In message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Jon Crowcroft writes: > >the bggest problems with security ssytems are generally 90% to do with >design errors at level 10 (human, not policitcal, economic, >application, transport etc) > Mostly right, though one shouldn't rule out the possibility of layer 10-inspired insider tampering with the software. Nor should one ignore the possiblity of simple bugs -- the electronic equivalent of hanging chad. See http://www.notablesoftware.com/evote.html for more details. But the hard parts of the electronic voting problem have nothing to do with crypto, firewalls, protocols, DDoS attacks and the like -- and I say that as an expert in those fields. --Steve Bellovin, http:/www.research.att.com/~smb
- Re: internet voting -- ICANN, SmartInitiatives, etc. Stephen Sprunk
- Re: internet voting -- ICANN, SmartInitiatives, etc. Ed Gerck
- Re: internet voting -- ICANN, SmartInitiatives, etc. Ed Gerck
- Re: internet voting -- ICANN, SmartInitiatives, etc. Paul Hoffman / IMC
- Re: internet voting -- ICANN, SmartInitiatives, etc. Ed Gerck
- Re: internet voting -- ICANN, SmartInitiatives, etc. Kai Henningsen
- Re: internet voting -- ICANN, SmartInitiatives, etc. Ed Gerck
- Re: internet voting -- ICANN, SmartInitiatives, etc. Jon Crowcroft
- Re: internet voting -- ICANN, SmartInitiatives, etc. Steven M. Bellovin
- Re: internet voting -- ICANN, SmartInitiatives, etc. Steven M. Bellovin
- Re: internet voting -- ICANN, SmartInitiatives, etc. Vernon Schryver
- Re: internet voting -- ICANN, SmartInitiatives, etc. Vernon Schryver
- Re: internet voting -- ICANN, SmartInitiatives, etc. Steven M. Bellovin