (which appeared after ours was >> in press) and Dan's comments raise some interesting points. Perhaps worries >> over unilateralism are overblown. That would be a welcome result from a >> procedural justice perspective, although non-unilateral deployment wouldn't >> necessarily be procedurally just (e.g., if some other countries, through no >> fault of their own, were still excluded from having a say in whether and how >> SAG gets deployed). >> >> Both Michael and Josh suggest that actual policies often violate the >> theories of procedural justice we consider in the paper. This may well be >> true, but that does not mean that those theories are false. What we actually >> do and what we ought to do are distinct--we can fail to live up to standards >> we should meet. Moreover, it seems that a policy could be more or less >> procedurally unjust, with the latter being ethically preferable to the >> former. For example, one could treat the Rawlsian principle as an >> ideal--even if it is rarely complied with perfectly, some decision >> procedures will come closer than others. >> >> Dan mentions a number of concerns, but I wouldn't characterize our paper as >> containing "objections" to SAG, because we don't advocate that it ought not >> to be deployed. In the sections on distributive and intergenerational >> justice, we point to risks of harm associated with SAG. We think these risks >> are ethically significant and should be taken into account. All things >> considered, it might turn out that these are risks that should be tolerated, >> but that remains to be shown in my view. >> >> Dan writes, "But on the whole, the suggested program of incremental >> research, followed possibly by limited testing, seem a sensible approach >> when we compare the risks of implementation against a world which is clearly >> warming in a dangerous way?" We don't deny this in the paper, as we focus on >> deployment rather than research. Dan also writes, "The idea that the >> question of intergenerational justice might be one where we're >> *disadvantaging* future generations seems likewise odd. After all, the whole >> reason this is being proposed is in large part because of concerns about the >> well being of future generations." But even if our intentions are good >> (e.g., the well-being of future persons), we can still cause substantial >> harm to persons. Again, perhaps we ought to deploy SAG, e.g. because the >> harm to future generations would be less if we do than if we do not. But if >> so, it is my view that an argument for that would need to be made in detail. >> >> Many Thanks, >> Toby -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "geoengineering" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/geoengineering?hl=en.
