Kathleen Moriarty has entered the following ballot position for draft-ietf-grow-filtering-threats-07: No Objection
When responding, please keep the subject line intact and reply to all email addresses included in the To and CC lines. (Feel free to cut this introductory paragraph, however.) Please refer to https://www.ietf.org/iesg/statement/discuss-criteria.html for more information about IESG DISCUSS and COMMENT positions. The document, along with other ballot positions, can be found here: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-grow-filtering-threats/ ---------------------------------------------------------------------- COMMENT: ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Please add in the proposed text from the SecDir review to address his questions: https://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/secdir/current/msg05855.html Additionally, I'd like to see the Security Considerations mention a point brought up earlier in the draft, namely that the filtering could cause traffic to be routed back through a path that doesn't have information for that more specific AS. As such, this essentially could cause a DoS on that traffic until the BGP route allows for the new path for the more specific AS. The importance of mentioning this int he security considerations section is to more explicitly call this out as a potential DoS attack method. The time for BGP to repropagate might be short(ish), but that could be a critical amount of time during an event and maybe the more specific AS is a web server farm or some other critical resource. _______________________________________________ GROW mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/grow
