There is much to be gleaned about US policy and practice in warfare, and in its social engineering, in Iraq and Afghanistan, over the last several years.
Time got away over the weekend. I've taken a few moments today while at home to get this finalised. Prof. Anthony Cordesman spent about 40 minutes talking, then took questions. I take notes of any kind of meeting like this, so can reasonably well reconstruct the sense of the talk. I am re-constructing the sense of what was said, and some of the specific words are therefore mine and not his. [My own clarifications are added in square brackets.] The first report is below this one. Peter +++ "Lessons of the Iraq War" at the Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA) Friday 3rd October 2003 The Iraq War #2 has shown that human factors matter still! There is a rush to pump up the Technology: to have a few videos, brochures, or as the featured subject of media reports. - Technology without readiness, professionalism and training would not have produced nearly the same results. The 'critical weapons' were: Laser Guided Bombs, the M1 tank, and the Bradley Fighting Verhicle, all of which had their genesis in Vietnam and the European 'cold war'. - No major new weapons or platforms were fielded. - The 4th Infantry Division (the most net-centric) was 'caught' in/by Turkey's non-involvement. Airlift gets people in; sealift gets people and things out. In this case, sealift provided 90% of the lift, [but you'd never know it from the reports showing air transports landing all over the place.] Modification: Clever people were modifying and restructuring file servers "on the fly"; "Shock and Awe" worked, and the Iraqi Republican Guard was (mainly) disrupted and played no part. In the 1991 war, 8% of the munitions were "precision guided"; in 2003, 68% were these type. >From the US side: - There were 7 different systems for identification, not talking to the others. (i.e. to prevent Blue-on-Blue casualties [engaging own-force] ) - Lessons about urban warfare need to be relearned; - Collateral Damage was much reduced v 1991... but, what is/was IN the building, and what are/were they doing? [intelligence] He called not finding the WMD "embarrasing" both strategically and politically. He also said that the media had been particularly unproductive in not making an honest and dispassionate investigation of the whole question. That Intelligence did not know 'everything' is not a "failure"; however, repeating past assessments without re-validating the data and assessments is a failure only surpassed by the Media's propensity for re-working and thereby repeating old reports. We / Intelligence CAN NOT KNOW in many cases and many places. The USA was not ready for low-level combat / counter-insurgency; it was optimised for knocking out things and not for 'people warfare' [that engages the local population as alies.] The UN is necessary. Nation-building under combat conditions is a military activity; No civilian or NGO does this; there is no way to transition 'suddenly [it is a slow process]; Iraq is not a "humanitarian crisis" that can be readily revitalised, especially its failed economy; there are detailed issues that must be under military control for some time. (Australia has local examples of this, too.) QUESTIONS: (1) To what extent is US 'ethnic politics' playing a role in [the aftermath]? [M. McK] There is a Polish ethnic vote playing a role at the moment; there is no great "Aussie vote", and [Cortesman joked that] he was not aware of mass migration to the USA being a policy that might create one. (2) Coallition Building by the USA / Pres. Bush? Cortesman gave the opinion that 'neo-conservative' can be taken by some to mean "vaguely mad", and 'internationalist' as "vaguely Communist". Funtional coallitions are what happen; there is no "international community" of the UN, just country-interests by individual nations; coallition is the "art of the practical". (3) Information operations? No lessons were learned since/after 1991; Psychological ops dispirited and theeby dissipated the Iraqi units. There was a "political failure": No radio or TV stations speaking to the Iraqis and explaining what the US forces were trying to achieve, what goals they had, and "what's in it for them -- the Iraqis!" (4) Intelligence and the USA's strategic policy for war [that you can get off the Internet! Written about 2 years ago. Try the White House or Pentagon web sites.] Pre-emptive war *is* mentioned, but only obliquely twice. The USA reacted in this case to a cumulative threat, not an imminent threat. US inspection info was a major source for the UK/US 'dossiers'. Why did Saddam Hussein repeat the "lies" in his declaration to the UN? If he had acted with transparency and obvious compliance then there might not have been a [need for and call for] war. (5) Strategic role of Iraq in War On Terror: Iraq and Al Quaida - Not a strong link Deal with groups individually, based on actions and intentions. There is a temptation [governments, media] towards, "When in doubt, call it Al Quaida." Identify specific groups and terrorists, and have specific counter-plans. There is a [natural but equally un-natural] divide between Islam, Christianity, and Judaiism. Afghanistan: There was no obvious strategy for nation-building [before the invasion.] Many different groups have been fighting for centuries. (6) Israel/Arab conflict? Causes... around 23 countries in the region: - not self-sustaining (economies, need massive