One other point here, is that we should try at least one interop experiment
with the PQC algorithm, whether it's composite mldsa44-ed25519-sha512 or
mldsa44-sha512.   This choice should be discussed at the interim
Wednesday.
-Wei

On Sat, Oct 17, 2026 at 11:21 PM Wei Chuang <[email protected]> wrote:

>
>
> On Thu, Oct 15, 2026 at 6:09 AM Hannah Stern <hannah.stern=
> [email protected]> wrote:
>
>> Hi!
>> On 7/28/26 17:38, John Levine wrote:
>>
>> It appears that Wei Chuang  <[email protected]> <[email protected]> said:
>>
>> [...]
>>
>>
>> I also looked around DNSOPS for PQC advice.  I found that they seem to be
>> actively 
>> working<https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/dnsop/Yr6A91U5gbjZ_L6NkMj8mbgTeQE/>
>>  <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/msg/dnsop/Yr6A91U5gbjZ_L6NkMj8mbgTeQE/>
>> on rules for handling greylisting algorithms on short notice via
>> draft-huque-dnsop-multi-alg-rules<https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-huque-dnsop-multi-alg-rules/>
>>  <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-huque-dnsop-multi-alg-rules/>.  We
>> likely need a similar discussion for DKIM2 on how to gracefully handle
>> greylisting of the classical RSA/Ed25519 signature.
>>
>> As I said in DNSOP, I think this is a bad idea becauase I don't think that
>> a typical DNS operator (or mail operator) knows enough about cryptography
>> to use such a feature sensibly.
>>
>> If you think a signing algorithm is broken, just stop signing with it.
>> I think that DKIM signatures are likely to be pretty far down the list
>> of things attacked with PQ computers since they're short lived and the
>> stuff they sign is usually low value. If I want to phish people, there
>> are a lot cheaper ways than using a quantum computer to make a fake
>> DKIM signature.
>>
>> I've become convinced that John's argument here offers the right
> perspective on finding a suitable PQC algorithm.  In
> draft-ietf-dkim-dkim2-dns-01
> <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dkim-dkim2-dns/01/> we
> introduced the composite PQC  algorithm mldsa44-ed25519-sha512; however,
> I'm worried that the downsides outweigh the security improvements it
> brings.  I agree that we shouldn't underestimate the difficulties of
> introducing a new algorithm, as we saw with the friction of getting DKIM
> operators to adopt Ed25519.  I've recently heard one reason was library
> compatibility issues.  See draft-ietf-dkim-dkim2-dns-01
> <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dkim-dkim2-dns/01/> appendix
> A for a description of the RSA key format errata which I'm sure caused
> DKIM1 early adopters trouble.  Without native support in the popular crypto
> libraries (OpenSsl, BouncyCastle, BoringSsl, Tink to name a few) for
> mldsa44-ed25519-sha512, email operators will have to implement their own
> composite implementation, introducing interoperability and security risks.
> Keep in mind that the long term goal for DKIM2 is to make these algorithms
> mandatory to implement as noted in Section 3.3 in that draft.
>
> I agree with John that stopping signing with a vulnerable algorithm is a
> reasonable solution.  If breakage of classical signature algorithms is
> imminent because of a Cryptographically  Relevant Quantum Computer (CRQC),
> I suspect that there will be warnings with rumors and research papers
> thrown about.  Also as John points out, email won't be the first target of
> actors with access to CRQCs.  What's more important is creating an
> ecosystem with the agility to pivot if there is a warning.  As noted above,
> the draft calls for an eventual mandatory implementation timeline in
> Section 3.3 which hopefully will help. On the other hand, if that
> mandatory-to-implement requirement is too onerous, it becomes a barrier to
> deploying DKIM2. Thus I think we should start with three algorithms: RSA,
> Ed25519, and ML-DSA-44 as they all have native support in the major crypto
> libraries.
>
>> My impression is also that
>>
>> a) I'm not sure how likely it is in the first place for quantum attacks
>> to become practical at all
>>
>> b) Even if they do so, I'd guess they'll stay very expensive for yet more
>> time
>>
>> c) I'd agree with you that DKIM keys won't be extra high on the priority
>> list of those operating such machines.
>>
> +1
>
>> However, I'd like to add something:
>>
>> "[...] DKIM signatures [...] short lived [...]"
>>
>> I think this might miss the point a little. As far as I understand, the
