Derek, That doesn’t square with the last build being two years ago, we removed auto tools in 2017. https://github.com/Gnucash/gnucash/pull/1943, which was merged immediately after the last successful docs build is the culprit. What version of Doxygen are you running? https://github.com/Gnucash/gnucash/pull/1943/changes/891b921c811f32e214fe9fc1a87e392b58ed7757 bumped the Doxyfile version from 1.8.3 to 1.9.7.
Regards, John Ralls > On Jul 11, 2026, at 18:08, Derek Atkins <[email protected]> wrote: > > Yes, doxygen not building is a known issue. The build requirements changed > and I've never spent the time to figure out how to update the script to meet > the new requirements. Specifically I used to be able to build the > doxygen.cfg manually by calling the Makefile.am with the right rule. But > that was removed for CMake, and I think to get that to work I might need to > install a complete build system, which I kinda don't want to do. Worst case > I'll have to make VM just for that.. But it just hasn't been high on my > priority list. > -derek > Sent using my mobile device. Please excuse any typos. > > On July 11, 2026 16:18:15 John Ralls <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Noah, >> >> Please always copy one of the mailing lists when you email one of the >> GnuCash developers unless it’s to send something like a GnuCash book; in >> that case the email should just have the file, all of the discussion around >> it should be copied to the list. >> >> I’ve passed on to Derek via IRC the Doxygen-docs problem just in case he >> misses it here. >> >> Yup, readonly-mode is largely cosmetic and applied only to the GUI. GnuCash >> is not designed for use by more than one user at a time and read-only mode >> is very simplistic. >> >> I don’t think it would be too hard to extend its force to the backend so >> that a read-only session is blocked from writing. But if you want a >> read-only session to lock the database then it’s not really read-only >> anymore. >> >> How about leveraging the database’s locking? Wrap all of the queries with >> dbi_conn_transaction_begin and dbi_conn_transaction_commit. That will make >> multi-table writes atomic with an exclusive lock, blocking a reader from >> reading them until the whole write is complete, while a read query while >> loading will block the exclusive write lock until the read is complete. >> >> Regards, >> John Ralls >> >> >> >> >>> On Jul 11, 2026, at 12:24 PM, [email protected] wrote: >>> >>> Thanks for merging #2264 and #2266 John. >>> >>> Arrg. As I've started to poke more into this read-only and lock >>> topic, I've found some surprises and ultimately a correctness matter. >>> >>> What SESSION_READ_ONLY actually means >>> ------------------------------------------------------------ >>> >>> 1. At the engine level, SESSION_READ_ONLY doesn't actually enforce >>> read-only. The mode only affects lock handling -- it does not mark the >>> book read-only. Book write-protection is applied separately by the GUI >>> only, which calls qof_book_mark_readonly() after opening. I confirmed >>> with an API bindings test that a SESSION_READ_ONLY session can still >>> edit an account and have the change persisted to the SQL store. So an >>> API/bindings consumer that opens SESSION_READ_ONLY expecting the book >>> to be unwritable does not get that guarantee unless it also calls >>> qof_book_mark_readonly() itself. [a bug if one interprets >>> SESSION_READ_ONLY reading the enum name while not carefully parsing >>> the header comments ] >>> >>> 2. SESSION_READ_ONLY ignores the lock. A read-only consumer opens a >>> book even while another process holds it open, perhaps mid-write, >>> which is exactly when the state can be inconsistent; and because the >>> SQL backend commits incrementally, a reader can catch a >>> partially-applied edit. [ a read-only client correctness bug ] >>> >>> So today the mode neither protects read consistency (it ignores the >>> lock) nor guarantees read-only-ness (that's a GUI add-on), even though >>> the name implies both. >>> >>> Proposed path forward >>> ----------------------------------- >>> >>> For