Hi,
> Ok fine you can be forward compatible but i still don't agree its my
> personal opinion if I don't know what the packet format for next
> version why should I support it.
Because we are talking about a industry standard with a huge user base
and it is very likely that next version will be backwards compatible,
like it was the case with TLSv1.2->TLSv1.1->TLSv1.0->SSLv3. Its unlikely
that the IETF WG will push a change that will break this format.
If the next TLS version doesn't break it, SNI will continue to work.
If the next TLS version breaks SNI, we will need to fix it.
If we restrict the SNI fetching to TLSv1.[0-2], we need to fix SNI
in every case, without any obvious advantage.
> I think the major is relaxing the record layer check to SSLv3 and we
> should fix it.
Its already fixed, Willy committed it yesterday. Tonight's snapshot already
contains the fix.
Regards,
Lukas
