On Aug 2, 2011, at 5:43 PM, Paul Hoffman wrote: > >>>> I have stated my reasons why I consider allocating multiple payload >>>> numbers etc for exactly same thing a bad thing. >>> >>> The three proposals do not do "exactly the same thing": they each >>> have different cryptographic and administrative properties. This has >>> been widely discussed in the WG. >> >> Note that I did not claim that three proposals are "exactly the same >> thing", I said that the payload types they allocate are "for the >> excatly same thing", i.e. transfering secure password protocol >> specific data between the peers. > > And SHA-3 will do "exactly the same thing" as SHA-2: will you not allocate > code points for it? :-)
If we knew as much about algorithms as we do about protocols, yes. But we don't. We don't know what algorithm will be considered secure in 2020, and that is why there's a (rough?) consensus in the IETF that algorithm agility is a "good thing". There is no such consensus that protocol variants are a good thing. I think it's just the opposite. Although I don't think it's Tero's job to stop the publication of three documents that are "for the same thing". That should be done by the community. Yoav _______________________________________________ IPsec mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipsec
