On 15 Jun 2007, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > And on a quirky note: The paper mentions a substantial number of > nodes that were simply downloading any file from their falsified > query results. I have a hard time imagining any but the most naive > Gnutella users from doing this, but I can think of one group that > *might* have automated programs doing this: Media Sentry (and their > counterparts elsewhere in the world). It would be interesting to > see if any of those "download anything" nodes belonged to Media > Sentry :-)
I know that I was operating passive filters that automatically downloaded data during this time period. It wasn't the file extensions that they talked about. It is possible that a gtk-gnutella node could have downloaded these files. For instance, a gtkg user might have a filter to downloads anything with "subject_of_interest.*\.mpg". Another user might search for "subject_of_interest" and the DDOS node would be successful. However, as noted the newline filtering should prevent this from happening with gtk-gnutella. The paper recommended detecting that the node was a gnutella participant before downloading. I don't really think that this is the best approach. Having magnet links referencing legitimate http is a valid way of using a gnutella client. The http transport brings gnutella very close to a "distributed web". Ie, a web sight that doesn't exist in any one place. There are many interesting application, like http to gnutella gateways, etc. fwiw, Bill Pringlemeir. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- This SF.net email is sponsored by DB2 Express Download DB2 Express C - the FREE version of DB2 express and take control of your XML. No limits. Just data. Click to get it now. http://sourceforge.net/powerbar/db2/ _______________________________________________ Gtk-gnutella-devel mailing list Gtk-gnutella-devel@lists.sourceforge.net https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/gtk-gnutella-devel
