The argument for a modern day Baruch agreement is hugely important, but for reasons beyond those covered in this post.
Once there is a genuine acceptance of what a safe temperature rise should be, which we previously estimated to be less than 0.5degC above the preindustrial baseline in our submission to the UN Talanoa Dialogue, or below the temperatures of 1980, as determined by the first observations of interacting and self reinforcing feedback mechanisms, then large scale SRM becomes an inescapable conclusion that would be needed on a global scale and with careful global management. It is inconceivable that this could be done without a modern equivalent of the Baruch Agreement, and indeed we referenced this in our submission. What was remarkable about the Baruch Agreement was how close it came to being accepted by the USA and Russia, and had it been accepted then post WWII history would have turned out very much differently. A critical consideration for a modern day Baruch agreement that is focused on climate intervention strategies which this article does not cover, is ensuring CO2 emissions are rapidly brought down to near zero in parallel with the deployment of a global SRM programme. Without this, the cooling effects of an SRM programme will be negated by ongoing CO2 emissions. The reduction in global CO2 emissions needed must be near total, as a deep cut, perhaps in the order of 50%, will not be sufficient to stop SRM cooling effects being negated, as it is the cumulative emissions that are the critical determinant of climate forcing, so all that will happen with a 50% cut is that it will take a little longer for the SRM coling effects to be negated. To get to the objective of zero global CO2 emissions, and staying there year after year, requires much more than developing a zero carbon electricity supply. Critically, it requires linking security agreements with the SRM implementation, with the objective of dismantling the super high carbon military industrial complexes that are expanding in self reinforcing vortexes of suicidal violence, and which are totally dependent on fossil fuel and taxes that can only come from expanding economies. So had the original Baruch agreement succeeded, we would not be facing the tragedy of today where we have rapid climate change threatening to undermine individual nations and then global civilisation, yet nations the fundamental response to this by nations is to developing weapons systems, such as Trident and the Russian and Chinese equivalents, with operational life times that will outlast the societies that they are intended to protect. The stakes are even higher today than they were in 1946/7, in that there was then a reasonable probability of an existential outcome from nuclear war, but now an existential outcome from climate change can be considered a virtual certainty unless there is drastic and immediate action to stabilize the climate. In the face of this crisis, and despite the evidence of its accelerating rate of development, the most likely response by nations to climate change is paradoxically to not cooperature to address it, but instead to pursue strategies that enhance competitive advantage in preparation for a final free-for-all which accelerates climate change further. Ironically, in the face of the existential climate change threat, there is more incentive by the strongest nations to renege on agreements to avoid damaging their competitive advantage at the expense of mutual cooperation. This is a predictable outcome from the emergence of Nash equilibrium stable states in game theory where competing parties become stuck on the most suboptimal joint outcome. All the empirical evidence points towards this being the dominant dynamic today, and once this dynamic has taken hold, then it is virtually impossible to break, unless by the action of an outside policing force. Even more critically, it has been proven that with interconnecting games if one game is in a Nash equilibrium then all other connected games (or negotiations) will be in a Nash equilibrium, (see https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/BF00418815). This disturbing conclusion applies to the global dynamics of today where there are essentially three games underway around the world, these are (1) nuclear and military domination, (2) economic domination, (3) Climate change. The outcomes and decisions of each affect the other games. So it is quite simply impossible under the current political structure to expect global cooperation in any one of these areas such as achieving climate change agreement, without achieving total success in all three at once and that is impossible. The only way of breaking this is to have some sort of Baruch agreement that starts by focusing on stablising one game, and the only viable option is using SRM to stabilise the climate, with the express statement of implementing a supranational control for all the others and the longer this is left, the less chance it has of succeeding. Unfortunately, modelling suggests that even this has a very low chance of success. So never has the Baruch agreement been more important, and with ongoing debate elsewhere about climate intervention governance, it is good to see this call being made. Kevin On Fri, Mar 19, 2021 at 12:16 AM Adrian Hindes <[email protected]> wrote: > Regarding