building read-only tools on the API, what I'd want is a read-only >>> session mode that (a) takes the lock, so a writer cannot be active >>> while the tool reads, and (b) actually enforces no writes. >>> >>> A possible direction would be to replace SESSION_READ_ONLY with two >>> modes whose names state what they do, and have both mark the book >>> read-only so enforcement is intrinsic rather than GUI-only: >>> - SESSION_READ_ONLY_EXCLUSIVE -- takes the lock (fails if the book is >>> already locked); for tools that need a consistent, uninterrupted read. >>> Calls qof_book_mark_readonly(). Obviously a SQL backend user would >>> need sufficient permissions to take the lock. I'd want to add some >>> user guide documentation about this where none exists today. >>> - SESSION_READ_ONLY_IGNORE_LOCK -- opens regardless of the lock state; >>> the path the GUI's "open read-only anyway" override would use. (i.e. >>> today's SESSION_READ_ONLY behavior, but with qof_book_mark_readonly() >>> ) >>> >>> These could be added now, with SESSION_READ_ONLY marked deprecated, >>> and SESSION_READ_ONLY removed in a later release (v6? whatever that >>> timeframe turns out to be). I believe the deprecation warning would >>> only apply to users of the API `SESSION_READ_ONLY` mode today. (The >>> GUI internal use would be swapped to SESSION_READ_ONLY_IGNORE_LOCK.)" >>> >>> Does folding read-only enforcement into the mode (so bindings >>> consumers get it too), plus splitting the lock behavior, sound like an >>> OK path? >>> >>> Aside, is it a known issue Doxygen isn't updating / is stale? (title >>> says "GnuCash 5.6-150-g038405b370+" ) >>> https://code.gnucash.org/docs/STABLE/qofsession_8h.html >>> I was initially looking for the enum descriptions but didn't find them >>> outside of the code. Double btw: There is a documentation bug in the >>> source here in that the five /** … */ comments need to be trailing >>> /**< … */ comments (Doxygen trailing-member syntax). Right now, when >>> the comments are rendered, they are offset by one. >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Noah >>> >>> >>> On Sat, Jul 11, 2026 at 8:47 AM Noah <> wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> Thanks, John. >>>> >>>>> Your premise that the database was necessarily written by a GnuCash >>>>> session is false. >>>> >>>> You're right, I was biasing by my own use principles. >>>> I never want to modify my production book through anything but the GnuCash >>>> GUI or the official GnuCash API / bindings. >>>> >>>> My household moved our finances to GnuCash 14 years ago motivated by two >>>> challenges. >>>> - need to support two users on different computers (in serial, not >>>> simultaneously). We were bit too many times with filesystem-based >>>> commercial options at the time. >>>> - a Q* commercial software was dropping support for Mac, or non-cloud, or >>>> both >>>> >>>> In more recent years, our financial institutions have been making it >>>> harder to get our transaction data into GnuCash (eg. removing OFX/QFX >>>> download) >>>> In order to hold the line at home, I've been doing more and more work >>>> adopting use of the API & Python bindings to help a lot in this regard. >>>> I've also been creating some reporting and exploration tools that don't >>>> need write access (and tinkering with other's work like piecash). Since >>>> they don’t need write access, I want them to access MySQL with the minimum >>>> privileges necessary. >>>> >>>> >>>>> The ffastmath problem underlying bug 611936 was on the write side of >>>>> libdii so a read-only test wouldn’t find the problem. >>>> >>>> That settles it for me: since the -ffast-math defect in #611936 is on the >>>> write side of libdbi, a read-only session can neither trigger nor detect >>>> it, so running the probe on a read-only open guards nothing. I've opened a >>>> PR that skips dbi_library_test() for SESSION_READ_ONLY and leaves all >>>> write-capable modes untouched: >>>> https://github.com/Gnucash/gnucash/pull/2266 >>>> >>>> I'm not trying to bolt access control onto GnuCash, and I agree