>Subject: Fw: British Counter Insurgency Strategy > >British Counter Insurgency Strategy=20 >from The Sovereign Nation, May/June 2000 >The following are extracts from a paper by the late Pat Mc Geown = >entitled "British Counter Insurgency Strategy". This paper was written = >at the time of the Brooke talks in 1991. Much of Mc Geown's analysis has = >proved prophetic in relation to how the British state went about = >defeating the Provisionals. More importantly it is an aid to Republicans = >today in learning from past mistakes and eliminating them from our = >strategies.=20 > >In essence Britain's counter-insurgency strategy, which at present dates = >from the arrival of British forces, their generals and experts in 1969 = >to the present day. It is best described as a political/military = >strategy co-ordinating governmental, judicial, economic, social and = >psychological agencies and dimensions, and aimed at containing, = >isolating and destroying identifiable resistance.=20 > >Let's remind ourselves of the five essential elements that compose the = >substance of British counter-insurgency strategy in Ireland, not only at = >the high points but on a day to day working basis: a. Identify the enemy = >and its reasons for existence. b. Co-ordinate the resources and = >personnel of all sections of the establishment against it. c. Contain = >the enemy and wear it down tactically. d. Isolate and frustrate it is = >every way, politically and militarily. e. Destroy it. This = >sectionalising of the process should not be taken as meaning that each = >is separate, or that one follows from the other in clear cut form as = >there is much overlapping.. While the 'counter-insurgency' expert starts = >by 'identifying', he is already 'co-ordinating' and so on, while he is = >'containing and isolating' he is continually trying to identify new = >faces and approaches etc. They are continuous processes only finished = >when he has 'destroyed'.=20 > =20 > > (a)...Identifying the enemy and it's reasons for existence..=20 > > Right from the start British strategy had political and military = >dimensions. . The Labour government of the day appeared to veer on the = >side of appeasement of the rebellious nationalist population, buying = >them off with reform in an attempt to control them again. They actively = >encouraged the setting up of the SDLP (Social Democratic and Labour = >Party), a Catholic middle class party set up around John Hume in an = >effort to take politics off the street, where the constitutional = >nationalists had little control, and back into the safe corridors of = >power in Westminster and Stormont (Northern Ireland's local parliament). = > > > By giving the SDLP their patronage they effectively chose the = >nationalist leadership that they would deal with and they promoted them = >in the media and press. These are age-old tactics of counter-insurgents = >in the broadest sense. The Unionists saw the situation differently. They = >saw all disorder as resulting from IRA conspiracies. The way to put them = >down was by force and threat of force. The RUC (Royal Ulster = >Constabulary), the armed militia that simply reflected and defended = >political unionism, supported this view.=20 > >The British Army at this juncture appear to have been content to just = >fulfill the first role of counter-insurgency, identify your enemy and = >the possible causes of discontent. Meetings held between senior British = >army personnel and IRA leadership at local level were an integral part = >of this process and also had the primary effect of keeping things quiet = >without having to actually initiate major political reform that could = >destabilize unionism. The IRA had of course their own agenda. But again = >it was an old Brit psychological 'counter-insurgency' tactic 'making the = >opposition feel important, by structuring them into an institution of = >state' without handing them any real power. This was to be used again = >with even greater effect in the 1975 IRA cease-fire period.=20 > >. (b)...Coordinate all resources and personnel...=20 > > A 'Joint Security Committee' had been established aimed at linking all = >the machinery of the state and its forces together into a powerful 'War = >Machine' capable of a co-ordinated and controlled politico/military = >response. However, those who sat on it had differing priorities or = >short-term objectives. The membership in early 1972 was the unionist = >Prime Minister, two unionist Cabinet ministers. the British Army GOC, = >the RUC Chief, and one British government representative. It's make-up = >demonstrates a heavy imbalance towards unionist phobias and paranoia. It = >was to cause much friction between Brit army counter insurgency experts = >and the Stormont administration and local forces. As British military = >'counter insurgency' experts like Brigadier Frank Kitson began to arrive = >in the North carrying with them the experience of British = >counter-insurgency campaigns in Malaya, Kenya, Muscat, Oman and Cyprus, = >that tension would increase. Kitson at this time was at Oxford = >University, writing the British Army's counter-insurgency' bible, "Low = >Intensity Operations". He was undoubtedly brought to the North in 1970 = >with the dual brief; to attempt to structure a 'counter insurgency' = >response and to gain experience of what was a relatively new = >'counter-insurgency' situation.