Noah,

Please always copy one of the mailing lists when you email one of the GnuCash 
developers unless it’s to send something like a GnuCash book; in that case the 
email should just have the file, all of the discussion around it should be 
copied to the list.

I’ve passed on to Derek via IRC the Doxygen-docs problem just in case he misses 
it here.

Yup, readonly-mode is largely cosmetic and applied only to the GUI. GnuCash is 
not designed for use by more than one user at a time and read-only mode is very 
simplistic. 

I don’t think it would be too hard to extend its force to the backend so that a 
read-only session is blocked from writing. But if you want a read-only session 
to lock the database then it’s not really read-only anymore.

How about leveraging the database’s locking? Wrap all of the queries with 
dbi_conn_transaction_begin and dbi_conn_transaction_commit. That will make 
multi-table writes atomic with an exclusive lock, blocking a reader from 
reading them until the whole write is complete, while a read query while 
loading will block the exclusive write lock until the read is complete.

Regards,
John Ralls




> On Jul 11, 2026, at 12:24 PM, [email protected] wrote:
> 
> Thanks for merging #2264 and #2266 John.
> 
> Arrg.  As I've started to poke more into this read-only and lock
> topic, I've found some surprises and ultimately a correctness matter.
> 
> What SESSION_READ_ONLY actually means
> ------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> 1. At the engine level, SESSION_READ_ONLY doesn't actually enforce
> read-only. The mode only affects lock handling -- it does not mark the
> book read-only. Book write-protection is applied separately by the GUI
> only, which calls qof_book_mark_readonly() after opening. I confirmed
> with an API bindings test that a SESSION_READ_ONLY session can still
> edit an account and have the change persisted to the SQL store. So an
> API/bindings consumer that opens SESSION_READ_ONLY expecting the book
> to be unwritable does not get that guarantee unless it also calls
> qof_book_mark_readonly() itself. [a bug if one interprets
> SESSION_READ_ONLY reading the enum name while not carefully parsing
> the header comments ]
> 
> 2.  SESSION_READ_ONLY ignores the lock. A read-only consumer opens a
> book even while another process holds it open, perhaps mid-write,
> which is exactly when the state can be inconsistent; and because the
> SQL backend commits incrementally, a reader can catch a
> partially-applied edit. [ a read-only client correctness bug ]
> 
> So today the mode neither protects read consistency (it ignores the
> lock) nor guarantees read-only-ness (that's a GUI add-on), even though
> the name implies both.
> 
> Proposed path forward
> -----------------------------------
> 
> For building read-only tools on the API, what I'd want is a read-only
> session mode that (a) takes the lock, so a writer cannot be active
> while the tool reads, and (b) actually enforces no writes.
> 
> A possible direction would be to replace SESSION_READ_ONLY with two
> modes whose names state what they do, and have both mark the book
> read-only so enforcement is intrinsic rather than GUI-only:
> - SESSION_READ_ONLY_EXCLUSIVE -- takes the lock (fails if the book is
> already locked); for tools that need a consistent, uninterrupted read.
> Calls qof_book_mark_readonly(). Obviously a SQL backend user would
> need sufficient permissions to take the lock.  I'd want to add some
> user guide documentation about this where none exists today.
> - SESSION_READ_ONLY_IGNORE_LOCK -- opens regardless of the lock state;
> the path the GUI's "open read-only anyway" override would use. (i.e.
> today's SESSION_READ_ONLY behavior, but with qof_book_mark_readonly()
> )
> 
> These could be added now, with SESSION_READ_ONLY marked deprecated,
> and SESSION_READ_ONLY removed in a later release (v6? whatever that
> timeframe turns out to be).  I believe the deprecation warning would
> only apply to users of the API `SESSION_READ_ONLY` mode today. (The
> GUI internal use would be swapped to SESSION_READ_ONLY_IGNORE_LOCK.)"
> 
> Does folding read-only enforcement into the mode (so bindings
> consumers get it too), plus splitting the lock behavior, sound like an
> OK path?
> 
> Aside,  is it a known issue Doxygen isn't updating / is stale? (title
> says "GnuCash  5.6-150-g038405b370+" )
> https://code.gnucash.org/docs/STABLE/qofsession_8h.html
> I was initially looking for the enum descriptions but didn't find them
> outside of the code.  Double btw:  There is a documentation bug in the
> source here in that the five /** … */ comments need to be trailing
> /**< … */ comments (Doxygen trailing-member syntax).  Right now, when
> the comments are rendered, they are offset by one.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Noah
> 
> 
> On Sat, Jul 11, 2026 at 8:47 AM Noah <> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> Thanks, John.
>> 
>>> Your premise that the database was necessarily written by a GnuCash session 
>>> is false.
>> 
>> You're right, I was biasing by my own use principles.
>> I never want to modify my production book through anything but the GnuCash 
>> GUI or the official GnuCash API / bindings.
>> 
>> My household moved our finances to GnuCash 14 years ago motivated by two 
