On Tue, Sep 1, 2015 at 12:11 PM, joel jaeggli <[email protected]> wrote: > On 9/1/15 8:16 AM, Peter Schoenmaker wrote: >> >>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> Now if the unexpected path through A is under-provisioned, >>>>> traffic will be lost. But that would be a bit strange for the >>>>> owner of P to do the documented trick to trigger a DoS of its >>>>> own prefix P, wouldn¹t it? >>>>> >>>>> So can I really talk about a DoS vector here? If someone else >>>>> than the owner of P plays games with P to trigger the >>>>> unexpected path for P through A, then it definitely becomes >>>>> one, but there we fall in the classic cases of prefix >>>>> hi-jacking. >>>> >>>> I don't see a pointer in the security considerations to other >>>> work describing this threat as a consideration, should this be >>>> included? It sounds as if it should be. >>> >>> >>> Well, I have the feeling that it is quite out of the scope of this >>> document, which is about playing with more specific prefixes >>> injection bound with restricted propagation. I am not sure I should >>> mention prefix hi-jacking here, as it¹s quite a different, >>> well-document approach; I inject a more specific prefix that >>> belongs to someone else and I drop the traffic. >>> >>> I don¹t know what others think about this. >> >> I would agree this is out of scope for the document. The traffic >> makes it to the intended and correct destination. There are no rogue >> players involved (at least more than normal which is covered >> extensively in other documents as pierre points out.) The main point >> is how traffic is routed through different networks. > > We worked pretty hard to keep both the attack terminology out of the > document and to keep the focus on the non-malicious action of ordinary > actors. I think it's better that we don't lump that in with malicious > action of varying varieties.
My comments were just comments and not a discuss, so I appreciate the discussion and you can decide what to do or not do with it. It basically was a set of questions I wound up with in reading the draft to make sure security considerations were included. Thanks, Kathleen > >> peter >> >> >>> >>> Cheers, >>> >>> Pierre. >>> >>> >>>> >>>> Thanks, Kathleen >>>> >>>>> >>>>> Cheers, >>>>> >>>>> Pierre. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> The importance of mentioning this int he security >>>>> considerations section is to more explicitly call this out as >>>>> a potential DoS attack method. The time for BGP to repropagate >>>>> might be short(ish), but that could be a critical amount of >>>>> time during an event and maybe the more specific AS is a web >>>>> server farm or some other critical resource. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> >>>> Best regards, Kathleen >>> >> >> > > -- Best regards, Kathleen _______________________________________________ GROW mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/grow
