On 03/27/2012 07:00 PM, Ray Hunter wrote: > My take on this is that a set of a few hundred individual persons who > are worried about privacy are more likely to be able to control their > own particular machines to correctly override the "default off" setting > than a single corporate network manager is to be able to guarantee > overriding a "default on" setting on 100% of 10000 machines attached to > their network.
Well, that's because we should probably do something like this: <http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-gont-6man-managing-slaac-policy-00.txt> While I understand the "procedural constraints" (i.e., document in WGLC), I think that much of the discussion that we're having is because we have limited choices in a number of areas. Namely: 1) Inability to convey address-generation policy in RA messages. 2) Stable privacy-enhanced addresses So we worry about selecting the right default because: 1) We have no mechanism to change that default dynamically 2) If we were to use stable addresses, in msot cases that implies "privacy-harmful" addresses. Thanks, -- Fernando Gont SI6 Networks e-mail: [email protected] PGP Fingerprint: 6666 31C6 D484 63B2 8FB1 E3C4 AE25 0D55 1D4E 7492 -------------------------------------------------------------------- IETF IPv6 working group mailing list [email protected] Administrative Requests: https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipv6 --------------------------------------------------------------------
