Regarding the quote: " It could be used to tweak the climate to the advantage of a country or region or disadvantage a rival, and in doing so, force the nations of the world to reconsider the very concepts of borders and sovereignty."
My understanding is this is exceedingly unlikely from a physical basis. Stratospheric aerosol injection would be global in nature (with the notable exception of high latitude injection - but even then it's not exactly tweaking for a particular country), and our current understanding of teleconnections and marine cloud brightening don't particularly paint a picture of fine regional-scale control. Might be wrong there though, if someone from the atmospheric or climate sciences wants to comment? Regardless, the main thrust of the article is quite interesting. A Baruch-esque plan for (solar) geoengineering could be pretty good, although I imagine some in this space might point to the real risk of (over-)securitizing climate intervention. On Thursday, 18 March 2021 at 7:16:32 pm UTC+10 Andrew Lockley wrote: > > https://www.cfr.org/blog/internationalism-protects-why-we-need-reboot-baruch-plan-geoengineering > > An Internationalism that Protects: Why We Need to Reboot the Baruch Plan > for Geoengineering > The sun reflects off the water in this picture taken by German astronaut > Alexander Gerst from the International Space Station and sent on his > Twitter feed on July 17, 2014. > The sun reflects off the water in this picture taken by German astronaut > Alexander Gerst from the International Space Station and sent on his > Twitter feed on July 17, 2014. REUTERS/Alexander Gerst/NASA/Handout via > Reuters > New planet-changing geoengineering technology is available to help > humanity combat an existential security threat. However, like atomic > fission, this technology is not to be jumped at without caution. > > Blog Post by Guest Blogger for the Internationalist > > March 17, 2021 > 8:00 am (EST) > > > The following is a guest post by Elizabeth Chalecki, an Associate > Professor of International Relations at the University of Nebraska Omaha, a > Research Fellow in the Environmental Change & Security Program at the > Woodrow Wilson Center, and a Research Chair with Fulbright Canada. > > This year is the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Baruch Plan. Almost no > one knows this, or if they do, they probably don’t remember who Bernard > Baruch was, or what his eponymous plan was for. But the Baruch Plan of 1946 > was our first and last real attempt at world governance of nuclear weapons. > Three-quarters of a century later, the ill-fated effort carries important > lessons for addressing the crisis of climate change. > > The scientists who worked on the Manhattan Project were excited about the > post-war industrial prospects of atomic technology, which they saw as > manifold. But they also had serious misgivings about its continued > development as a weapon, misgivings which they repeatedly brought to the > U.S. government’s attention. So they proposed a new governance regime with > the ambitious goal of ending all wars. On June 4, 1946, the financier and > statesman Bernard Baruch, serving as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations > Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC), proposed this scheme to the world. > > The Internationalist > Stewart M. Patrick assesses the future of world order, state sovereignty, > and multilateral cooperation. 1-2 times weekly. > Email Address > View all newsletters > > The Baruch Plan, derived from the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, laid out > three characteristics of atomic weapons that made governing this technology > unlike any previous arms control challenge. First, the technology was more > powerful than any other weapon in existence. It only took one bomb to wipe > out a city and two to force the end of a six-year world war. Second, there > were no defenses or countermeasures against atomic weapons. Anti-aircraft > systems of the time were unlikely to bring down a solo plane, and the > destructive radius of an atomic bomb meant that civilians would have no > time to flee an attack. Third, there was no longer any secrecy surrounding > the bomb, at least among major powers. American, British, Canadian, and > French scientists had worked on various facets of atomic technology during > the war, and by 1945, Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union all had their > own experiments underway. > > The Baruch Plan proposed that all atomic weapons be placed under the > control of the United Nations, which would oversee all peacetime research > into the field the physicists called nucleonics. In addition, participating > countries would be subject to UN inspections to make sure they were not > violating the plan by making their own atomic weapons secretly. In > presenting this international governance arrangement to the UNAEC, Baruch > said, “The peoples…are not afraid of an internationalism that protects; > they are unwilling to be fobbed off by mouthings about narrow sovereignty, > which