>> challenges.
>> - need to support two users on different computers (in serial, not 
>> simultaneously). We were bit too many times with filesystem-based commercial 
>> options at the time.
>> - a Q* commercial software was dropping support for Mac, or non-cloud, or 
>> both
>> 
>> In more recent years, our financial institutions have been making it harder 
>> to get our transaction data into GnuCash (eg. removing OFX/QFX download)
>> In order to hold the line at home, I've been doing more and more work 
>> adopting use of the  API & Python bindings to help a lot in this regard.  
>> I've also been creating some reporting and exploration tools that don't need 
>> write access (and tinkering with other's work like piecash). Since they 
>> don’t need write access, I want them to access MySQL with the minimum 
>> privileges necessary.
>> 
>> 
>>> The ffastmath problem underlying bug 611936 was on the write side of libdii 
>>> so a read-only test wouldn’t find the problem.
>> 
>> That settles it for me: since the -ffast-math defect in #611936 is on the 
>> write side of libdbi, a read-only session can neither trigger nor detect it, 
>> so running the probe on a read-only open guards nothing. I've opened a PR 
>> that skips dbi_library_test() for SESSION_READ_ONLY and leaves all 
>> write-capable modes untouched:
>> https://github.com/Gnucash/gnucash/pull/2266
>> 
>> I'm not trying to bolt access control onto GnuCash, and I agree that 
>> wouldn't end well. The narrower goal is just to let a read-only consumer 
>> honor a least-privilege credential a DBA may already have in place -- and, 
>> independently, to stop running a write-only probe on a read-only open. The 
>> PR stands on that second part alone.
>> 
>> Thanks again,
>> Noah
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Thu, Jul 9, 2026 at 8:31 PM John Ralls 
>> <[email protected]> wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>>> On Jul 9, 2026, at 14:34, [email protected] wrote:
>>>> Hello again,
>>>> Obviously backend stuff is on my mind lately and there's been a
>>>> quirk impacting read-only access to SQL back-ed books that has
>>>> bothered me for a while.
>>>> Opening a book with SESSION_READ_ONLY through the SQL/DBI backend
>>>> still requires the database user to have permission to create a
>>>> temporary table. On every session_begin (regardless of mode),
>>>> dbi_library_test() runs the 64-bit round-trip guard from Bug #611936
>>>> -- CREATE TEMPORARY TABLE / INSERT / SELECT / DROP -- to detect a
>>>> 15-year-old -ffast-math libdbi miscompilation. A least-privileged,
>>>> SELECT-only database user therefore cannot open the book at all: the
>>>> create fails and begin returns ERR_SQL_DBI_UNTESTABLE.
>>>> (SESSION_READ_ONLY already skips the gnclock lock, so this probe is
>>>> the only remaining reason a read-only open needs write-ish rights.)
>>>> I'd like to propose making a read-only open work without those
>>>> privileges. Two possible directions:
>>>> 1. Skip dbi_library_test() when the session is opened SESSION_READ_ONLY.
>>>> 2. Or, for read-only, replace it with a check that needs no write
>>>> privileges -- for example, verify the driver retrieves large
>>>> int64/uint64 and a high-precision FLOAT8 via a SELECT of
>>>> literals/casts (dbi_result_get_longlong / get_ulonglong / get_double),
>>>> so the reader's conversion path is still validated. I'd welcome
>>>> suggestions on the best minimal form.
>>>> The justification for either approach: the data already in the
>>>> database was written by a GnuCash session, and dbi_library_test() ran
>>>> for that session, so any book that was successfully saved was
>>>> necessarily saved by a driver that passed the round-trip test -- the
>>>> stored 64-bit and FLOAT8 values are therefore correct at rest. A
>>>> read-only session never writes back, so the only thing left to guard
>>>> against is a reader-side retrieval defect. For a modern 64-bit libdbi
>>>> that is the 2011, 32-bit / -ffast-math case from #611936, which is
>>>> essentially historical (or maybe never existed on the read)
>>>> If there is a preferred direction, I'm happy to prepare a PR.
>>> 
>>> Your premise that the database was necessarily written by a GnuCash session 
>>> is false. Anybody with db write access (and for a SQLite3 database that 
>>> means anyone with write access to the filesystem) can write (or delete) 
>>> whatever they want into the database. There is at least one public Python 
>>> library that reads and writes GnuCash SQLite3 files 
>>> (https://github.com/sdementen/piecash). The databases have no integrity 
>>> checks enabled: Any integrity checking (and it’s pretty minimal) is in 
>>> GnuCash’s engine.
>>> 
>>> The ffastmath problem underlying bug 611936 was on the write side of libdii 
>>> so a read-only test wouldn’t find the problem. I think it unlikely that 
>>> anyone is using that version of gcc anymore so it’s probably safe to remove 
>>> the test.
>>> 
>>> That said, I have my doubts about the value of having users without 
>>> database write access. Access control hasn’t ever been a consideration in 
>>> GnuCash’s design and trying to bolt it on 30 years later isn’t likely to 
>>> produce a satisfactory result.
>>> 
>>> Regards,
>>> John Ralls

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