“NIST would not deliberately weaken a cryptographic standard.” (But the NSA wouldn't let a cryptographic standard out the door unless they could decode it. - Mike Schwab).
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=nsa-nist-encryption-scandal Computer scientists for years suspected that such a backdoor existed in Dual_EC_DRBG. Security researchers from Eindhoven University of Technology in the Netherlands noted in May 2006 that the algorithm was insecure<http://www.propublica.org/documents/item/786216-cryptanalysis-of-the-dual-elliptic-curve>and that an attack against it was easy enough to launch on “an ordinary PC”. The following year two Microsoft engineers flagged Dual_EC_DRBG as potentially containing a backdoor (pdf)<http://rump2007.cr.yp.to/15-shumow.pdf>, although they stopped short of accusing NIST and the NSA of inserting it there intentionally. NIST denies the accusations<http://www.nist.gov/director/cybersecuritystatement-091013.cfm>, pointing out on its Web site that the agency is “required by statute” to consult with the NSA and stating, “NIST would not deliberately weaken a cryptographic standard.”* Yet that is exactly what appears to have happened. Documents provided by Snowden show the spy agency played a crucial role in writing the standard that NIST is now cautioning against using, the *New York Times* reported<http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/10/government-announces-steps-to-restore-confidence-on-encryption-standards/?_r=0>. NIST published the cryptography standard in 2006, and the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) later adopted it for its 163 member countries. Despite Dual_EC_DRBG’s known flaws, prominent tech companies including Microsoft, Cisco, Symantec and RSA include the algorithm in their product’s cryptographic libraries<http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cavp/documents/drbg/drbgval.html>primarily because they need it to be eligible for government contracts, cryptographer Bruce Schneier <https://www.schneier.com/> says. It is up to the private sector companies that buy these products to decide whether to enable the algorithm, something they are unlikely to do in the case of Dual_EC_DRBG, according to RSA’s Juels. On Tue, Sep 17, 2013 at 6:15 AM, Shmuel Metz (Seymour J.) < [email protected]> wrote: > In <[email protected]>, on > 09/16/2013 > at 10:56 AM, "J.P." <[email protected]> said: > > >NSA is pushing ecliptic curves > > NSA is into astronomy? > > -- > -- Mike A Schwab, Springfield IL USA Where do Forest Rangers go to get away from it all? ---------------------------------------------------------------------- For IBM-MAIN subscribe / signoff / archive access instructions, send email to [email protected] with the message: INFO IBM-MAIN
