kalo dulu bener kejadian Intel bikin procie mobile seperti SnapDragon, mungkin Qualcomm udah gulung tikar sejak lama ya :)
On Thu, Apr 21, 2016 at 4:49 PM, Alvin Tedjasukmana < [email protected]> wrote: > > <http://www.linkedin.com/shareArticle?mini=true&source=Vox&summary=Intel+didn%27t+take+the+market+for+smartphone+chips+seriously+until+it+was+too+late.&title=Intel+made+a+huge+mistake+10+years+ago.+Now+12%2C000+workers+are+paying+the%26nbsp%3Bprice.&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.vox.com%2F2016%2F4%2F20%2F11463818%2Fintel-iphone-mobile-revolution> > <?subject=From%20Vox.com%3A%20Intel%20made%20a%20huge%20mistake%2010%20years%20ago.%20Now%2012%2C000%20workers%20are%20paying%20the%20price.&body=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.vox.com%2F2016%2F4%2F20%2F11463818%2Fintel-iphone-mobile-revolution%3Futm_medium%3Dsocial%26utm_source%3Demail%26utm_campaign%3Dvox%26utm_content%3Dshare%3Aarticle%3Atop> > > Artikel yg lumayan menarik buat dibaca, monggo.... > > > June 6, 2005, seemed to be a triumphant moment for Intel. The chipmaker > was already dominating the market for processors that powered Windows-based > PCs. Then Steve Jobs took the stage at Apple's World Wide Developers > Conference to announce that he was switching the main Windows alternative, > Macintosh computers, to Intel chips as well. The announcement cemented > Intel's status as the leading company of the PC era. > > There was just one problem: The PC era was about to end. Apple was already > working on the iPhone, which would usher in the modern smartphone era. > Intel turned down an opportunity > <http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/05/paul-otellinis-intel-can-the-company-that-built-the-future-survive-it/275825/> > to provide the processor for the iPhone, believing that Apple was unlikely > to sell enough of them to justify the development costs. > > Oops. > > On Tuesday, Intel announced that it was laying off 12,000 employees > <http://www.oregonlive.com/silicon-forest/index.ssf/2016/04/intel_quarterly_results.html>, > 11 percent of its workforce, the latest sign of the company's struggle to > adapt to the post-PC world. Intel still isn't a significant player in the > mobile market — iPhones, iPads, and Android-based phones and tablets mostly > use chips based on a competing standard called ARM. > > The company is still making solid profits — it just announced a $2 > billion profit > <http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/INTC/1917929754x0x886646/374B039B-F62C-4429-99C8-131CA7DE75DF/Earnings_Release_Q1_2016_final.pdf> > for the first quarter of 2016. But the company's growth has stalled, and > Wall Street is getting worried about its future. > > Obviously, Intel made a mistake by missing out on the iPhone business. > Intel's error in judgment is a classic example of what business guru Clay > Christensen calls "disruptive innovation." The term disruption has become > so overused in the technology world that it's sometimes treated as a joke. > But Christensen gave it a more precise meaning that fits Intel's situation > perfectly: a cheap, simple, and less profitable technology that gradually > erodes the market for a more established technology. > > Intel is just the latest in long line of companies that have failed to > effectively deal with this kind of disruptive threat. > Smartphones are based on a different chip standard than PCs > > Intel invented a chip standard called x86 that was chosen for the IBM PC > in 1981 and became the standard for Windows-based PCs generally. As the PC > market soared in the 1980s and 1990s, Intel grew with it. > > The key to success in the PC business was performance. Chips with more > computing power could run more complex applications, complete tasks more > quickly, and run more applications at the same time. During the 1990s, > Intel and its rivals raced to increase their chips' megahertz ratings — a > measure of how many steps the chips could perform in a second. > > One thing these early chipmakers *didn't* care about was power > consumption. Higher-performance chips often consumed more energy, but this > didn't matter because most PCs were desktop models plugged into the wall. > Even laptops had large batteries and could be plugged in most of the time. > > But this became a problem in the late 2000s, when the market began to > shift to smartphones and tablets. These devices had smaller batteries (to > keep the weight down), and users wanted to use them all day on a single > charge. Existing x86 chips were a poor fit for these new applications. > > Instead, these companies turned to a standard called ARM. Created by a > once-obscure > British company <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ARM_architecture>, it was > designed from the ground up for low-power mobile uses. In the mid-2000s, > ARM chips weren't nearly as powerful as high-end chips from Intel, but they > consumed a lot less power, which was important for smartphones from Apple > and BlackBerry. > > Even better, the ARM architecture is designed for customization. ARM > licenses its design to other companies such as Qualcomm and Samsung, which > make the actual chips. That provides flexibility that allows smartphone > makers to combine a number of different functions on a single chip. And > packing a bunch of functions — like data storage and image processing — > onto one chip helps to keep power consumption down. > Wikipedia / ARM <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ARM_Holdings> ARM chip > sales, in billions. > > Today, ARM chips totally dominate the mobile device business. iPhones and > iPads run on a chip called the A9 (and predecessors such as the A8 and A7) > that are based on the ARM platform, designed by Apple, and manufactured by > chipmakers like Samsung <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Samsung> and TSMC > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TSMC>. Most Android-based phones run on > ARM-based chips from Samsung, Qualcomm, and other ARM chipmakers. > The mobile revolution is leaving Intel behind > > Intel had not just one but two opportunities to become a major player in > the mobile chip market. One was the opportunity to bid on Apple's iPhone > business. The other was its ownership of XScale, an ARM-based chipmaker > Intel owned until it sold it for $600 million > <http://www.theregister.co.uk/2006/06/27/intel_sells_xscale/> in 2006. > > Intel sold XScale because it wanted to double down on the x86 architecture > that had made it so successful. Intel was working on a low-power version of > x86 chips called Atom, and it believed that selling ARM chips would signal > a lack of commitment to the Atom platform. > > But Atom chips didn't gain much traction. Intel has made a lot of progress > <http://www.androidauthority.com/arm-vs-x86-key-differences-explained-568718/> > improving the power efficiency of its Atom chips. But ARM-based chipmakers > are experts at building low-power chips, having focused on that task for > more than a decade. So they had the early advantage. And at this point, ARM > has a huge share of the market. That gives them all of the advantages — > more engineers, better software — that come with being a dominant platform. > Intel's decline is a classic story of disruptive innovation > > On one level, you can say that Intel just got unlucky and backed the wrong > horse. The chipmaker could have tried harder to win Apple's iPhone > contract, and it could have bet on its XScale ARM subsidiary instead of > trying to create Atom processors. But it chose not to. > > But on a deeper level it's not surprising that Intel took the path it did, > again because of Christensen's theory of disruptive innovation > <http://www.amazon.com/The-Innovators-Dilemma-Revolutionary-Business/dp/0062060244> > . > > Intel's basic problem was that the mobile chip market didn't seem > profitable enough to be worth the trouble. Intel had built a sophisticated > business around the PC chip. Its employees were experts at building, > selling, distributing, and supporting PC chips. This was a lucrative > business — often Intel could charge several hundred dollars for its > high-end chips — and the company was organized around the assumption that > each chip sale would generate significant revenue and profits. > > Mobile chips were different. In some cases, an entire mobile device could > cost less than the price of a high-end Intel processor. With many companies > selling ARM chips, prices were low and profit margins were slim. It would > have been a struggle for Intel to slim down enough to turn a profit in this > market. > > And in any event, Intel was making plenty of money selling high-end PC > chips. There didn't seem to be much reason to fight for a market where the > opportunity just didn't seem that big. > > What this analysis missed, of course, was that the mobile market would > eventually become vastly larger than the PC market. ARM-based chipmakers > might make a much smaller profit *per chip,* but the market was destined > to grow to many billions of chips per year. Even a small profit per chip > multiplied by billions of chips could add up to a big opportunity. > > Meanwhile, Intel had to worry that jumping wholeheartedly into low-power > mobile chips would undermine demand for its more lucrative desktop chips. > What if companies started buying Intel's cheap mobile chips and putting > them in laptops? That could hurt Intel's bottom line more than the added > mobile revenue would help it. > > Obviously, Intel's leadership now recognizes that they made a mistake. > They're now so far behind that it's going to be a struggle to gain a > foothold in the new market. And as cheap mobile chips get more and more > powerful, we can expect more and more companies to put them into low-end > laptop and desktop computers, eroding demand for Intel's more expensive and > power-hungry chips. > Chipmakers are doing to Intel what Intel once did to Digital Equipment > Corporation > > Ironically, Intel is now suffering the same fate that it inflicted on an > earlier generation of computing innovators three decades ago. In the 1980s, > there was a thriving community of "minicomputer" makers led by a company > called the Digital Equipment Corporation. > > These washing machine–size minicomputers were only "mini" compared to the > room-size mainframe computers that preceded them, and they cost tens of > thousands of dollars. > > Early PCs based on Intel chips were referred to as microcomputers, and > companies like DEC dismissed them as toys. They did this for exactly the > same reasons Intel dismissed the mobile market — selling a $2,000 PC was a > lot less profitable than selling a $50,000 minicomputer, and DEC didn't > expect PCs to be a big enough market to be worth the effort. > > Of course, that turned out to be totally wrong. The PC market turned out > to be vastly larger than the minicomputer market, just as the mobile market > is now much larger than the PC market. But by the time this became clear, > it was too late. DEC and most of its peers were forced out of business by > the end of the 1990s. > > > Sumber: > > http://www.vox.com/2016/4/20/11463818/intel-iphone-mobile-revolution > > -- > =========== > Saksikan drone Telkomsel dari Sabang hingga Merauke melalui video > streaming interaktif selama 30 hari di >> tsel.me/elangnusa #ElangNusa > > --------------------- > Toko Headphone & Earphone Terlengkap dan Terbaru > Kunjungi >> http://bassaudio.net > ---------------------- > Kontak Admin, Twitter @agushamonangan > ----------------------- > FB Groups : https://www.facebook.com/groups/android.or.id > > Aturan Umum ID-ANDROID >> goo.gl/mL1mBT > > ========== > --- > Anda menerima pesan ini karena berlangganan grup "[id-android] Indonesian > Android Community" di Google Grup. > Untuk berhenti berlangganan dan berhenti menerima email dari grup ini, > kirim email ke [email protected]. > Kunjungi grup ini di https://groups.google.com/group/id-android. > -- Sent thru my PC Powered by Andromax M2Y 4G LTE -- =========== Saksikan drone Telkomsel dari Sabang hingga Merauke melalui video streaming interaktif selama 30 hari di >> tsel.me/elangnusa #ElangNusa --------------------- Toko Headphone & Earphone Terlengkap dan Terbaru Kunjungi >> http://bassaudio.net ---------------------- Kontak Admin, Twitter @agushamonangan ----------------------- FB Groups : https://www.facebook.com/groups/android.or.id Aturan Umum ID-ANDROID >> goo.gl/mL1mBT ========== --- Anda menerima pesan ini karena Anda berlangganan grup "[id-android] Indonesian Android Community" dari Google Grup. Untuk berhenti berlangganan dan berhenti menerima email dari grup ini, kirim email ke [email protected]. Kunjungi grup ini di https://groups.google.com/group/id-android.
