----- Original Message ----- From: hkb <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Wednesday, April 26, 2000 4:35 PM Subject: MLL: Fw: India and China ----- Original Message ----- From: Ulhas Joglekar <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Wednesday, April 26, 2000 3:02 PM Subject: Fw: India > > > STRATFOR.COM Global Intelligence Update > > 26 April 2000 > > > > > > India Challenges China in South China Sea > > > > > > Summary > > > > India intends to hold a series of bilateral and unilateral naval > > exercises in the South China Sea in October and November 2000, > > according to government sources cited by the Hindustan Times April > > 24. The decision comes amid debate within the Indian armed forces > > over the reshaping of naval forces and the expansion of their > > operational capabilities. By extending its area of operation firmly > > into the South China Sea, India presents a direct challenge to > > China, which claims the entire area as its territorial waters. This > > promises both a redefinition of the naval balance of power in the > > region, and an intensification of tensions between New Delhi and > > Beijing. > > > > Analysis > > > > During a recent Indian Naval Commanders' Conference, the Naval > > Operations Directorate announced plans for unilateral Indian navy > > exercises in the South China Sea later this year, according to > > government sources cited in the Hindustan Times April 24. The > > announcement comes amid debate within India's armed forces over the > > future role of the navy, including plans to increase its aircraft > > carrier force to three. > > > > The decision to extend the reach and operational areas of India's > > expanding navy firmly into the South China Sea will not only > > trigger a reassessment of the balance of naval power in the region, > > but also risks a deterioration of Beijing-New Delhi relations as > > India encroaches into territory claimed by China. > > > > India's navy intends to hold bilateral exercises with South Korea > > and Vietnam in October and November 2000. Following these > > exercises, four or five Indian vessels will remain in the South > > China Sea to be joined by an Indian Kilo-class submarine and > > reconnaissance aircraft for unilateral naval exercises. > > > > The exercises fit within India's shifting definition of its naval > > areas of concern, as laid out by Defense Minister George Fernandes > > April 14 at the launching of India's latest warship the INS > > Brahmaputra. Fernandes said India's "area of interest extends > > from the north of the Arabian Sea to the South China Sea." The > > debate in New Delhi over the role of India's navy is apparently > > being won by those who wish to expand the operational capabilities > > of the navy and to increase attention to force projection and > > expeditionary forces. > > > > India's spreading naval reach is in part to counter the growing > > threat of piracy on both sides of the Strait of Malacca. In > > November 1999, Indian navy and coast guard vessels recaptured a > > hijacked Japanese cargo ship after a 12-hour chase. The hijacking > > prompted Japan to consider increased financial and possibly naval > > support to patrol the areas around the Strait in cooperation with > > China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and South Korea. This > > in turn contributed to Fernandes calling Japan and Vietnam key > > strategic partners in anti-piracy operations. > > > > > > However, while India-Japan ties remain constrained by Tokyo's > > ongoing attempts to mediate between India and Pakistan, ties with > > Vietnam have been improving since a 1994 visit of then Indian Prime > > Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao to Hanoi and the signing of a defense > > cooperation agreement. More recently, India has re-embarked on a > > "Look East" policy, increasing military and economic cooperation > > with Vietnam and enhancing ties with other South East Asian > > nations, including Myanmar. > > > > > > At the same time India is expanding its naval reach into the South > > China Sea, it is expanding its force structure as well. The > > 2000-2001 defense budget includes $940 million for the Navy, up > > from $835 million the previous year. Of this, 60 percent has been > > allotted to acquisition of weapons and modernization programs. > > > > While India's single operational aircraft carrier, the INS Viraat, > > is under refit, there are plans to build a domestic carrier and > > acquire the re-fit Russian Kiev-class Admiral Gorshkov. Prior to > > the recent launch of the INS Brahmaputra, India also commissioned > > its third fleet tanker, adding to its blue-water capabilities. > > There are plans to launch six more warships in 2000. India's naval > > expansion also includes buying several Russian MiG-29 Ks to add to > > its naval air force. > > > > India is also preparing to launch a Kilo-class submarine capable of > > ballistic missile launches, according to the Hindu. On April 10, > > India tested the Dhanush ship-launched ballistic missile, and there > > are plans to fit some of India's Kilo-class submarines with Russian > > Klub-class ballistic missiles. > > > > The expanding navy presents a direct challenge to China. Beijing > > and New Delhi are already competing for control over the Andaman > > Sea, along the west coast of Myanmar leading to the entrance of the > > Strait of Malacca. On land, the border between China and India > > remains contested in two areas, and China's traditional backing of > > Pakistan continues to hinder the potential for improved relations. > > > > The move to expand operations from the north of the Arabian Sea > > through the South China Sea and to establish an expeditionary- > > capable force not only threatens China's areas of operation but > > also alters the balance of naval power in the region. Further, > > plans for three operation carriers will make India equal to the > > United Kingdom and second only to the United States in carrier > > assets. Regionally, other carrier-capable navies have just one, > > including Russia and Thailand. > > > > Currently in the Pacific, West Pacific and Indian Ocean, the only > > viable expeditionary naval force is the United States. While Japan > > has significant naval forces, it will be some time before it is > > capable of extensive expeditionary activities. In creating a viable > > blue-water reach, including refueling and support craft, India will > > significantly surpass China's naval capabilities as well. > > > > For China, the threat of an encroaching Indian naval presence will > > further undermine any potential Sino-Indian reconciliation and > > cooperation. An India capable of placing a carrier force off > > Chinese shore - supported by submarines capable of ballistic > > missile launches - drastically changes the equation with regard to > > China's support for India's rival Pakistan. With Russia supplying > > much of the technology and hardware, Sino-Russian relations will > > also be strained. > > > > India's plans stem from several sources - counter-piracy, > > protection of trade routes, balancing China and establishing itself > > as a world power rather than simply a regional power. China has two > > choices: tie down Indian defense spending on land-based assets by > > instigating tensions with Pakistan or, more costly, match India's > > naval expansion with its own. > > > > China will likely follow both paths, increasing its own naval reach > > in the short term by focusing on the establishment and maintenance > > of forward bases in the Spratly Islands and Myanmar. As India > > pushes to redefine itself as an international naval power, friction > > and confrontation with China will become more volatile. > > > > > > > > (c) 2000 WNI, Inc. http://www.stratfor.com/ > > > > ___________________________________________________ > > > > SUBSCRIBE to FREE, DAILY GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE UPDATES by clicking on > > http://www.stratfor.com/services/giu/subscribe.asp > > > > UNSUBSCRIBE FROM THE GLOBAL INTELLIGENCE UPDATES (GIU) > > http://www.stratfor.com/services/giu/subscribe.asp > > > > or send your name, title, organization, address, phone number, and > > e-mail to [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > ___________________________________________________ > > > > STRATFOR.COM 504 Lavaca, Suite 1100 Austin, TX 78701 > > Phone: 512-583-5000 Fax: 512-583-5025 > > Internet: http://www.stratfor.com/ > > Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > ___________________________________________________ > --- from list [EMAIL PROTECTED] ---