that >>>> wouldn't end well. The narrower goal is just to let a read-only consumer >>>> honor a least-privilege credential a DBA may already have in place -- and, >>>> independently, to stop running a write-only probe on a read-only open. The >>>> PR stands on that second part alone. >>>> >>>> Thanks again, >>>> Noah >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Thu, Jul 9, 2026 at 8:31 PM John Ralls >>>> <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> On Jul 9, 2026, at 14:34, [email protected] wrote: >>>>>> Hello again, >>>>>> Obviously backend stuff is on my mind lately and there's been a >>>>>> quirk impacting read-only access to SQL back-ed books that has >>>>>> bothered me for a while. >>>>>> Opening a book with SESSION_READ_ONLY through the SQL/DBI backend >>>>>> still requires the database user to have permission to create a >>>>>> temporary table. On every session_begin (regardless of mode), >>>>>> dbi_library_test() runs the 64-bit round-trip guard from Bug #611936 >>>>>> -- CREATE TEMPORARY TABLE / INSERT / SELECT / DROP -- to detect a >>>>>> 15-year-old -ffast-math libdbi miscompilation. A least-privileged, >>>>>> SELECT-only database user therefore cannot open the book at all: the >>>>>> create fails and begin returns ERR_SQL_DBI_UNTESTABLE. >>>>>> (SESSION_READ_ONLY already skips the gnclock lock, so this probe is >>>>>> the only remaining reason a read-only open needs write-ish rights.) >>>>>> I'd like to propose making a read-only open work without those >>>>>> privileges. Two possible directions: >>>>>> 1. Skip dbi_library_test() when the session is opened SESSION_READ_ONLY. >>>>>> 2. Or, for read-only, replace it with a check that needs no write >>>>>> privileges -- for example, verify the driver retrieves large >>>>>> int64/uint64 and a high-precision FLOAT8 via a SELECT of >>>>>> literals/casts (dbi_result_get_longlong / get_ulonglong / get_double), >>>>>> so the reader's conversion path is still validated. I'd welcome >>>>>> suggestions on the best minimal form. >>>>>> The justification for either approach: the data already in the >>>>>> database was written by a GnuCash session, and dbi_library_test() ran >>>>>> for that session, so any book that was successfully saved was >>>>>> necessarily saved by a driver that passed the round-trip test -- the >>>>>> stored 64-bit and FLOAT8 values are therefore correct at rest. A >>>>>> read-only session never writes back, so the only thing left to guard >>>>>> against is a reader-side retrieval defect. For a modern 64-bit libdbi >>>>>> that is the 2011, 32-bit / -ffast-math case from #611936, which is >>>>>> essentially historical (or maybe never existed on the read) >>>>>> If there is a preferred direction, I'm happy to prepare a PR. >>>>> >>>>> Your premise that the database was necessarily written by a GnuCash >>>>> session is false. Anybody with db write access (and for a SQLite3 >>>>> database that means anyone with write access to the filesystem) can write >>>>> (or delete) whatever they want into the database. There is at least one >>>>> public Python library that reads and writes GnuCash SQLite3 files >>>>> (https://github.com/sdementen/piecash). The databases have no integrity >>>>> checks enabled: Any integrity checking (and it’s pretty minimal) is in >>>>> GnuCash’s engine. >>>>> >>>>> The ffastmath problem underlying bug 611936 was on the write side of >>>>> libdii so a read-only test wouldn’t find the problem. I think it unlikely >>>>> that anyone is using that version of gcc anymore so it’s probably safe to >>>>> remove the test. >>>>> >>>>> That said, I have my doubts about the value of having users without >>>>> database write access. Access control hasn’t ever been a consideration in >>>>> GnuCash’s design and trying to bolt it on 30 years later isn’t likely to >>>>> produce a satisfactory result. >>>>> >>>>> Regards, >>>>> John Ralls >> >> _______________________________________________ >> gnucash-devel mailing list >> [email protected] >> https://lists.gnucash.org/mailman/listinfo/gnucash-devel > >
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