FWIW I looked into BoringSsl
<https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+/main/pki/signature_algorithm.h>,
BouncyCastle
<https://www.bouncycastle.org/documentation/specification_interoperability/#algorithms-and-key-types>
and Tink
<https://boringssl.googlesource.com/boringssl/+/main/pki/signature_algorithm.h>
signature
algorithms and I don't see hybrid support on their official sanctioned
support pages. (There are hints in commit comments that there might be
support in the future)  Proponents suggest creating one's own hybrid
implementation, but my worry is that it still involves implementing your
own crypto, which presents an interoperability and security risks.
-Wei

On Sat, Oct 10, 2026 at 3:15 PM Wei Chuang <[email protected]> wrote:

> Sorry for the delayed response.
>
> I looked for currently available OpenSSL signature algorithms and don't
> see composite PQC.  I do see support for ML-DSA algorithm in OpenSSL 3.6.4:
> ML-DSA-44, MLDSA44
> ML-DSA-65, MLDSA65
> ML-DSA-87, MLDSA87
>
> I checked with Viktor Dukhovni at Openssl, it sounds like it will not be
> supported in the near term.  Another way to build out support for
> composite PQC signatures is to use the multi-algorithm signature support in
> DKIM2.  I think some folks suggested that early on.  Regarding RSA vs
> Ed25519, sure, if we use DKIM2 multi-signature support, supporting it
> should also be straightforward.
>
> -Wei
>
> On Mon, Oct 5, 2026 at 10:08 AM John R Levine <[email protected]> wrote:
>
>> On Mon, 5 Oct 2026, Wei Chuang wrote:
>> > Just following up here.  At the DKIM interim -05, PQC was discussed; the
>> > direction is to use a composite aka hybrid: ML-DSA-44 / Ed25519 to
>> support
>> > PQC.  This would apply only to DKIM2, skipping DKIM1.  The belief is
>> that
>> > the update could be done as small text additions to existing drafts
>> rather
>> > than requiring a new internet-draft.  Assuming that, we'll need new text
>> > for the draft-ietf-dkim-dkim2-spec and draft-ietf-dkim-dkim2-dns.
>>
>> We heard that while that combo is the best guess at the moment for a PQ
>> algorithm, it may not be in the future.  So what's important is that we
>> have at least two algorithms specified so we can test out key and
>> algorithm rotation.
>>
>> That reminds me, are we including RSA keys?  The argument against was
>> that
>> ed25519 keys are better in every way, argument for was that there are a
>> lot of published RSA keys people might want to keep using.
>>
>> Regards,
>> John Levine, [email protected], Taughannock Networks, Trumansburg NY
>> Please consider the environment before reading this e-mail. https://jl.ly
>>
>
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