Thanks for merging #2264 and #2266 John. Arrg. As I've started to poke more into this read-only and lock topic, I've found some surprises and ultimately a correctness matter.
What SESSION_READ_ONLY actually means ------------------------------------------------------------ 1. At the engine level, SESSION_READ_ONLY doesn't actually enforce read-only. The mode only affects lock handling -- it does not mark the book read-only. Book write-protection is applied separately by the GUI only, which calls qof_book_mark_readonly() after opening. I confirmed with an API bindings test that a SESSION_READ_ONLY session can still edit an account and have the change persisted to the SQL store. So an API/bindings consumer that opens SESSION_READ_ONLY expecting the book to be unwritable does not get that guarantee unless it also calls qof_book_mark_readonly() itself. [a bug if one interprets SESSION_READ_ONLY reading the enum name while not carefully parsing the header comments ] 2. SESSION_READ_ONLY ignores the lock. A read-only consumer opens a book even while another process holds it open, perhaps mid-write, which is exactly when the state can be inconsistent; and because the SQL backend commits incrementally, a reader can catch a partially-applied edit. [ a read-only client correctness bug ] So today the mode neither protects read consistency (it ignores the lock) nor guarantees read-only-ness (that's a GUI add-on), even though the name implies both. Proposed path forward ----------------------------------- For building read-only tools on the API, what I'd want is a read-only session mode that (a) takes the lock, so a writer cannot be active while the tool reads, and (b) actually enforces no writes. A possible direction would be to replace SESSION_READ_ONLY with two modes whose names state what they do, and have both mark the book read-only so enforcement is intrinsic rather than GUI-only: - SESSION_READ_ONLY_EXCLUSIVE -- takes the lock (fails if the book is already locked); for tools that need a consistent, uninterrupted read. Calls qof_book_mark_readonly(). Obviously a SQL backend user would need sufficient permissions to take the lock. I'd want to add some user guide documentation about this where none exists today. - SESSION_READ_ONLY_IGNORE_LOCK -- opens regardless of the lock state; the path the GUI's "open read-only anyway" override would use. (i.e. today's SESSION_READ_ONLY behavior, but with qof_book_mark_readonly() ) These could be added now, with SESSION_READ_ONLY marked deprecated, and SESSION_READ_ONLY removed in a later release (v6? whatever that timeframe turns out to be). I believe the deprecation warning would only apply to users of the API `SESSION_READ_ONLY` mode today. (The GUI internal use would be swapped to SESSION_READ_ONLY_IGNORE_LOCK.)" Does folding read-only enforcement into the mode (so bindings consumers get it too), plus splitting the lock behavior, sound like an OK path? Aside, is it a known issue Doxygen isn't updating / is stale? (title says "GnuCash 5.6-150-g038405b370+" ) https://code.gnucash.org/docs/STABLE/qofsession_8h.html I was initially looking for the enum descriptions but didn't find them outside of the code. Double btw: There is a documentation bug in the source here in that the five /** … */ comments need to be trailing /**< … */ comments (Doxygen trailing-member syntax). Right now, when the comments are rendered, they are offset by one. Regards, Noah On Sat, Jul 11, 2026 at 8:47 AM Noah <> wrote: > > > Thanks, John. > > > Your premise that the database was necessarily written by a GnuCash session > > is false. > > You're right, I was biasing by my own use principles. > I never want to modify my production book through anything but the GnuCash > GUI or the official GnuCash API / bindings. > > My household moved our finances to GnuCash 14 years ago motivated by two > challenges. > - need to support two users on different computers (in serial, not > simultaneously). We were bit too many times with filesystem-based commercial > options at the time. > - a Q* commercial software was dropping support for Mac, or non-cloud, or both > > In more recent years, our financial institutions have been making it harder > to get our transaction data into GnuCash (eg. removing OFX/QFX download) > In order to hold the line at home, I've been doing more and more work > adopting use of the API & Python bindings to help a lot in this regard. > I've also been creating some reporting and exploration tools that don't need > write access (and tinkering with other's work like