>Subject: [pttp] Iraqi Sanctions Monitor Number 75 >Status: > >Iraqi Sanctions Monitor Number 75 >Friday, June 16 2000 > >LATEST NEWS + VIEWS + MESSAGES > >Gulf war reparations may take Iraq more than a century to pay >(The Guardian, June 16) > >Iraq faces a series of gigantic claims for Gulf war damage - so large that >there is almost no way to recover the money, short of extending sanctions >for well over 100 years. > >Although Iraq has so far paid about $7bn, further claims amounting to $276bn >are in the pipeline at the United Nations Compensation Commission in Geneva. > >Until now, the commission has processed the smallest and >most straightforward claims. But this week it turned to the first of the big >ones: a $21.5bn demand from Kuwait. > >The scale of the claims has put experts and officials in a quandary. Some >argue that future generations of Iraqis cannot reasonably be expected to >continue paying for Saddam Hussein's folly. Others insist that war victims >are entitled to compensation and that to let Saddam off the hook would set a >dangerous precedent. > >Altogether, about 100 governments have lodged 2.6m separate claims, on their >own behalf and on behalf of individuals and companies. > >Of the claims processed so far, many have been reduced substantially by the >UNCC. One, from the Egyptian government, sought $491m for 915,000 workers >but was eventually settled at just $84m. > >Although Iraq agreed 10 years ago to pay compensation for losses caused by >the invasion and occupation of Kuwait, there was no practical way to recover >the money until December 1996 when the UN's oil-for-food programme started. >Since then, 30% of the revenue from Iraq's oil sales under the programme has >been deducted to pay for war damage and the cost of running the UN >commission. > >The amount that can be collected in this way varies with oil prices but is >currently $400m a month. At that rate, if all the outstanding claims were >approved, it would take Iraq 58 years from now to pay off the debt. > >But as soon as the main debt is paid Iraq will be required to pay interest, >at a rate still to be decided, for the delays in compensation since 1990. >Even at a very modest rate of 3% a year, interest charges could amount to a >further $320bn - in which case Iraq would still be paying for the invasion >of Kuwait in the year 2125. > >Iraq's compensation payments are, however, dependent on continuation of the >oil-for-food programme. A Foreign Office spokesman confirmed yesterday that >the UN has no way of enforcing payments if sanctions are lifted. > >Unless an alternative mechanism is found, the UN may eventually have to >choose between abandoning hope of compensation and continuing sanctions into >the next century. >Arthur Rovine, president of the American Society of International Law and an >expert on Gulf war compensation, said that when the oil-for-food programme >ends `the chances of the claimants collecting all the monies due them would >be reduced severely and perhaps to nil". > >He continued: `Unless Iraq agreed to a mechanism and process similar to the >UNCC, the only alternative would be lawsuits by claimants around the world >in places where they can attach Iraqi assets, including oil assets. > >`Whether or not such lawsuits represent a viable alternative is open to >serious question. In my judgment, it would be a completely disorganised >alternative." > >The UNCC has already awarded $2.9bn to Kuwaiti oil companies for the >destruction of property and the cost of putting out fires in hundreds of oil >wells set alight by Iraq during the war. > >The $21.5bn claim now under consideration - which Kuwait has backed up with >a million documents - is for lost revenue and for oil spilled or destroyed >during the war. `This is the big one we've all been waiting for,' a diplomat >said. >Khaled al-Mudaf, chairman of Kuwait's Public Authority for Assessment of >Compensation, called on the UNCC to `confirm Iraq's responsibility before >the international community for its criminal acts and its liability to >compensate for all consequential damage and loss". He said Iraqi occupying >forces had mined Kuwait's oilfields so as to destroy the emirate. `Just >before its forces withdrew from Kuwait, Iraq ordered the complete blowing up >of Kuwait's oilfield infrastructure: production, refining and export." > >But independent experts who evaluated the claim are understood to have >recommended reducing it to $15.9bn. >Although the UNCC has always accepted expert recommendations so far, this >claim is seen as an issue of principle and could go to a vote. Yesterday, >the commission members failed to agree and postponed their decision