I'll combine two answers in message.. [me:] > > Why exactly should we care if party X's internal applications break > > because it hijacks a prefix?
On Mon, 3 Nov 2003, Hans Kruse wrote: > We don't, and that is my point. The draft in question improves on that > situation by creating a prefix that the rest of the network can easily deal > with. Internal apps may still break, although I would argue that the local > addressing prefix opens some options to make that a little less likely... No, the point is that when someone hijacks a prefix, they intentionally do something they know they should not do, and they "deserve" their applications to get broken. If we specify a mechanism for local addressing that "just about works", but still breaks apps, we've "blessed" a mechanism that doesn't work. That's even worse :-) [Fred:] > Because simply allowing internal apps to break is in clear violation of the > robustness principle. (e.g., if two disconnected/intermittently-connected > sites that have somehow hijacked the same prefix encounter one another > we have what Data would call: "a simple matter/anti-matter reaction".) Yes, but the site who hijacked a prefix is lost beyond redemption. Again, why should we care if their apps break? (We certainly care about apps not breaking in "valid" deployment scenarios..) -- Pekka Savola "You each name yourselves king, yet the Netcore Oy kingdom bleeds." Systems. Networks. Security. -- George R.R. Martin: A Clash of Kings -------------------------------------------------------------------- IETF IPv6 working group mailing list [EMAIL PROTECTED] Administrative Requests: https://www1.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipv6 --------------------------------------------------------------------