the quote: " It could be used to tweak the climate to the > advantage of a country or region or disadvantage a rival, and in doing so, > force the nations of the world to reconsider the very concepts of borders > and sovereignty." > > My understanding is this is exceedingly unlikely from a physical basis. > Stratospheric aerosol injection would be global in nature (with the notable > exception of high latitude injection - but even then it's not exactly > tweaking for a particular country), and our current understanding of > teleconnections and marine cloud brightening don't particularly paint a > picture of fine regional-scale control. > > Might be wrong there though, if someone from the atmospheric or climate > sciences wants to comment? > > Regardless, the main thrust of the article is quite interesting. A > Baruch-esque plan for (solar) geoengineering could be pretty good, although > I imagine some in this space might point to the real risk of > (over-)securitizing climate intervention. > > On Thursday, 18 March 2021 at 7:16:32 pm UTC+10 Andrew Lockley wrote: > >> >> https://www.cfr.org/blog/internationalism-protects-why-we-need-reboot-baruch-plan-geoengineering >> >> An Internationalism that Protects: Why We Need to Reboot the Baruch Plan >> for Geoengineering >> The sun reflects off the water in this picture taken by German astronaut >> Alexander Gerst from the International Space Station and sent on his >> Twitter feed on July 17, 2014. >> The sun reflects off the water in this picture taken by German astronaut >> Alexander Gerst from the International Space Station and sent on his >> Twitter feed on July 17, 2014. REUTERS/Alexander Gerst/NASA/Handout via >> Reuters >> New planet-changing geoengineering technology is available to help >> humanity combat an existential security threat. However, like atomic >> fission, this technology is not to be jumped at without caution. >> >> Blog Post by Guest Blogger for the Internationalist >> >> March 17, 2021 >> 8:00 am (EST) >> >> >> The following is a guest post by Elizabeth Chalecki, an Associate >> Professor of International Relations at the University of Nebraska Omaha, a >> Research Fellow in the Environmental Change & Security Program at the >> Woodrow Wilson Center, and a Research Chair with Fulbright Canada. >> >> This year is the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Baruch Plan. Almost no >> one knows this, or if they do, they probably don’t remember who Bernard >> Baruch was, or what his eponymous plan was for. But the Baruch Plan of 1946 >> was our first and last real attempt at world governance of nuclear weapons. >> Three-quarters of a century later, the ill-fated effort carries important >> lessons for addressing the crisis of climate change. >> >> The scientists who worked on the Manhattan Project were excited about the >> post-war industrial prospects of atomic technology, which they saw as >> manifold. But they also had serious misgivings about its continued >> development as a weapon, misgivings which they repeatedly brought to the >> U.S. government’s attention. So they proposed a new governance regime with >> the ambitious goal of ending all wars. On June 4, 1946, the financier and >> statesman Bernard Baruch, serving as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations >> Atomic Energy Commission (UNAEC), proposed this scheme to the world. >> >> The Internationalist >> Stewart M. Patrick assesses the future of world order, state sovereignty, >> and multilateral cooperation. 1-2 times weekly. >> Email Address >> View all newsletters > >> The Baruch Plan, derived from the Acheson-Lilienthal Report, laid out >> three characteristics of atomic weapons that made governing this technology >> unlike any previous arms control challenge. First, the technology was more >> powerful than any other weapon in existence. It only took one bomb to wipe >> out a city and two to force the end of a six-year world war. Second, there >> were no defenses or countermeasures against atomic weapons. Anti-aircraft >> systems of the time were unlikely to bring down a solo plane, and the >> destructive radius of an atomic bomb meant that civilians would have no >> time to flee an attack. Third, there was no longer any secrecy surrounding >> the bomb, at least among major powers. American, British, Canadian, and >> French scientists had worked on various facets of atomic technology during >> the war, and by 1945, Germany, Japan, and the Soviet Union all had their >> own experiments underway. >> >> The Baruch Plan proposed that all atomic weapons be placed under the >> control of the United Nations, which would oversee all peacetime research >> into the field the physicists called nucleonics. In addition, participating >> countries would be subject to UN inspections to make sure they were not >> violating the plan by making their own atomic weapons secretly. In >> presenting this international governance arrangement to the UNAEC, Baruch >> said, “The peoples…are not afraid of an internationalism that protects; >> they are unwilling to be fobbed off by mouthings about narrow sovereignty, >> which is today’s phrase for yesterday’s isolation.” Unfortunately, Baruch’s >> warning went unheeded. The United States and the Soviet Union could not >> agree on vital matters of inspections and control, and the plan was