In message <[email protected]>, Andrew Sullivan writes: > Hi, > > Mark Andrews's point about a DNSSEC insecure delegation today was not > I think fully appreciated. > > In order to create a top-most label in the domain name that can be > used this way and that has the necessary properties, we cannot simply > instruct IANA to do it. That is in fact creating a delegation in the > root zone of the DNS. I believe that RFC 2860 (the MoU between the > IETF and ICANN) does allow us to create special-use domain names at > the top-most level. But I do not believe it allows us to create > special-use domain names at the top-most level _in the DNS_, because > that is control of the root zone and it is unambiguously the province > of ICANN. > > Therefore, if the WG decides to use a top-level label for these > purposes, we have to apply to ICANN to get it delegated from the root > in a provably insecure fashion. Interestingly, ICANN actually has a > policy that it won't delegate things from the root any more that are > _not_ DNSSEC signed, and the whole point here is in fact to add an > entry that is contrary to that policy, so getting such a delegation > would require ICANN to change its policies before it could happen.
I suspect this is a mischaracterization of the policy. GTLD delegations are so constrained. This is not a GTLD delegation. New country code delegations are not so constrained. We are not asking them to delegate away from the roots. root zone: HOMENET. NS A.ROOT-SERVERS.NET. ... HOMENET. NS M.ROOT-SERVERS.NET. homenet zone: HOMENET. SOA a.root-servers.net. nstld.verisign-grs.com. 1 1800 900 604800 86400 HOMENET. NS A.ROOT-SERVERS.NET. ... HOMENET. NS M.ROOT-SERVERS.NET. B.T.W. this should also be done for .ONION and .LOCAL if we want local DNS resolvers to intercept these queries. DNSSEC keeps getting forgotten. The only reason people aren't screaming is that there are very few validating clients and the both .ONION and .LOCAL don't use the DNS. SERVFAIL is nearly as good as NXDOMAIN for these use cases. HOMENET uses the DNS. If one can get a trust anchor for HOMENET installed in every validator there shouldn't be any queries for HOMENET/DS. > That is an important practical fact that ought to be taken into > consideration when deciding what kind of label to use. > > Best regards, > > A > > -- > Andrew Sullivan > [email protected] > > _______________________________________________ > homenet mailing list > [email protected] > https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/homenet -- Mark Andrews, ISC 1 Seymour St., Dundas Valley, NSW 2117, Australia PHONE: +61 2 9871 4742 INTERNET: [email protected] _______________________________________________ homenet mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/homenet