=20 > >There were things that could be done in the far off obscure ends of the = >'Empire', which could not be done under the watchful eye of the mass = >media, in a so-called liberal democratic society so close to Britain and = >Western Europe. The 'counter-insurgency' strategy for Ireland in the = >70's would require a degree of sophistication and subtlety that the = >unionists were certainly showing themselves incapable of. It would have = >more to do with propaganda than physical show of strength. This is = >reflected in the Brit understanding that right from the start they = >needed to dictate how others saw the essence of the problem in the = >North. Their first propaganda victory was in getting acceptance for the = >explanation that the North's 'troubles' had sectarian roots and that = >British soldiers were the 'peace-keepers'. This is not to say that = >Kitson advocated a 'softly softly' approach, and his use of a curfew' on = >the Falls Road in his first days here adequately demonstrates this. = >Rather, what Kitson saw as important was that all the institutions of = >state be co-ordinated to provide a disciplined and controlled = >politico/military response.=20 > >(c)...Contain the Enemy: Wear it down tactically.=20 > > By 1972 nationalist Ireland was almost completely alienated from the = >British and it was recognized that--as opposed to 'containing' the = >situation, and allowing it to evolve towards a climate in which a = >political settlement could be initiated to isolate the = >'insurgents'--another cornerstone of 'counter insurgency' strategy, the = >opposite was happening. Even with the mass internment arrests the IRA = >had no shortage or recruits and apparently unlimited support and = >sympathy within the nationalist community, while the possible = >'appeasement nationalists' the SDLP had been forced almost completely = >out of the system through which reform could be initiated. There was a = >serious imbalance in the politio/military strategy towards the military = >solution. Through the suspension of Stormont, the institution of direct = >British government rule and the short-lived IRA truce the British = >initiated a new political climate which would allow them to rebalance = >their strategy towards bringing in the reformers (SDLP) and 'isolating' = >the revolutionaries (IRA). Or at least ensure that the situation didn't = >deteriorate further, beyond an 'acceptable level of violence.' The = >climax of this phase of Brit 'counter insurgency' strategy would be the = >attempted political settlement, and subsequent failure, of Sunningdale = >in 1974.=20 > >." As for Special laws and powers they were progressively introduced; = >the Emergency Provisions Act, (a refined version of the Special Powers = >Act),--reforms are often little more than refined versions of repressive = >methods--the Prevention of Terrorism Act, and the introduction of = >juryless Diplock courts. A further important tactic in use during this = >phase, and with lasting effects, was the use of Brit = >'counter-insurgency' operatives in the 26 Counties to attempt to isolate = >Republicans and allow more pro-Brit elements in the government to have = >their way. The planting of bombs in Dublin on the eve of a parliamentary = >debate on special legislation was an example.=20 > >The whole concept of psychological warfare was something that Kitson = >pioneered and later went on to teach to all British officers during = >training as 'psych-ops'. The full extent of 'psych-ops' is infinite and = >revolutionary, in other words it is continually updated. However, we do = >know the basic principles--'discredit, demoralize, and intimidate'--some = >examples of their practical use have been made public in the revelations = >of ex-British army personnel and agents. It ranges from the most basic = >black propaganda to murder. Kitson accepted the Mao analysis of what = >makes guerrillas/insurgents tick, when he wrote, "It is in men's minds = >that wars of subversion have to be fought and decided.' Following on = >this psychological state of the collective and individual insurgent's = >mind becomes a target. As indeed does the hearts and minds of the people = >who support and shelter them. One technique that became very much a = >fixation with the Kitsonian 'counter insurgency' strategists and is = >still in use today was the attempt to create a 'split' in Republican = >ranks. The 'hawks' and 'doves' stories that continue to appear are an = >important part of this process. As are the 'going political' stories and = >their sensationalist 'touts and traitors' line. A brief look at the = >background of the type of publications and journalists who produce such = >drivel should demonstrate to anyone where their sympathies lie. A former = >Brit member of the 'black propaganda unit; Colin Wallace, had much to = >say about these types of stories and what their aim was. While there are = >many other examples of how the technique worked in the early years, the = >best years for a practical study of the battle of hearts and minds is = >post 1976, when the processes of Normalization, Ulsterisation and = >Criminalisation were introduced=20 > >. (d) ...Isolate and frustrate the enemy in every politically and = >militarily=20 > >. For a range of tactical reasons, the British administration had = >decided to enter into talks with the IRA in late 1974, early 1975. Not = >least amongst those reasons was that a 'breathing space' would give them = >time to prepare the ground for their new policies. They believed that = >after an initial cooling off period the 'new RUC' could be made, if not = >more acceptable to nationalists, then at least more apt when linked with = >the UDR at military type patrolling and containment in nationalist = >areas. Also, by using a 'police force' as the frontline defence against = >insurgency it may be possible to de-politicize the situation and portray = >it as something less than a war, a battle between 'police and criminal = >gangs'. And a reduction in the level of actual British troops could be = >portrayed as part of this cosmetic exercise.