not >> adopted. Narrow sovereignty carried the day. >> >> Why is an unsuccessful arms control agreement relevant seventy-five years >> later? Because once again we need to learn this same lesson: new >> planet-changing technology is available to help humanity combat an >> existential security threat—that of anthropogenic climate change. New >> technologies are becoming available that will permit commons-based >> geoengineering (CBG), or the deliberate manipulation of Earth’s climate in >> the global commons, including through stratospheric aerosol injection, >> ocean iron fertilization, and marine-based cloud brightening. However, like >> atomic fission, this technology is not to be jumped at without caution. It >> could be used to tweak the climate to the advantage of a country or region >> or disadvantage a rival, and in doing so, force the nations of the world to >> reconsider the very concepts of borders and sovereignty. >> >> The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists’ Doomsday Clock currently stands at >> one hundred seconds before midnight, due to a combination of the lingering >> nuclear threat and our ongoing recalcitrance to take any meaningful action >> to slow climate change. As the effects of global warming become more >> pronounced, geoengineering technologies will start to look more attractive >> as a policy option for states that cannot or will not commit to reducing >> greenhouse gas emissions, or which find themselves victims of the >> unwillingness of others to do so. Some countries may try to use >> geoengineering to gain temporary relief from climate-related security >> threats, or to gain a longer-term strategic advantage over others. >> Intriguingly, CBG shares the same three characteristics that made atomic >> weapons such a unique threat in 1946, and the prospect of their >> international governance so compelling. First, it is a powerful technology, >> capable of shifting regional or possibly global weather patterns. Second, >> short of sabotaging equipment, there are no countermeasures and no defense >> against CBG. Third, there is no possibility of keeping this technology >> secret, since scientists from all over the world have collaborated on >> different methods of climate engineering. >> >> More on: >> >> Climate Change >> >> United Nations >> >> Global Governance >> >> Nuclear Weapons >> >> While the original Baruch Plan dealt specifically with atomic weapons, >> several features of that proposed regime should carry over to any >> authoritative international geoengineering agency. First, the agency should >> have the power to inspect and license all technology, conduct or oversee >> deployments, and lead research and development efforts cooperatively with >> states, universities, and private companies. This would ensure that the >> agency serves as a clearinghouse for major experiments, provides for >> orderly experimentation at critical locations, and disallows rogue >> geoengineers. Second, the agency should have the sole right to conduct or >> license research in the field of CBG. The designs, equipment, and patents >> used in scientific experiments could remain private property, but the >> results and ongoing data monitoring must be publicly available at all times >> so as to provide international transparency and maintain public confidence >> that use of CBG is the result of sanctioned experiments only. Third, the >> agency should use its scientific expertise to reassess which experiments >> are working and which are not. It is critically important to the entire CBG >> endeavor that the relevant technologies be used for greater good than harm; >> only the international agency should make this determination. This ensures >> that the interests of narrow sovereignty will not cause nations to override >> the general good in favor of whatever temporary advantage CBG might give >> them. >> >> Just as nuclear fission can produce both weapons and energy, so too can >> geoengineering provide benefits if applied judiciously. But as the climate >> crisis becomes more acute and its effects more powerful, the window for >> judicious thinking will begin to close. Confronted with the reality of a >> warming planet, the temptation for states to use climate engineering as >> just another sovereign tool of national security will be overwhelming. As >> technology historian Jill Lepore points out, the links between the military >> and earth scientists predate geoengineering, and even public-spirited >> science yields to the demands of the national security state. In order to >> avoid a climate change arms race and sidestep the sovereignty trap, we need >> a new governance structure for planet-altering climate manipulation >> technologies. We need a new Baruch Plan >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "geoengineering" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/geoengineering/02bc1716-7064-449a-a0dd-8e1c77189a89n%40googlegroups.com > <https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/geoengineering/02bc1716-7064-449a-a0dd-8e1c77189a89n%40googlegroups.com?utm_medium=email&utm_source=footer> > . > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "geoengineering" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/geoengineering/CAE%3DUiezj-wjLX3riaAMNWBf%3Dob_4C9bxVJ9QN8VLawjYxyw4aA%40mail.gmail.com.
