I've been following this online discussion about the events documented at the Houma Incident Command Center, and its with profound trepidation that I enter the fray to express some thoughts about what I experienced there firsthand while working as a GIS specialist under the leadership of Drew and Devon.
I say trepidation because I have incomplete information. I wasn't privy to most of the discussions that Drew and Devon had with BP IT officials over strategic vision for how GIS should serve the oil spill response, and over data stewardship. I also don't want to step on what Drew and Devon are trying to constructively accomplish. I did, however, observe actions and behavior by BP officials which sent up my conspiracy radar to such an extent that, when Drew and Devon were fired, I declined invitations to return to Houma. I have lived in New Orleans for eighteen years, and I've been a GIS developer for nearly fifteen of those years. I care about the impact of this disaster on the Gulf Coast, and I know something about data and GIS. I've also led a successful post-Katrina open government initiative in New Orleans. I believe that this discussion about the Houma ICP and BP would benefit from some thoughtful consideration of what I believe are core issues. 1) The National Incident Management System (NIMS<http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nims/AboutNIMS.shtm>) is supposed to govern how agencies work together to effectively manage disasters -- including corporations. When the disaster is massive, and created by reckless corporate actions that trigger perhaps unprecedented liability, what should be the role of that corporation in the disaster response? We can accept that the oil exploration industry has the technology and expertise required to kill the leak, but how can we trust that BP is truly acting in the public and environmental interest, and is taking into consideration priorities that may not agree with their corporate self interest, or that may be innovative and workable solutions? Why don't we fire BP from the response, and get another exploration company to manage response decisions? NIMS is supposed to eviscerate agency and corporate boundaries, subjugating all to a single unified incident command structure. How is it, then, that BP was able to fire the two GIS managers, who were credited with ramping up operations from nothing, to supporting tactical decisions in incident command with over 150 datasets, as well as getting hammered by dozens of agencies and field operations for support? Who should be making firing decisions? BP, or incident command? Why was there no accounting for the impact of the incapacitation of the GIS shop in an inherently geospatial disaster response? I say again -- an *inherently* geospatial operation. We were literally being constantly disrupted in our work by people needing access to location information 24 hours a day. Was BP's corporate power allowed to corrupt the NIMS formal process with a unilateral decision, causing a deleterious disruption of the command response? And if so, why hasn't there been a response from the federal government to restore integrity to operations? 2) Astonishingly, BP and its contractor for overseeing spill response, The Response Group (TRG), had no GIS capacity whatsoever of which I am aware. TRG had to quickly ramp up from a couple dozen employees to hundreds in a matter of days and weeks. As a result, TRG had to call upon GIS "fire jumpers" to respond to the crisis. Drew and Devon excelled in a truly commendable fashion within that crisis environment, but questions are merited about whether TRG or BP should have had such a prominent role to play in creating a GIS operation when they realized no need for GIS prior to the disaster. There are certainly independent GIS professionals in government and the private sector who don't depend upon BP for their profit who could have been tapped to respond to the crisis. It should be said that Drew and Devon, as well as myself, were forced to function as subcontractors for TRG. There was no alternative that I know of to provide services to support the Incident Command Center. 3) With respect to data stewardship -- really -- should BP be allowed to place data collected by federal agencies on private servers behind its corporate firewall? It may be that BP means no ill intent. On the other hand, what evidence do we have that BP hasn't been operating in its self interest all along? BP's seizure of data behind its corporate firewall -- where access *can* (though may not be) restricted, and where priorities can be vetted for how information and analysis should be developed and disseminated -- is consistent with troubling self-interested actions and statements by BP officials from the beginning of this disaster. 4) Open data? I strongly object to the assertion that a justification need be found for how data will be used by the public prior to the government releasing it. Even before the government builds a website to present data in a graphic fashion, agencies should provide an easy way to find and download source data. Not doing so is the contemporary equivalent of colonial licensing of printing presses. It limits the dissemination of information, analysis, and yes, criticism. The public spends an enormous amount of taxpayer money sustaining federal bureaucracies and logistics that collect data in expensive planes and satellites and ships. It's our frikking data. We paid for it. Damn it -- give it to us! And don't ask us what we intend to do with it. But for those who might be looking for suggestions, let me just suggest two. First, the BP-controlled geospatial operation has, by my own observations, failed to collect and disseminate the vast quantity of data that's required to adequately respond to this vast disaster. That might be by design, or it might be through lack of capacity. Second, liability. If it's difficult to access and aggregate data that can prove the extent of the disaster, BP can diminish its liability. That may not be a federal priority (or maybe I'm wrong about that), but it is absolutely an issue that the nation needs to recognize. It's certainly something that coastal communities recognize. Respectfully, Brian Denzer *NolaStat | A new operating system for New Orleans <http://NolaStat.org>* 2010/6/15 Iván Sánchez Ortega <[email protected]> > El día Wednesday 16 June 2010 02:58:41, Edward Vielmetti dijo: > > There are news media crawling the coast and documenting what's happening > > all over the place, but I don't know (and this is my ignorance) if anyone > > is systematically scooping that crude information and refining it until > it > > turns into data. > > Rely on the media to get consistent data? Ha! > > Just look at Haiti. Media outlets were actually hindering all kinds of > efforts > over there. Their only goal is to bring the goriest image to your living > room > at prime time. Their goal is not to "document" an event. > > You should rely on the emergency response teams, but in an oil spill, they > are > likely to be funded (read: bought) by the oil lobbies. > > > As Tim Berners-Lee recently said, "it has to start at the bottom, it has to > start at the middle, and it has to start at the top". > > It has to start at the bottom. People cleaning up the gunk must have some > sort > of motivation to collect data. Give them some cool app for tracking effort, > or for semi-automatic health risk assesment, or something useful. As SteveC > says: "Easy, fun, takes 5 minutes". > > It has to start at the middle. This is the GIS people at the coast guard > and > wildlife dept and whatnot. Throw them any data and they'll use them. > > It has to start at the top. This is politicians and oil companies. And, > man, > this is where the problem resides. Better data won't get a politician a > longer term, and won't make the oil companies' stock to raise. > > > I'm sorry to put my pessiimistic hat on, but I don't think there'll be any > good spillage-related dataset anytime good. Without support from "the top", > there'll be no comunication between agencies and no cool apps. > > > Just my 2¢. > > > Best, > -- > Iván Sánchez Ortega <[email protected]> > > Un ordenador no es una televisión ni un microondas: es una herramienta > compleja. > > _______________________________________________ > Geowanking mailing list > [email protected] > http://geowanking.org/mailman/listinfo/geowanking_geowanking.org >
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