>X-Originating-IP: [165.132.106.122] >From: "T Murphy" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] >Status: > > > > >>From: Alex Chis <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >>Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] >>To: solid <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >>Subject: [SLDRTY-L]: Urban Warfare: Russia Shows What Not to Do - fwd >>Date: Tue, 25 Jan 2000 15:20:01 -0800 >> >> >>Johnson's Russia List >>#4068 >>26 January 2000 >>[EMAIL PROTECTED] >> >>****** >> >>#9 >>Wall Street Journal >>January 25, 2000 >>[for personal use only] >>Commentary >> >>Urban Warfare: Russia Shows What Not to Do >> >>By Gary Anderson, chief of staff of the Marine Corps Warfighting >>Laboratory, which is responsible for urban warfare experimentation. >> >>It was 1995 when the Russians were first humiliated in Chechnya. Their >>navigation and communication systems didn't work in the urban canyons of >>Grozny. Their poorly trained conscript soldiers were not prepared to >>conduct room-to-room combat. Rebels stayed close to civilians, forcing >>Russians to either root them out in close combat or knock down whole >>buildings. When the military chose the latter solution, the CNN effect was >>devastating and helped end the war on unfavorable terms to the Russians. >> >>Five years later, the Russians are again stumbling blindly. Troops with >>inadequate equipment look to be suffering systematic slaughter at the hands >>of well-prepared Chechen fighters. Heavy artillery is having little effect. >>A top Russian commander, Maj. Gen. Mikhail Malofeyev, was found dead over >>the weekend. Journalists who showed up for a symbolic flag-raising >>ceremony--meant to demonstrate Russian control over the city--were turned >>away amid heavy fighting. >> >>Going to Grozny >> >>How did a major military power end up blundering the same war twice? The >>answer is that the Russians have done little to ready themselves for what >>is increasingly the most common type of warfare: urban combat. Their >>ill-preparedness for this new approach to conflict is a cautionary tale for >>our own political and military leaders. >> >>Two major missteps got the Russians into their current mess. In both >>instances, the civilian leadership in Moscow bears some of the >>responsibility, though much of the blame falls squarely on the military. >>Nor can the military's mistakes be chalked up to ignorance. The Russians >>seem to have done their homework, and much of their literature analyzing >>the last conflict is quite good. But they have not applied the lessons of >>the past. >> >>The first mistake was to fixate on a supposed "stab in the back," blaming >>foreign and domestic journalists for turning Russian and world opinion >>against the first war. As with the U.S. armed forces after the Vietnam War, >>this rationalization for defeat allowed the leaders of the Russian military >>to hide from their own mistakes, while alienating otherwise sympathetic >>reporters and other observers. >> >>This first mistake led to the second. In preparing for this war, the >>Russian military had two alternative courses of action. One was to invest >>in its forces, fixing the tactics, training and equipment that didn't work >>the first time. The other was to ignore the CNN effect and level Grozny. >>The second option, Moscow thought, was easy, allowing the military and its >>civilian leaders to skirt hard choices. They were wrong. Now they have no >>fallback position. >> >>In Russia's debacle is a timely lesson for U.S. military and civilian >>leaders. The Marine Corps has conducted a series of experiments in an >>attempt to solve the problems the Russians are currently experiencing in >>Grozny. The simulated casualty rates have been very high, showing just how >>unprepared our troops our for urban warfare. >> >>The real-world stakes are high. Some 80% of Army and Marine deployments >>since the end of the Cold War have been in urban areas. Most of these have >>been evacuations, humanitarian missions or peacekeeping operations, and >>have not erupted into full-scale fighting. But they could. >> >>Given the danger, some generals have suggested that we simply not fight in >>cities. The flaw in that logic is obvious: If the enemy knows we won't >>fight in urban areas, that's where he will go. The U.S. already has an >>example of what can happen when we are not ready to face an urban enemy. In >>October 1993, 18 Army Rangers were killed and dragged through the streets >>of Mogadishu, Somalia, because they lacked the proper tactics and equipment >>to deal with Somali guerrillas. >> >>The U.S. armed forces, and especially the Marines, have been trying to >>better prepare our troops for urban combat. We are teaching troops not to >>bunch up--communicating more with handheld radios--so that one sniper can't >>kill an entire squad with a single burst of fire. We are also coaching them >>to make better use of combined-arms techniques, including some nonlethal >>weapons, for use when civilians are mixed with enemy fighters. >> >>We are also developing new equipment, including satellite-based radio >>communication and navigation systems that work in urban canyons. We are >>creating small ground and air robots that will guard us from hidden enemy >>fighters. We are even developing an automatic system that will locate and >>return a sniper's fire immediately after he pulls the trigger. >> >>While the U.S. develops new finesse in urban warfare, Russia continues to >>use its old bulldozer methods, wasting countless lives. The primary mistake >>the Russian armed forces made this time wasn't just that they failed to fix >>their equipment, or that they thought they could intimidate the Chechens >>with threats to destroy Grozny. Their big mistake was in actively pushing >>their government into yet another war, an urban war, for which their >>military forces are woefully unprepared. That is inexcusable >>incompetence--and the Russian troops floundering through the streets of >>Grozny are now paying a high price for their leaders' shortcomings. >> >>******** >>------- >>David Johnson >>home phone: 301-588-3861 >>work phone: 202-332-0600 ext. 107 >>email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] >>fax: 1-202-478-1701 (Jfax; comes direct to email) >>home address: >> 9039 Sligo Creek Parkway #1606 >> Silver Spring MD 20901 >> USA >> >>Web page for CDI Russia Weekly: >>http://www.cdi.org/russia >> >> >>_____________________________________________________________ >>Check out the new and improved Topica site! >>http://www.topica.com/t/13 > >______________________________________________________ >Get Your Private, Free Email at http://www.hotmail.com > > >=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-= > The Socialism From Below listserve was created by the New Socialist > Group to discuss and debate socialist activism, share news relating to > revolutionary struggles around the world, assist in organizing projects > of socialist renewal and on the ground activism. 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