On 9/1/15 8:16 AM, Peter Schoenmaker wrote: > >> >>> >>>> >>>> Now if the unexpected path through A is under-provisioned, >>>> traffic will be lost. But that would be a bit strange for the >>>> owner of P to do the documented trick to trigger a DoS of its >>>> own prefix P, wouldn¹t it? >>>> >>>> So can I really talk about a DoS vector here? If someone else >>>> than the owner of P plays games with P to trigger the >>>> unexpected path for P through A, then it definitely becomes >>>> one, but there we fall in the classic cases of prefix >>>> hi-jacking. >>> >>> I don't see a pointer in the security considerations to other >>> work describing this threat as a consideration, should this be >>> included? It sounds as if it should be. >> >> >> Well, I have the feeling that it is quite out of the scope of this >> document, which is about playing with more specific prefixes >> injection bound with restricted propagation. I am not sure I should >> mention prefix hi-jacking here, as it¹s quite a different, >> well-document approach; I inject a more specific prefix that >> belongs to someone else and I drop the traffic. >> >> I don¹t know what others think about this. > > I would agree this is out of scope for the document. The traffic > makes it to the intended and correct destination. There are no rogue > players involved (at least more than normal which is covered > extensively in other documents as pierre points out.) The main point > is how traffic is routed through different networks.
We worked pretty hard to keep both the attack terminology out of the document and to keep the focus on the non-malicious action of ordinary actors. I think it's better that we don't lump that in with malicious action of varying varieties. > peter > > >> >> Cheers, >> >> Pierre. >> >> >>> >>> Thanks, Kathleen >>> >>>> >>>> Cheers, >>>> >>>> Pierre. >>>> >>>> >>>> The importance of mentioning this int he security >>>> considerations section is to more explicitly call this out as >>>> a potential DoS attack method. The time for BGP to repropagate >>>> might be short(ish), but that could be a critical amount of >>>> time during an event and maybe the more specific AS is a web >>>> server farm or some other critical resource. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> >>> Best regards, Kathleen >> > >
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