=20 > >. ...Normalization.=20 > >. If Ulsterisation was in essence a military strategy with political and = >psychological dimensions, Normalization was essentially the political, = >social and economic prong. Its central plank was to convince people that = >normality or peace was returning and that there was no need for war. The = >'terrorists' were the only ones who didn't want peace. If they could = >turn the nationalist community against the insurgents, or make them = >think they had turned them, they could isolate the insurgent. Thousands = >of millions of pounds were pumped in during this period to give the = >impression of growing prosperity and fairness. New housing went up = >wholesale particularly in nationalist areas. Estates (housing projects = >in American parlance. facilitator note.) were specifically designed by = >'counter insurgency' specialists, so that they could be easily sealed = >off in the event of an incident. Factories and industry appeared to be = >booming, again with particular direction towards nationalist areas. = >Leisure centres (community centres) grew up out of nowhere. Everywhere = >things appeared to be getting better. "If only the terrorists would stop = >all could be rosy"..."and anyway, the terrorists were being = >defeated"..."They were less effective than they had been, the arrest and = >conviction rates were up and the nationalist community were informing on = >them". These were all common propaganda lines of the day and statistics = >were produced to back up their image. The opportunist use by Brit = >propaganda units of an incident involving IRA volunteers when three = >children were killed and the subsequent 'gut-reaction' peace movement, = >to give the impression that the nationalist community were rejecting the = >IRA is another example of the tactic of psychological warfare in action. = >This period also saw the increased and more refined co- ordination of = >all sections of state control, (control in the ideological sense as much = >as physical). Business leaders met with Generals and RUC chiefs, NIO = >(Northern Ireland Office, the official British government department = >charged with administering Northern Ireland. facilitator) officials met = >with church leaders at a local level, and with press and media people on = >a regular basis to ensure that their line and explanations were carried. = >While within the state forces, the fight against insurgents became more = >refined. Targeting of individual Republicans as opposed to the community = >became the order of the day. The policy of normalization is an ongoing = >one so it would be wrong to attempt to judge its real success or failure = >yet. But what is clear, is that primarily the reason that it has not = >brought the Brits the success they planned for is because of their = >inability to get an internal political settlement. Without that the = >facade of normality doesn't hold up internally or internationally.=20 > >...Criminalisation..=20 > >. This was to become the most controversial and least secure part of the = >'counter-insurgency' strategy. It began with the announcement in 1975 = >that no one arrested after March 1976 would be entitled to political = >status in the prisons, but its scope went far wider that prison policy. = >The Brit propaganda line through which they hoped to influence 'hearts = >and minds' here and abroad was that things were returning to normal; = >those who continued to resist were going against the better interests of = >the community, therefore they should be treated as common criminals. As = >it was essentially a 'law and order problem', the way to deal with them = >was investigation, arrest, conviction, and sentencing to a normal prison = >with no privileges under the due process of law. And anyway, they were = >'Mafia-like led by Godfathers only interested in personal gain.' What = >the psychologically oriented propaganda line hid was special laws, = >special 'no-jury' courts, presided over by unionist judges who happily = >accepted co-ordination into the war machine, and ignored torture and = >ill-treatment as a way of getting convictions which are usually the = >result of community co-operation in a normal society.=20 > >Over 80 percent of people convicted in this period were imprisoned on = >the basis of 'self-incriminating' statements signed under physical = >pressure and threat in purpose-built interrogation centres. The onus of = >proof of guilt, normal principle of law, was shifted so that the accused = >had to prove they were innocent. Essentially, in Kitson's own words, the = >law became "...just another weapon in the government's arsenal..." which = >"...becomes little more than a propaganda cover for the disposal of = >unwanted members of the public." Resistance to criminalisation, = >particularly within the prisons, and ultimately with the hunger strike = >deaths of 1981 effectively limited the success of this policy. However, = >it did play an important role in 'counter insurgency' strategy during = >the late '70's.=20 > >(e)...Destroy the Enemy...=20 > > Present Brit counter insurgency strategy centres around the = >Hillsborough Treaty, aimed at nationalists and the Brooke talks aimed at = >unionists. It is based on a 'balancing act', an attempt to balance all = >anti-revolutionary forces in Ireland, be they British oriented, or = >'constitutional nationalist', in a unified structure of sorts which can = >then be co-ordinated into the British counter insurgency forces and used = >to isolate and crush Republican opposition. The Hillsborough Treaty was = > __________________________________ KOMINFORM P.O. 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