>Date: Tue, 25 Jan 2000 05:18:45 -0500 >Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] >Status: > >STRATFOR.COM Global Intelligence Update >25 January 2000 > > >The West Loses Its Grip On Georgia > >Summary > >The Russian and Georgian interior ministers announced Jan. 22 the >launching of joint border patrols to police the Chechen-Georgian >border, reported Russian Radio. If true, this marks a collapse in >Georgian government policy and establishes a new Russian military >presence in Georgia. The West must react quickly, or Russian >policies will further erode Georgian independence. > >Analysis > >Russian Interior Minister Vladimir Rushailo and his Georgian >counterpart Kakha Targamadze announced Jan. 22 the beginning of >joint border operations - codenamed Undercover - to police the >Chechen-Georgian border, reported Russian Radio. If true, this >marks a significant policy shift for the Georgian government and >establishes a new Russian military presence in Georgia. The West >must react quickly or face losing Georgia as an ally in the >Caucasus. > >At the beginning of the Chechen war, Georgian President Eduard >Shevardnadze steadfastly refused any Russian presence on the border >stating that Georgia was capable of monitoring it. This view has >incrementally changed over the past five months. A few weeks into >the Chechen campaign, in early November 1999, Georgia insisted that >in addition to monitoring the border, it would seal it. But >instead, in December, Russia dropped paratroopers at the most >accessible connection between Chechnya and Georgia, at the top of >the Argun Valley, and sealed it themselves. Georgia responded by >welcoming an Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe >monitoring group, hinting that Russians could join this effort. >Now, with a contentious CIS summit >[http://www.stratfor.com/SERVICES/giu2000/012100.ASP] as a backdrop, >Georgia has agreed to participate in the joint operation. > >The Russian component, the composition of which has yet to be >determined, must be flown into Georgia, because Russia does not >have land access to the border from the north. It is likely the >force will be based somewhere in Georgia. The logical headquarters >for the operation is the Russian base near the Georgian city of >Vaziani - the same base the Georgian government has doggedly tried >to wrest from Russian control for several years. Shevardnadze's >original position of refusing Russia access to its borders has >collapsed. > >Georgia's agreement to participate in what is likely a Russian- >dominated operation on Georgian territory serves two purposes for >Russia's acting President Vladimir Putin. First, sealing the >Georgian border will finally prevent the Chechens from resupplying >their forces. This signals the beginning of the end of the Chechen >War. > >Second, Georgia's decision informs Putin that the West will not >significantly intervene in his efforts to manipulate the states of >the South Caucasus into assisting him in eliminating the Chechen >rebels. For the last five months, Shevardnadze has sought Western >support to maintain Tbilisi's independent line vis-a-vis Moscow. >Having realized that Washington will not support him, he has >changed Georgian policy to placate Russia. The only way Georgia can >be prevented from falling back into Russia's orbit is if Turkey >establishes a military presence in Georgia - something that becomes >less likely with every passing day. > >Other CIS states have noticed that the West has abandoned Georgia. >Normally independent-minded Uzbek President Islam Karimov recently >stated that if Islamic militants threatened his country, then >"Russia is a country we can rely on." Turkmenistan is also sounding >conciliatory toward Russia. It is now looking to Russia as a >petroleum export route after Azerbaijan rebuffed it in a pipeline >deal. Azerbaijan, too, is speaking of diversifying its oil export >routes to include additional Russian pipelines. This is a far cry >from its "Baku-Ceyhan or bust" rhetoric of the past several years. > >The shift from a willingness to "observe the border" without >Russians to "secure the border" with Russians marks a >transformation in the Georgian government's perception of >geopolitical realities. Russia is economically and diplomatically, >and in the case of Georgia, militarily, reasserting its influence >in the states of the former Soviet south. >[http://www.stratfor.com/CIS/specialreports/special13.htm] The lack >of Western support and Putin's more aggressive strategy in Chechnya >[http://www.stratfor.com/CIS/commentary/c0001190220.htm] have forced >Shevardnadze to seek a "normalizing of relations" with Russia - >code for establishing relations on Russia's terms - at the CIS >summit. Unless the West begins to invest the resources required to >maintain Georgia's independent line - and quickly - Georgia will be >only the first former Soviet state to capitulate to Russian >demands. > > > > > >(c) 2000, Stratfor, Inc. http://www.stratfor.com/ > > >-- >Macdonald Stainsby > >check the "ten point platform" of Tao at: http://new.tao.ca > >"`Order rules in Berlin.' You stupid lackeys! Your >`order' is built on sand. Tomorrow the revolution will rear >ahead once more and announce to your horror amid the brass >of trumpets: `I was, I am, I always will be!'" > >-Rosa Luxemburg, 1918. > > __________________________________ KOMINFORM P.O. Box 66 00841 Helsinki - Finland +358-40-7177941, fax +358-9-7591081 e-mail [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.kominf.pp.fi ___________________________________ [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subscribe/unsubscribe messages mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] ___________________________________
