++ Cheers, Tom Longson (nym) ------------------------------ http://tomlongson.com
On Tue, Jun 15, 2010 at 8:58 PM, Brian Denzer <[email protected]> wrote: > I've been following this online discussion about the events documented at > the Houma Incident Command Center, and its with profound trepidation that I > enter the fray to express some thoughts about what I experienced there > firsthand while working as a GIS specialist under the leadership of Drew and > Devon. > > I say trepidation because I have incomplete information. I wasn't privy to > most of the discussions that Drew and Devon had with BP IT officials over > strategic vision for how GIS should serve the oil spill response, and over > data stewardship. I also don't want to step on what Drew and Devon are > trying to constructively accomplish. I did, however, observe actions and > behavior by BP officials which sent up my conspiracy radar to such an extent > that, when Drew and Devon were fired, I declined invitations to return to > Houma. > > I have lived in New Orleans for eighteen years, and I've been a GIS > developer for nearly fifteen of those years. I care about the impact of this > disaster on the Gulf Coast, and I know something about data and GIS. I've > also led a successful post-Katrina open government initiative in New > Orleans. > > I believe that this discussion about the Houma ICP and BP would benefit > from some thoughtful consideration of what I believe are core issues. > > 1) The National Incident Management System > (NIMS<http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nims/AboutNIMS.shtm>) > is supposed to govern how agencies work together to effectively manage > disasters -- including corporations. When the disaster is massive, and > created by reckless corporate actions that trigger perhaps unprecedented > liability, what should be the role of that corporation in the disaster > response? We can accept that the oil exploration industry has the technology > and expertise required to kill the leak, but how can we trust that BP is > truly acting in the public and environmental interest, and is taking into > consideration priorities that may not agree with their corporate self > interest, or that may be innovative and workable solutions? Why don't we > fire BP from the response, and get another exploration company to manage > response decisions? NIMS is supposed to eviscerate agency and corporate > boundaries, subjugating all to a single unified incident command structure. > How is it, then, that BP was able to fire the two GIS managers, who were > credited with ramping up operations from nothing, to supporting tactical > decisions in incident command with over 150 datasets, as well as getting > hammered by dozens of agencies and field operations for support? Who should > be making firing decisions? BP, or incident command? Why was there no > accounting for the impact of the incapacitation of the GIS shop in an > inherently geospatial disaster response? I say again -- an *inherently* > geospatial operation. We were literally being constantly disrupted in our > work by people needing access to location information 24 hours a day. Was > BP's corporate power allowed to corrupt the NIMS formal process with a > unilateral decision, causing a deleterious disruption of the command > response? And if so, why hasn't there been a response from the federal > government to restore integrity to operations? > > 2) Astonishingly, BP and its contractor for overseeing spill response, The > Response Group (TRG), had no GIS capacity whatsoever of which I am aware. > TRG had to quickly ramp up from a couple dozen employees to hundreds in a > matter of days and weeks. As a result, TRG had to call upon GIS "fire > jumpers" to respond to the crisis. Drew and Devon excelled in a truly > commendable fashion within that crisis environment, but questions are > merited about whether TRG or BP should have had such a prominent role to > play in creating a GIS operation when they realized no need for GIS prior to > the disaster. There are certainly independent GIS professionals in > government and the private sector who don't depend upon BP for their profit > who could have been tapped to respond to the crisis. It should be said that > Drew and Devon, as well as myself, were forced to function as subcontractors > for TRG. There was no alternative that I know of to provide services to > support the Incident Command Center. > > 3) With respect to data stewardship -- really -- should BP be allowed to > place data collected by federal agencies on private servers behind its > corporate firewall? It may be that BP means no ill intent. On the other > hand, what evidence do we have that BP hasn't been operating in its self > interest all along? BP's seizure of data behind its corporate firewall -- > where access *can* (though may not be) restricted, and where priorities can > be vetted for how information and analysis should be developed and > disseminated -- is consistent with troubling self-interested actions and > statements by BP officials from the beginning of this disaster. > > 4) Open data? I strongly object to the assertion that a justification need > be found for how data will be used by the public prior to the government > releasing it. Even before the government builds a website to present data in > a graphic fashion, agencies should provide an easy way to find and download > source data. Not doing so is the contemporary equivalent of colonial > licensing of printing presses. It limits the dissemination of information, > analysis, and yes, criticism. The public spends an enormous amount of > taxpayer money sustaining federal bureaucracies and logistics that collect > data in expensive planes and satellites and ships. It's our frikking data. > We paid for it. Damn it -- give it to us! And don't ask us what we intend to > do with it. But for those who might be looking for suggestions, let me just > suggest two. First, the BP-controlled geospatial operation has, by my own > observations, failed to collect and disseminate the vast quantity of data > that's required to adequately respond to this vast disaster. That might be > by design, or it might be through lack of capacity. Second, liability. If > it's difficult to access and aggregate data that can prove the extent of the > disaster, BP can diminish its liability. That may not be a federal priority > (or maybe I'm wrong about that), but it is absolutely an issue that the > nation needs to recognize. It's certainly something that coastal communities > recognize. > > Respectfully, > Brian Denzer > > *NolaStat | A new operating system for New Orleans <http://NolaStat.org>* > > > 2010/6/15 Iván Sánchez Ortega <[email protected]> > > El día Wednesday 16 June 2010 02:58:41, Edward Vielmetti dijo: >> > There are news media crawling the coast and documenting what's happening >> > all over the place, but I don't know (and this is my ignorance) if >> anyone >> > is systematically scooping that crude information and refining it until >> it >> > turns into data. >> >> Rely on the media to get consistent data? Ha! >> >> Just look at Haiti. Media outlets were actually hindering all kinds of >> efforts >> over there. Their only goal is to bring the goriest image to your living >> room >> at prime time. Their goal is not to "document" an event. >> >> You should rely on the emergency response teams, but in an oil spill, they >> are >> likely to be funded (read: bought) by the oil lobbies. >> >> >> As Tim Berners-Lee recently said, "it has to start at the bottom, it has >> to >> start at the middle, and it has to start at the top". >> >> It has to start at the bottom. People cleaning up the gunk must have some >> sort >> of motivation to collect data. Give them some cool app for tracking >> effort, >> or for semi-automatic health risk assesment, or something useful. As >> SteveC >> says: "Easy, fun, takes 5 minutes". >> >> It has to start at the middle. This is the GIS people at the coast guard >> and >> wildlife dept and whatnot. Throw them any data and they'll use them. >> >> It has to start at the top. This is politicians and oil companies. And, >> man, >> this is where the problem resides. Better data won't get a politician a >> longer term, and won't make the oil companies' stock to raise. >> >> >> I'm sorry to put my pessiimistic hat on, but I don't think there'll be any >> good spillage-related dataset anytime good. Without support from "the >> top", >> there'll be no comunication between agencies and no cool apps. >> >> >> Just my 2¢. >> >> >> Best, >> -- >> Iván Sánchez Ortega <[email protected]> >> >> Un ordenador no es una televisión ni un microondas: es una herramienta >> compleja. >> >> _______________________________________________ >> Geowanking mailing list >> [email protected] >> http://geowanking.org/mailman/listinfo/geowanking_geowanking.org >> > > > _______________________________________________ > Geowanking mailing list > [email protected] > http://geowanking.org/mailman/listinfo/geowanking_geowanking.org > >
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