I happen to like your draft. But even in the presence of a mechanism to
distribute an advisory address-generation policy (which may or may not
not be supported by all end-node implementations for another 10 years)
IMHO the proper *default* behavior is still "off" = option A. In other
words, default = IPv4-like behavior, at least until we really figure out
how to operate all of these fancy new features of IPv6.
regards,
RayH
Fernando Gont wrote:
On 03/27/2012 07:00 PM, Ray Hunter wrote:
My take on this is that a set of a few hundred individual persons who
are worried about privacy are more likely to be able to control their
own particular machines to correctly override the "default off" setting
than a single corporate network manager is to be able to guarantee
overriding a "default on" setting on 100% of 10000 machines attached to
their network.
Well, that's because we should probably do something like this:
<http://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-gont-6man-managing-slaac-policy-00.txt>
While I understand the "procedural constraints" (i.e., document in
WGLC), I think that much of the discussion that we're having is because
we have limited choices in a number of areas. Namely:
1) Inability to convey address-generation policy in RA messages.
2) Stable privacy-enhanced addresses
So we worry about selecting the right default because:
1) We have no mechanism to change that default dynamically
2) If we were to use stable addresses, in msot cases that implies
"privacy-harmful" addresses.
Thanks,
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