It appears that Wei Chuang <[email protected]> said: >... I agree that we shouldn't underestimate the difficulties of >introducing a new algorithm, as we saw with the friction of getting DKIM >operators to adopt Ed25519. I've recently heard one reason was library >compatibility issues.
I don't think that's it. Everyone figured out how to handle RSA signatures, and the spec we wrote for Ed25519 was clear enough that nobody I know had significant trouble implementing it. As I said: >> Key rotation in DKIM1 doesn't work in practice, mostly because you have >> to have separate selectors for different algorithms which means double >> signing, which risks losing mail in badly designed receivers that >> penalize signatures they can't verify. I think we fixed this in DKIM2 ... ... by allowing multiple signatures in each header. They have to be ORed or algorithm rotation isn't going to work. I don't think an AND option makes sense unless you can explain to me what is the correct thing to do with a signature with two signatures, one of which you can verify and passes, and the other you don't understand at all and can't even try to verify. R's, John _______________________________________________ Ietf-dkim mailing list -- [email protected] To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
