Could you please explain to us why you are circulating postings from "Macdonald Stainsby" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> containing "intelligence" reports from Stratfor, a right-wing, "private" (and no doubt CIA-financed) intelligence outfit based in Austin, Texas?
We await your reply. In the meantime, please do not forward us anymore "Stratfor" mailings.
Comradely,
Central office,
Communist Party of Canada
At 10:32 PM 2/9/00 -0800, you wrote:
STRATFOR.COM Weekly Global Intelligence Update
10 February 2000
Murder in Belgrade: An Elite Feud or A Drug War?
Summary
Yugoslav Defense Minister Pavle Bulatovic was assassinated Feb. 7
in a Belgrade restaurant. Although media rumors have linked his
murder to that of Serb warlord Zeljko Raznatovic, both deaths are
in fact results of a much longer string of killings in Serbia. Ten
powerful Belgrade men have been killed over the past three years in
what seems to be a complex and organized attempt to wipe out many
of President Slobodan Milosevic's closest allies. Are they split by
a deadly internal feud, or caught up in a dangerous drug war?
Analysis
The assassination of Yugoslav Defense Minister Pavle Bulatovic in
Belgrade on Feb. 7 is not an isolated incident. Media speculation
has suggested a link between Bulatovic's murder and the recent
murder of Serb warlord Zeljko Raznatovic, also known as Arkan. But
these two murders are actually only the most recent of almost a
dozen similar killings in Belgrade over a three-year period.
Bulatovic is the most recent, and highest- ranking, victim in a
long string of assassinations of increasingly prominent and
influential Serbs.
Bulatovic was shot while sitting in a restaurant in a soccer club
and died several hours later. The two men with him, a banker and
the restaurant owner, were also injured in the attack. The defense
minister was a close friend of Yugoslav Prime Minister Momir
Bulatovic - no relation to the defense minister -- and a strong
supporter of President Slobodan Milosevic. Although of Montenegrin
origin, Bulatovic was a Serb nationalist, which led to his alleged
relationship with two of the most wanted war criminals in Serbia:
Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic.
Before, on Jan. 15, two gunmen shot and killed Arkan in a hotel
lobby in Belgrade. Arkan's reputation as a well-connected
paramilitary leader, brutal war criminal, wealthy mobster and
elusive international thief left many unanswered questions as to
the identity and motive of his murderers. Several people have
reportedly been identified as suspects; some have police
backgrounds.
But these are not isolated cases. The two most recent
assassinations resemble other murders stretching back as far as
three years, suggesting a coordinated assault on Milosevic's
allies. In February 1997 Vlada "Tref" Kovacevic, a close friend of
Milosevic's son Marko, was killed in a shopping mall. Kovacevic was
made wealthy by black market dealings, especially the smuggling of
cigarettes and cars. Despite his close ties to the ruling family,
no suspects were arrested in connection with his death.
In April 1997 Deputy Interior Minister Radovan "Badza" Stojicic was
shot dead in a Belgrade restaurant. Stojicic, director of
approximately 80,000 police, had just received an award from
Milosevic for his anti-terrorist work in Kosovo, in January 1997.
For the same reason, the United Nations International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) considered him a war
criminal. Badza also knew Arkan. Their relationship went back at
least as far as 1991, when Badza began equipping Arkan's
paramilitary group, the Tigers, with weapons for use in Croatia and
Bosnia. Afterward, the two remained associates, leading to rumors
that Badza was also entangled in drug trafficking and arms
smuggling. No suspects were arrested for his death.
Another close Milosevic ally, Zoran "Kundak" Todorovic, was killed
later that year. Todorovic, secretary-general of the Yugoslav
United Left - the party of Milosevic's wife - was killed in October
1997. Todorovic was one of the richest men in Yugoslavia and
profited from special treatment by the ruling family, which granted
him exclusive rights to export and import valuable commodities such
as copper and wheat. The week after his death there were rumors
that a suspect had been arrested, but there are no confirmed
reports of an arrest or conviction.
In May 1998, Jusuf Bulic was shot dead while leaving a caf�.
Although he has no direct public connection to Milosevic, Bulic was
a known member of the Belgrade underground who profited from drug
trafficking and gambling. Bulic, who also owned a chain of betting
shops and a first division soccer club, was reputed to be linked to
Arkan through underworld connections.
In August 1998, paramilitary leader Slobodan Miljkovic was shot to
death in a bar. Miljkovic, also known as Major Mauser, was wanted
as a war criminal. A former police officer was convicted of his
murder and sentenced to 15 years in prison. Also noteworthy,
shortly after Miljkovic's death, his attorney gave the United
Nations investigators documents that allegedly incriminated other
Serb leaders wanted for war crimes.
All of the men listed above were connected to the Serbian regime -
and to each other - in one way or another. They were Serb
nationalists, several of whom organized paramilitary units to
subdue enemies in Yugoslavia's wars with Bosnia, Croatia and
Kosovo. Most, if not all, were tied in with the lucrative,
dangerous Belgrade underground. They used their influence to grow
wealthy and their high-level connections to remain powerful and
untouchable, or almost untouchable. They were killed in
professional hits and in most cases their murderers were not found.
In addition to the murdered mobsters, political players and war
criminals, three high profile police were killed in Belgrade
between 1997 and 1999. Miroslav Bizic was a former policeman
working as a private detective. He was known in particular for his
investigations into murdered criminals. Milorad Vlahovic, deputy
chief of the criminal investigation unit of Belgrade's police, was
killed in March 1999. He had reportedly been an associate of
Badza's. Then in July, Dragan Simic, who headed a Belgrade homicide
and sex crimes department, was shot outside his home. None of them
had any apparent relationship with Milosevic, but all were in
positions to investigate the criminal underworld populated by these
deceased associates of Milosevic.
Admittedly, Belgrade is teeming with crime, black market sales,
high-level corruption and murders, many of which are never solved.
But the recent attacks on such high-profile figures as Arkan and
Bulatovic are causing the common Belgrade citizen to worry for his
own safety, reasoning that if such prominent and protected men can
be shot in public, no one is safe in the capital.
In fact, the reality appears to be just the opposite. Because of
these men's influential positions and dangerous careers, they have
been targeted. To determine who is methodically executing them, we
must ask: Who gains from their deaths and why?
Milosevic himself might like to have fewer potential witnesses
around if he ever faces the United Nations war crimes tribunal.
But, the men being killed are the few remaining friends of the
president. They were also the men in control of the security
apparatus that Milosevic relies upon for his personal safety, as
well as to guarantee national security. And, this could actually
backfire: Remember the case of Slobodan Miljkovic, whose lawyer
handed over war crimes testimony after his death.
If Milosevic himself is not the perpetrator, than perhaps a foreign
intelligence agency is. Milosevic has accused foreign entities,
such as the CIA, and Montenegrin nationalists of the recent slew of
murders. Neither of these suspects would gain much, however, from a
scattered and long-term campaign against Belgrade's most elite
criminals. Also, Milosevic's accusation infers that a foreign power
has maintained a covert operation in downtown Belgrade for three
years - which is hard to believe.
The Serb opposition could be suspected of foul play. However, this
would only be useful if they actually assassinated the president.
Plus, the Serb opposition is burdened with a history of internal
friction [http://www.stratfor.com/CIS/commentary/c9910082325.htm]
and disorganization that would prevent a long-term assassination
campaign.
Two more realistic scenarios do present themselves as potential
explanations. The first: Belgrade's most powerful men are involved
in infighting, and these deaths are a result of high-level
retaliatory warfare. Serbia is war-torn and impoverished. Its upper
class earns its wealth through power, threats and criminal
activities. The underground is overcrowded and the military, police
and paramilitaries each vie to be the most powerful. Milosevic is
relatively safe in power but his associates are climbing over each
other to claw their way to safety and riches - or at least the Serb
version of them.
This kind of competition between skilled fighters and seasoned
mobsters could certainly lead to a three year long string of
assassinations. And, the overwhelming lack of closure in most of
these cases suggests infighting, since Milosevic would forcefully
reply to any external attack on his closest ranks.
The second scenario: Belgrade's elite is engaged in a turf war with
the primary drug traffickers in the Balkans, who are Kosovar
Albanians. The poverty and lawlessness of the Balkans - as well as
its convenient geography - funnels immensely profitable drug trade
through the region. Heroin from Turkey is transported through the
Balkans to Western Europe and the United States. An estimated 80
percent of Europe's heroin enters through the Balkan route, which
is worth approximately $400 billion per year, according to the
Center for Strategic and International Studies and the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
The Kosovar Albanians have their own mafia to control the drug
trade. They rely on strong ethnic identification and extended
family loyalty to hold together a cohesive smuggling operation.
They also were tightly tied to the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and
the arms smuggling needed to equip the KLA during its war with
Serbia. If the Serb elite is vying for the Albanian-dominated
heroin trade, it could very well be meeting with years of
assassinations.
Not only do ethnic Albanians have a reputation of fighting to
protect their drug trade, but they already despise the Serb
nationalists for their violence toward ethnic Albanians. Milosevic
was known to use the paramilitaries for specific revenge missions
in Kosovo, which could have been in response to the slaying of his
own comrades in Belgrade. Not coincidentally, none of these men
were killed during the NATO bombing of Kosovo last summer, when
drug battles would have been overshadowed by war.
Whether stemming from an internal quarrel or a drug war compounded
by ethnicity, the argument remains that these eleven deaths are
related. Bulatovic and Arkan did not die in isolated
assassinations.
_______
Macdonald Stainsby
-----
Check out the Tao ten point program: http://new.tao.ca
***
"Our enemies are not our enemies due to the lots of mistakes and blunders we made, but due to the few good things we did".
- Peron
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