for two >weeks. > > Kamil Mahdi, an economist of Iraqi origin at Exeter University, said: >`There's no indication yet how the commission is going to deal with this.. > >`We haven't got to the position yet where these very large claims have been >awarded, and it's important that they should not be awarded. Jordan, for >example, is claiming $8bn and its economy is minute. It's astounding." > >He added: `We're talking of many, many generations of Iraqis to pay this >burden. The whole question has to be solved politically." > > >Turkish official confirms policy on Iraq's territorial integrity >Text of report in English by the Turkish news agency Anatolia > >Ankara, 14th June: Ankara continues its policy regarding preservation of >Iraq's territorial integrity and thinks that Baghdad administration has >responsibilities regarding the solution of problem in Iraq. > >Diplomatic sources said Foreign Ministry Undersecretary Faruk Logoglu >conveyed important messages to Iraqi administration during his visit to this >country between 4th and 7th June. > >Within this framework, Logoglu stressed that northern Iraq was a part of >Iraq and reiterated the policy that "Iraq's territorial integrity should be >preserved". > >The same sources pointed out that the other message given to Baghdad >administration was that the "problem should be solved within Iraq's own >structure". Sources said Iraqi officials were told that Iraqi administration >has important responsibilities in the solution. > >Pointing out that after Iraq withdrew its administrative structure from the >northern part of the country, a gap was formed in the region, the sources >said Iraq should assume a more active role in filling this gap and make >peace with its people in the north, and that they should rely on those >people. The sources said these points were conveyed to the Iraqi side within >the framework of the visit. > >Source: Anatolia news agency, Ankara, in English 1457 gmt 14 Jun 00. > > > >Official says US fleet watches tankers smuggling Iraqi oil >Text of report by Iranian radio on 16th June > >Despite the [UN] embargo on the export of oil by Iraq, this country [Iraq] >smuggles oil to other countries of the region, through collaboration of some >Arab states and under the watchful eyes [vernacular: nezarat] of the >American fleet in the Persian Gulf. > >According to a report by the Central News Unit, the managing director of >Iran's Ports and Shipping Organization, [Hamid] Kalantari, while announcing >the above yesterday, added: The Iraqi oil export has created some problems >by polluting the marine environment. We have allocated a sum of 20m dollars >to purchase and erect sophisticated equipment in order to clean the >pollution left by such oil tankers. > >Source: Voice of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Tehran, in Persian 0330 gmt >16 Jun 00. > > >MESSAGES + MISCELLANY > > >Thousands of miles from Incirlik Air Base in Turkey, the no-fly zones >recently went on trial. Professor Jeffery Weiss wrote this elegant >synopsis, which touches on the legality, effectiveness, and responsibility >of protest. > An article from the Des Moines Register is also attached. > >Note that Professor Weiss offers a free report on the no-fly zones (write >him at [EMAIL PROTECTED]). > >Regards, >Drew Hamre >Golden Valley, MN USA >Dear friends, >............................................ > >As promised, please find enclosed below an excerpt from Scott Ritter's >latest -- and most detailed and thus most powerful -- article on Iraq's >disarmament. The article is called "The Case for Iraq's Qualitative >Disarmament." It is currently in press, and will be published by "Arms >Control Today." > >The reference for the article is: Scott Ritter, "The Case for Iraq's >Qualitative Disarmament," Arms Control Today, Volume 30, Number 5, June >2000, pg. __ > >The URL for the article is: >http://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/june00/iraqjun.htm > >Included below are the most powerful excerpts from his article. These >statements should be used in the discussion with Butler. My apologies >for the delay in sharing this with you -- please note that Butler will be >on-line at 5 pm EST! > >I STRONGLY recommend reading this article by Scott Ritter. It is an >excellent and very powerful resource for us to use in our struggle to end >the war against the people of Iraq. > >Once again, the article can be viwed >at: http://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/june00/iraqjun.htm > >- Rania Masri > >....................................................... > >SCOTT RITTER: > >"Given the comprehensive nature of the monitoring regime put in place by >UNSCOM, which included a strict export-improt control regime, it was >possible as early as 1997 to determine that, from a qualitative >standpoint, Iraq had been disarmed. Iraq no longer possessed any >meaningful quantities of chemical or biological agent, if it possessed any >at all, and the industrial means to produce these agents had either been >eliminated or were subject to stringent monitoring. The same was true of >IRaq's nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities. As long as monitoring >inspections remained in place, iraq presented a WMD-based threat to no >one." > >"THrough its extensive investigations, UNSCOM was able to ensure that the >vast majority of IRaq's WMD arsenal, along wth the means to produce such >weaponry, was eliminated. Through monitoring, UNSCOM was able to guarantee >that Iraq was not reconstituting that capability in any meaningful way." > >Ballistic Missiles: > >"In his Dec. 1992 report to the SC, then-Executive Chairmain Rolf Ekeus >noted, "All ballistic missiles and items related to their production and >development, identified as requiring destruction ... have been >destroyed.." > >Chemical Weapons (CW): > >"There was absolutely no evidence that Iraq was trying to hide CW >production equipment. In its monitoring capacity, UNSCOM carried out >extensive inspections of all of Iraq's civilian chemical manufacturing >infastructure and found no evidence of illicit stores of CW precursor >chemicals. Precursor chemicals are difficult to hide from inspectors >because the minimum amount required for any viable CW-agent production run >is several hundred tons. Inspections of dozens of Iraq munitions depots by >UNSCOM also failed to turn up any illicit unfilled munitions." > >"However, the key to the qualitative argument is that individual pieces of >CW production equipment are worthless unless they are assembled in a >specific configuration, a unique combination that would be readily >discernible to weapons inspectors. ... THe point is that all of UNSCOM's >speculative fears concerning reconstitution of an Iraqi CW capability can >be laid to rest as long as viable monitoring regime... is in place -- the >kind of regime that existed prior to the withdrawal of inspectors in >Dec. 1998." {NOTE: Butler removed the inspectors w/o permission from the >UNSC.} > >Biological Weapons (BW): > >"...The biologists responsible for monitoring Iraqi compliance found >exactly that --- compliance. In all their inspections, the monitors could >find no meanginful evidence of Iraqi circumvention of its committment not to >reconstitute the BW program." > >"One of the conclusions drawn from the extensive monitoring of Iraq's >biological capbilities carried out by UNSCOM was that the overall level of >Iraq's biolgoical capability, in terms of available infrastructure, was >very low. ... The reality of the situation was that, regardless of >UNSCOM's ability to verify Iraq's declarations regarding its past BW >programs, the major BW production facility at AL Hakim had been destroyed, >together with its associated equipment, and extensive monitoring of Iraq's >biological infrastructure could find no evidence of continued proscribed >activity. If weapons inspectors were once again allowed back into Iraq to >resume monitoring along the lines carried out by UNSCOM, there is no reason >to doubt that similar findings would be had, with the same level of >confidence." > >Nuclear Weapons > >"Often overloked in the debate about Iraq's nuclear capabilities is just >how effective the IAEA was at destroying, dismantling, or rendering >harmless Iraq's nuclear weapons capability. Despite every attmpt by Iraq >to retain some level of nuclear weapons capability, the massive >infrastructure Baghdad had assembled by 1991 to produce a nuclear bomb had >been eliminated by 1995." > >"There has been no evidence provided of any attempt by Iraq to acquire a >nuclear weapon or major related components since 1991." > >Conclusion: > >"No one knows for sure what has transpired in Iraq since the last >inspectors were withdrawn. Conjecture aside, however, there is absolutely no >reason to believe Iraq could have meaningfuly reconstituted any element of >its WMD capabilities in the past 18 months." >[...] > >"By the end of 1998, Iraq had, in fact, been disarmed to a level >unprecedented in modern history, but UNSCOM and the Security Council were >unable-and in some instances, unwilling-to acknowledge this accomplishment. > >"Unfortunately, the quantitative standards for Iraqi compliance set forth >in Resolution 687 are still in place today in the form of Resolution 1284, >which emphasizes verifying material balance over resuming viable >monitoring activities. This is a formula for disaster, perpetuating the >cycle of conflict with Iraq that led to the discrediting of UNSCOM in >December 1998. UNMOVIC will meet with the same fate unless the Security >Council takes measures to refocus the inspection regime on disarmament >issues related to viable weapons and weapons production capability, instead >of engaging in a never-ending effort to account for every last vestige of >Iraq's former WMD programs." > >[...] > >"One serious obstacle to the reformulation of Iraq's disarmament >obligation by the Security Council is the current U.S. policy of removing >Saddam Hussein from power, codified in the Iraqi Liberation Act of >1998. That law has so far failed to threaten Saddam Hussein in any >meaningful way, but it has succeeded in precluding any meaningful >diplomatic initiative by locking the United States into a unilateral >policy that makes cooperation with Iraq impossible. If the United States >is serious about disarming Iraq, it should repeal the Iraqi Liberation Act >and work within the framework of the Security Council to formulate a >policy that results in the rapid reintroduction of meaningful, >monitoring-based weapons inspections into Iraq. That will require the >lifting, not simply the suspension, of sanctions. While it is true that the >sanctions have retarded Iraq's ability to acquire technology that >could aid any WMD reconstitution effort, Resolution 687 stated that a >finding of compliance would trigger the lifting of sanctions. Sanctions >are thus not an open-ended option. At some point, they will need to be >lifted, and if a finding of qualitative disarmament backed with the >implementation of viable monitoring-based inspections can be had, then >there is no reason to keep sanctions in place. The Security Council must >also follow through on the promise it made in paragraph 14 of Resolution >687, which speaks of regional disarmament. While monitoring-based >inspections in Iraq must be expected to last indefinitely, they cannot be >expected to last in a vacuum. Unless arrangements are made to address WMD >programs in Iran and Israel, as well as the regional proliferation of >advanced conventional weaponry, Iraq will never accept perpetual >disarmament. What is needed is a Security Council resolution that >concludes Resolution 687, supercedes Resolution 1284, and redefines the >disarmament obligations of Iraq to meet more realistic qualitative >benchmarks. In addition to verifying Iraqi compliance with these new >benchmarks, the resulting inspectorate, whether a revamped UNMOVIC or a new >agency, would be tasked with implementing a monitoring regime similar to the >one UNSCOM had in place prior to its withdrawal from Iraq. Once Iraq's >disarmament along clearly defined qualitative standards had been verified by >weapons inspectors, and after a viable monitoring regime was in place to >detect and deter any attempt at reconstituting its WMD programs, the >Security Council would lift, not suspend, economic >sanctions." > >.......................................... > >Richard Butler's Salary and the U.S. > >* UNSCOM inspectors and the UNSCOM chairmen were not salaried UN employees, >for the UN did not pay their salaries. UN member State governments donated >individuals for UNSCOM and also financed their salaries. That said, an >inspector's home government had no authority over the inspector. Every >inspector answered and was responsible to the Security Council. > >* Richard Butler was nominated by the Security Council to be UNSCOM chairman > >* In order for Butler to have the post the Australian government needed to >agree to pay his salary > >* The Australian government told Butler that it would not finance his >salary > >* Despite the payment refusal, Butler told Kofi Annan that he accepted the >chairmanship. Butler did not tell Annan that the Australian government >would not pay his salary > >* Annan announced that Butler was the new UNSCOM chairman > >* Butler went to the Australian government and told it that that the UN was >not going to pay his salary > >* The Australian government made an arrangement with its U.S. counterpart. >Australia's government paid Butler's salary, and the U.S. government then >reimbursed the Australian government > >* Therefore, the U.S. did not make direct payments to Butler; however, it >is unlikely that the Australian government would have agreed to make a >salary payment without the U.S. reimbursement > > >Richard Butler, the U.S., and Desert Fox > >UNSCOM set up a listening post to monitor communication between and by top >members of the Iraqi leadership. This post was for UNSCOM's use only. >Richard