imports) [oil-wealth to buy stuff!]; - population growth 9significant); - explosion of youth; - disguised unemployment; - hyper-urbanisation; - agricultural collapse; - de-industrialisation of economies; - infrastructure breaking down; - demographics of terrorism!; How can this be fixed? - "escallating to no-where" - intervention force would be a target for either/both sides - imposing peace is not a solution - [emphasis added] PEACE MUST COME FROM THEIR OWN DECISION (7) What is favourable for the future of Iraq? 9,000 people taken prisoner and processed; 225 of them have been foreigners [of some kind] Counter-insurgency is now being re-learned and applied, but will takje a while to be effective. Support for Saddam limited in scope/place/level-of-interest. Aid-delivery: the USA needs to provide aid, survey the "command economy", and get things moving. Repair of the infrastructure will be frustratingly long in happening, as many pieces of national infrastructure [water and electric plant equipment] is quite out of date and needs to be fabricated; and this takes time! Shi-ites have been repressed since the 1920s (and are now having a [majority-] reaction to this.) (8) What is a favourable future for Iraq? When asked for a "best case scenario", he said: - a federal governmental structure in 2 years; - sharing of wealth and power between all factions that is seen to be fair to all; - a legal system; - economic transformation and development; - reparations and forgiveness (for the wrongs of many years); - a stable basis for the country's development (by Iraqis, not outsiders); - human rights - hope; - political parties (but, then, 'democracies' can arguably not claim 'viable' political parties!) --- Rememberm there have been 2 wars, dictatorship and a 'command economy' recently, and arguably a disfunctional government since the country was created in the 1920s. Electoral outcomes: Constitution (and the current one doesn't need that much work). Office-bearers (and only some are obvious.) Exit Strategy: - US likely to be "thrown out" after about 2 years (e,g, whan the politics have matured); - Constitution needs to mention the Kurds; - Government structures under Saddam were providing for separation between otherwise warring peoples. - Iraqis are creating the structures of government, again. - minorities need to feel that they get "a say", and be working together. +++++ ----- Original Message ----- From: "Ellis" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Insights Mailing List" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Saturday, October 04, 2003 8:06 AM Subject: Re: weapons of mass destruction: the search continues > Yesterday, I attended a lecture by Prof. Anthony Cordesman, who is the > "Arliegh A Burke Chair in Strategy" at the Centre for Strategic and > International Studies (CSIS) in Washington DC. [ http://www.csis.org & > http://csis.org/html/4cordesm.htm & http://csis.org/burke/ ] He was talking > about"Lessons of the Iraq War" at the Australian Defence Force Academy > (ADFA) http://www.defence.gov.au/adfa/ , organised by the Australian Defence > Studies Centre (ADSC) http://idun.itsc.adfa.edu.au/ADSC/. > > Cordesman was/is NOT a 'yes-man' for the current administration. His recent > paper on Saudi Arabia ight show this. > http://csis.org/burke/saudi21/saudi_challenge.pdf [62kB] > > He was particularly critical, several times, about the lack of planning for > "counter-insurgency" in the US invasion of Iraq. He commented that it seemed > that there was little thought given to it compared to the 1991 invasion. > Consequently, there had been a degree of unpreparedness for the push-back by > the Iraqi irregulars who have been sniping at the US forces. > > He called not finding the WMD "embarrasing" both strategically and > politically. He also said that the media had been particularly unproductive > in not making an honest and dispassionate investigation of the whole > question. > > In the 1991 war, 8% of the munitions were "precision guided"; in 2003, 68% > were these type. > > When asked for a "best case scenario", he said: > - a federal governmental structure in 2 years; > - sharing of wealth and power between all factions that is seen to be fair > to all; > - a legal system; > - economic transformation and development; > - reparations and forgiveness (for the wrongs of many years); > - a stable basis for the country's development (by Iraqis, not outsiders); > - human rights > - hope; > - political parties (but, then, 'democracies' can arguably not claim > 'viable' political parties!) > --- Rememberm there have been 2 wars, dictatorship and a 'command economy' > recently, and arguably a disfunctional government since the country was > created in the 1920s. > > I'll write up more of my notes if people are interested. > > Peter > > ------------------------------------------------------ > - You are subscribed to the mailing list [EMAIL PROTECTED] > - To unsubscribe, email [EMAIL PROTECTED] and put in the message body 'unsubscribe insights-l' (ell, not one (1)) > See: http://nsw.uca.org.au/insights-l-information.htm > ------------------------------------------------------ > ------------------------------------------------------ - You are subscribed to the mailing list [EMAIL PROTECTED] - To unsubscribe, email [EMAIL PROTECTED] and put in the message body 'unsubscribe insights-l' (ell, not one (1)) See: http://nsw.uca.org.au/insights-l-information.htm ------------------------------------------------------