>> potential quantum attacks would probably be against the keys. So the effort
>> isn't proportional to the number of signatures one would like to fake, but
>> only to the number of keys involved.
>>
>> So so for sites with long-lived DKIM keys (much mail traffic with the
>> same key), the effort/costs would be amortized over a much larger number of
>> mails (or faked mails) than for sites with short-lived DKIM keys.
>>
>> So a partial mitigation of potential quantum attacks even without
>> employing PQ algorithms would be rotating keys daily (removing old keys
>> from DNS after 14 days). Then a potential quantum attacker would get even
>> less value for the effort/costs.
>>
>> Re the "AND" thing, if we really think that's important, we can add
>> a double signing algorithm where the keys and signatures are the
>> two individual ones concatenated.  No need to add more complication
>> to the spec.
>>
>> After my mail suggesting such a combined algorithm, I read some
>> rationales against them too (in favor of using one of the PQ algorithms
>> "purely"). But then this would still leave us the way to decide to specify
>> both a "pure" PQ algorithm, and a ed25519+PQ (concatenation based)
>> algorithm.
>>
>> A bit orthogonal to that is the discussion we're still having elsewhere
>> how to go on with the current spec ambiguities about multiple signature
>> entries.
>>
>> But regardless which direction, I'd not like algorithm specific special
>> rules like "in this combination it's AND, otherwise it's OR".
>>
> Currently multiple signatures for a given DKIM2-signature header field are
> supposed to be evaluated with an "OR".  Removing vulnerable signatures on
> warning is one approach.  Another approach could be to have a signature tag
> that toggles the "OR" evaluation to "AND" which is more flexible but more
> complex.  Both approaches allow the signer to evaluate the effects of
> deploying new algorithms.
> -Wei
>
>> [...]
>>
>> Key rotation in DKIM1 doesn't work in practice, mostly because you have
>> to have separate selectors for different algorithms which means double
>> signing, which risks losing mail in badly designed receivers that
>> penalize signatures they can't verify.  I think we fixed this in DKIM2.
>>
>> IMO not completely.
>>
>> Also, the DNS crowd puts a lot of emphasis on keeping responses small.
>> While ed25519 is smaller than RSA, it's not enough smaller that it
>> would make any different in mail handling.
>>
>> I'm not sure about this.
>>
>> IIRC an ED25519 key is 256 or 257 bits, i.e. 43 base64 characters.
>>
>> A 2048 bit RSA key is those 2048 bits plus a bit for the 17 bit exponent.
>> That is 345 base64 characters, i.e. already needs (at least) two
>> at-most-255-char "entries" in the TXT record.
>>
>> But I've seen elsewhere in the discussion that it might be reasonable
>> that even an ML-DSA-44 key would still be at least bearable with 1750
>> base64 characters.
>>
>> Hannah.
>>
>> --
>> Hannah Stern
>>
>> Software Developer
>> Mail Transfer Development
>>
>> 1&1 Mail & Media Development & Technology GmbH |  |   |
>> Phone: +49 721 91374-4519 <+49%20721%20913744519>
>> E-Mail: [email protected] | Web: www.mail-and-media.com www.gmx.net 
>> www.web.de www.mail.com www.united-internet-media.de
>>
>> Hauptsitz Montabaur, Amtsgericht Montabaur, HRB 5452
>>
>> Geschäftsführer: Alexander Charles, Dr. Michael Hagenau, Thomas Ludwig, Dr. 
>> Verena Patzelt
>>
>>
>> Member of United Internet
>>
>> Diese E-Mail kann vertrauliche und/oder gesetzlich geschützte Informationen 
>> enthalten. Wenn Sie nicht der bestimmungsgemäße Adressat sind oder diese 
>> E-Mail irrtümlich erhalten haben, unterrichten Sie bitte den Absender und 
>> vernichten Sie diese E-Mail. Anderen als dem bestimmungsgemäßen Adressaten 
>> ist untersagt, diese E-Mail zu speichern, weiterzuleiten oder ihren Inhalt 
>> auf welche Weise auch immer zu verwenden.
>>
>> This e-mail may contain confidential and/or privileged information. If you 
>> are not the intended recipient of this e-mail, you are hereby notified that 
>> saving, distribution or use of the content of this e-mail in any way is 
>> prohibited. If you have received this e-mail in error, please notify the 
>> sender and delete the e-mail.
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> Ietf-dkim mailing list -- [email protected]
>> To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]
>>
>
_______________________________________________
Ietf-dkim mailing list -- [email protected]
To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]

Reply via email to