Butler, to the anger of UNSCOM inspectors, informed the U.S. about >the listening post. The U.S. used that listening post to set Desert Fox >targets, which had very little to do with Iraq's WMD production facilities. >Aside from targeting Iraqi intelligence and Republican guard units, the U.S. >and UK went after members of the Iraqi leadership with information gleaned >from the listening post to which Butler had given the U.S. access. There >are credible claims that the very first two launched missiles were targeted >at the two sites where Saddam Hussein was supposed to potentially be with >his main mistress on the day of the attack. > >For other commentary on Butler and the U.S. see Scott Ritter's "Endgame" and >look in the index under "Butler". >----------------------------------------------- > > >Ritter shoots from the hip > >The controversial American who led the United Nations task force sent to >destroy all of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, and so put an end of >sanctions, says that while his part of the deal has been accomplished the >rest of the rest of the bargain has not been honoured. The weapons are gone >but the sanctions remain. And the dying in Iraq continues. >Scott Ritter, the former second in command of the United Nations arms >monitoring group Unscom and author of the book Endgame, is to be the main >speaker at the launch of the Great Britain-Iraq Society in the House of >Commons on June 26. This is sure to draw a huge attendance and space is >limited so if you want to attend see the details on the bottom of this >bulletin. > > >A MESSAGE FROM GEORGE GALLOWAY MP > >Great Britain - Iraq Society >C/o Mariam Appeal >1 Northumberland Avenue >Trafalgar Square >London WC2N 5BW >Tel : 020 7872 5451 >Fax : 020 7753 2731 > >GREAT BRITAIN - IRAQ SOCIETY > >Working for Reconciliation > >Dear Friend, > >The GBIS is a non-political society working for better understanding, >reconciliation and peace between the peoples of Great Britain and Iraq. The >GBIS believes that what unites these two historic peoples is greater than >that which divides them. Membership is open to all people of goodwill of any >nationality who wish to see the strengthening of British-Iraqi relations and >an end to recent enmity. > >The GBIS will circulate a newsletter, publish material, organise events, >exchange visits, organise trade missions, religious and other tourism and >generally seek to rebuild the once warm relations between the two countries. > >The Great Britain Iraq Society (GBIS) will work for reconciliation between >the peoples of Great Britain and Iraq. It will foster cultural, social, >educational and economic relations between the two countries and, while >eschewing directly political issues will work to clear obstacles to the >success of these objectives. > >Membership shall be on an individual basis with an annual membership fee of >�25 (�15 unwaged). Cheques should be made payable to the GBIS. Membership >shall entitle the holder to a regular newsletter and priority for attendance >at any GBIS event. > >The GBIS will hold its inaugural meeting in the Grand Committee Room of the >House of Commons on Monday 26th June from 8.00 pm - 10.00 pm. There will >also be a reception in the Jubilee Room for GBIS members only. > >For further information, please contact either myself or Stuart Halford on >Tel: 020 7872 5451, Fax: 020 7753 2731 or E-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > >I look forward to seeing you on the 26th June, > >Yours sincerely > > >George Galloway MP > >tel: +44 (0)20 78725451 >fax: +44 (0)20 77532731 >email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] >web: www.mariamappeal.com > > > > > > >------------------------------------------------------------------------ >Free, Unlimited Calls Anywhere! >Conference in the whole family on the same call. >Let the fights begin! Visit Firetalk.com - Click below. >http://click.egroups.com/1/5476/2/_/22961/_/961216810/ >------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >Knowledge is Power! >Elimination of the exploitation of man by man >http://www.egroups.com/group/pttp/ >POWER TO THE PEOPLE! > >Subscribe: [EMAIL PROTECTED] >Unsubscribe: [EMAIL PROTECTED] >Change Delivery Options: >http://www.egroups.com/mygroups > > __________________________________ KOMINFORM P.O. Box 66 00841 Helsinki - Finland +358-40-7177941, fax +358-9-7591081 e-mail [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.kominf.pp.fi ___________________________________ [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subscribe/unsubscribe messages mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] ___________________________________