is today’s phrase for yesterday’s isolation.” Unfortunately, Baruch’s > warning went unheeded. The United States and the Soviet Union could not > agree on vital matters of inspections and control, and the plan was not > adopted. Narrow sovereignty carried the day. > > Why is an unsuccessful arms control agreement relevant seventy-five years > later? Because once again we need to learn this same lesson: new > planet-changing technology is available to help humanity combat an > existential security threat—that of anthropogenic climate change. New > technologies are becoming available that will permit commons-based > geoengineering (CBG), or the deliberate manipulation of Earth’s climate in > the global commons, including through stratospheric aerosol injection, > ocean iron fertilization, and marine-based cloud brightening. However, like > atomic fission, this technology is not to be jumped at without caution. It > could be used to tweak the climate to the advantage of a country or region > or disadvantage a rival, and in doing so, force the nations of the world to > reconsider the very concepts of borders and sovereignty. > > The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists’ Doomsday Clock currently stands at > one hundred seconds before midnight, due to a combination of the lingering > nuclear threat and our ongoing recalcitrance to take any meaningful action > to slow climate change. As the effects of global warming become more > pronounced, geoengineering technologies will start to look more attractive > as a policy option for states that cannot or will not commit to reducing > greenhouse gas emissions, or which find themselves victims of the > unwillingness of others to do so. Some countries may try to use > geoengineering to gain temporary relief from climate-related security > threats, or to gain a longer-term strategic advantage over others. > Intriguingly, CBG shares the same three characteristics that made atomic > weapons such a unique threat in 1946, and the prospect of their > international governance so compelling. First, it is a powerful technology, > capable of shifting regional or possibly global weather patterns. Second, > short of sabotaging equipment, there are no countermeasures and no defense > against CBG. Third, there is no possibility of keeping this technology > secret, since scientists from all over the world have collaborated on > different methods of climate engineering. > > More on: > > Climate Change > > United Nations > > Global Governance > > Nuclear Weapons > > While the original Baruch Plan dealt specifically with atomic weapons, > several features of that proposed regime should carry over to any > authoritative international geoengineering agency. First, the agency should > have the power to inspect and license all technology, conduct or oversee > deployments, and lead research and development efforts cooperatively with > states, universities, and private companies. This would ensure that the > agency serves as a clearinghouse for major experiments, provides for > orderly experimentation at critical locations, and disallows rogue > geoengineers. Second, the agency should have the sole right to conduct or > license research in the field of CBG. The designs, equipment, and patents > used in scientific experiments could remain private property, but the > results and ongoing data monitoring must be publicly available at all times > so as to provide international transparency and maintain public confidence > that use of CBG is the result of sanctioned experiments only. Third, the > agency should use its scientific expertise to reassess which experiments > are working and which are not. It is critically important to the entire CBG > endeavor that the relevant technologies be used for greater good than harm; > only the international agency should make this determination. This ensures > that the interests of narrow sovereignty will not cause nations to override > the general good in favor of whatever temporary advantage CBG might give > them. > > Just as nuclear fission can produce both weapons and energy, so too can > geoengineering provide benefits if applied judiciously. But as the climate > crisis becomes more acute and its effects more powerful, the window for > judicious thinking will begin to close. Confronted with the reality of a > warming planet, the temptation for states to use climate engineering as > just another sovereign tool of national security will be overwhelming. As > technology historian Jill Lepore points out, the links between the military > and earth scientists predate geoengineering, and even public-spirited > science yields to the demands of the national security state. In order to > avoid a climate change arms race and sidestep the sovereignty trap, we need > a new governance structure for planet-altering climate manipulation > technologies. We need a new Baruch Plan > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "geoengineering" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. 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