piecash). Since they don’t > need write access, I want them to access MySQL with the minimum privileges > necessary. > > > > The ffastmath problem underlying bug 611936 was on the write side of libdii > > so a read-only test wouldn’t find the problem. > > That settles it for me: since the -ffast-math defect in #611936 is on the > write side of libdbi, a read-only session can neither trigger nor detect it, > so running the probe on a read-only open guards nothing. I've opened a PR > that skips dbi_library_test() for SESSION_READ_ONLY and leaves all > write-capable modes untouched: > https://github.com/Gnucash/gnucash/pull/2266 > > I'm not trying to bolt access control onto GnuCash, and I agree that wouldn't > end well. The narrower goal is just to let a read-only consumer honor a > least-privilege credential a DBA may already have in place -- and, > independently, to stop running a write-only probe on a read-only open. The PR > stands on that second part alone. > > Thanks again, > Noah > > > > On Thu, Jul 9, 2026 at 8:31 PM John Ralls > <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > > >> On Jul 9, 2026, at 14:34, [email protected] wrote: > >> Hello again, > >> Obviously backend stuff is on my mind lately and there's been a > >> quirk impacting read-only access to SQL back-ed books that has > >> bothered me for a while. > >> Opening a book with SESSION_READ_ONLY through the SQL/DBI backend > >> still requires the database user to have permission to create a > >> temporary table. On every session_begin (regardless of mode), > >> dbi_library_test() runs the 64-bit round-trip guard from Bug #611936 > >> -- CREATE TEMPORARY TABLE / INSERT / SELECT / DROP -- to detect a > >> 15-year-old -ffast-math libdbi miscompilation. A least-privileged, > >> SELECT-only database user therefore cannot open the book at all: the > >> create fails and begin returns ERR_SQL_DBI_UNTESTABLE. > >> (SESSION_READ_ONLY already skips the gnclock lock, so this probe is > >> the only remaining reason a read-only open needs write-ish rights.) > >> I'd like to propose making a read-only open work without those > >> privileges. Two possible directions: > >> 1. Skip dbi_library_test() when the session is opened SESSION_READ_ONLY. > >> 2. Or, for read-only, replace it with a check that needs no write > >> privileges -- for example, verify the driver retrieves large > >> int64/uint64 and a high-precision FLOAT8 via a SELECT of > >> literals/casts (dbi_result_get_longlong / get_ulonglong / get_double), > >> so the reader's conversion path is still validated. I'd welcome > >> suggestions on the best minimal form. > >> The justification for either approach: the data already in the > >> database was written by a GnuCash session, and dbi_library_test() ran > >> for that session, so any book that was successfully saved was > >> necessarily saved by a driver that passed the round-trip test -- the > >> stored 64-bit and FLOAT8 values are therefore correct at rest. A > >> read-only session never writes back, so the only thing left to guard > >> against is a reader-side retrieval defect. For a modern 64-bit libdbi > >> that is the 2011, 32-bit / -ffast-math case from #611936, which is > >> essentially historical (or maybe never existed on the read) > >> If there is a preferred direction, I'm happy to prepare a PR. > > > > Your premise that the database was necessarily written by a GnuCash session > > is false. Anybody with db write access (and for a SQLite3 database that > > means anyone with write access to the filesystem) can write (or delete) > > whatever they want into the database. There is at least one public Python > > library that reads and writes GnuCash SQLite3 files > > (https://github.com/sdementen/piecash). The databases have no integrity > > checks enabled: Any integrity checking (and it’s pretty minimal) is in > > GnuCash’s engine. > > > > The ffastmath problem underlying bug 611936 was on the write side of libdii > > so a read-only test wouldn’t find the problem. I think it unlikely that > > anyone is using that version of gcc anymore so it’s probably safe to remove > > the test. > > > > That said, I have my doubts about the value of having users without > > database write access. Access control hasn’t ever been a consideration in > > GnuCash’s design and trying to bolt it on 30 years later isn’t likely to > > produce a satisfactory result. > > > > Regards, > > John Ralls _______________________________________________ gnucash-devel mailing list [email protected] https://lists.gnucash.org/mailman/listinfo/gnucash-devel
