>the start of this process. And it's worth remembering it is a = >'revolutionary process.' That is, the plans have not been laid out, just = >the principles, so that adjustments can be made. The common principle of = >all involved is to destroy Republican resistance and the potential = >revolutionary alternative that it may offer to the Irish people. It has = >an Irish dimension only in so far that 26 County politicians now see it = >in their interests to that the force of revolution be crushed before = >they threaten their power and privilege. In this, they have become = >effective open allies of the Brits and turned their backs completely on = >national liberation for their own personal interests. The Hillsborough = >strategy had to undergo changes because of loyalist misunderstanding and = >intransigence.=20 > >The Brooks talks are about balancing Hillsborough's illusion of an Irish = >dimension, and stabilizing unionists through the demand for the = >amendment of dropping Articles 2 and 3 (articles in the Irish = >constitution that refuse to recognize partition, and which consider = >that, in theory, Irish law extends through all of Ireland.) But in = >essence the process begun at Hillsborough in 1985 will remain, although = >its mutual slope and title may change. It marked the first total = >co-ordination of all counter revolutionary forces in Ireland and = >Britain. Like all phases of 'counter insurgency' strategy already used = >it will be evolved and refined in the days ahead and it is important to = >remember this when dealing with counter insurgency/revolutionary = >strategy. It mirrors revolutionary strategy in that it too has to be = >progressive. Albeit only in so far that it brings about limited reforms = >as those who hold power attempt to hold onto it. The prize that is being = >played for is who holds power. It can't be static. Because in the main, = >the Hillsborough process is the current Brit counter insurgency strategy = >directed against Republicans, we look at it more closely. It is = >worthwhile remembering the climate in which Hillsborough was conceived = >and initiated in.=20 > >There had long been an acceptance amongst military strategists that the = >IRA could not be defeated militarily. In the period after the hunger = >strikes and with Sinn Fein's move to radical revolutionary politics and = >into the public electoral process and their apparent success there, it = >was felt by the nationalist 'constitutionalists' that unless the Brit = >government moved there was a danger that the situation would no longer = >be containable. The Brits saw an opener in the nationalist community in = >that if the SDLP could be brought in to an internal settlement then the = >nationalist community could be divided with a significant section siding = >with British interests. In such a situation it may be possible to mop up = >the IRA and, through isolating the political force of Sinn Fein, to = >render it impotent. It required the creating of a basic illusion to end = >deep nationalist alienation, and some very subtle management to increase = >the prestige of the SDLP and church (the main anti- revolutionary = >parties in the nationalist community) to do so. Funding of community = >based ACE schemes under church and SDLP patronage and the putting down = >of others and the careful management of international funding are ways = >of doing this. Hillsborough was all about providing the illusion of an = >Irish Dimension, whereby basic nationalist rights could be protected by = >the Dublin government in consultation with London and where it was = >possible that sometime in the future a United Ireland, the basic = >ideological target the supports Republicanism, could be negotiated. The = >practical implementation of this strategy, designed to split and recruit = >a section of the nationalist community, required a re-identification of = >who actually was the enemy., as some old enemies may now be allies, a = >re-look at coordination as there was now the extra dimension of = >cross-border co-operation, a limited open co-operation of the SDLP and = >church, and a refinement of containment and isolation in the light of = >the above.=20 > >The full effectiveness of the Hillsborough process as a 'counter = >insurgency' strategy with the potential for destroying Republican = >resistance remains to be seen. However, one can already see the cracks = >appearing as the perfect theory is tested against day to day practical = >implementation. Also the obvious weakness in the Hillsborough/Brooke = >balancing act is precisely this. It is a balancing act in theory. Too = >much emphasis or weight to either side and it can tilt out of balance, = >causing fragmentation. Republicans attempt to influence this by making = >it difficult for 'constitutional' nationalists to go further into this = >alliance through conceding Articles 2 and 3, and completely surrendering = >to Brit/Loyalists. But the internal contradictions of the 'balancing = >act' are its biggest obstacle. Has it the potential for destroying the = >Republican Movement? There are two answers to this, a simple basic no, = >or a more complex analytical response. The basic Republican prediction = >is that it will fail to bring peace in the same way that other phases = >have failed simply because armed and political resistance are a = >'response' to British rule and all the tinkering and illusion making in = >the world does not change that reality. Nor does it change the fact that = >to maintain British rule in the North the British have to rely on a = >'divided community', not one necessarily divided on sectarian lines, but = >divided on the lines of power and privilege. Those who fall on the wrong = >side of the line, in the frustrating position of no power or privilege = >have only one means of asserting their voice, through political conflict = >and armed struggle. These of course will always be the people who are = >either less supportive of, or don't support British rule at all. =20 > > >-------------------------------------------------------------------------= >------- > >Copyright =A9 2000 Ireland's OWN=20 >Copyright =A9 2000 32 County Sovereignty Movement > > > > >-------------------------------------------------------------------------= >------- > > >-------------------------------------------------------------------------= >------- > > >------=_NextPart_000_00C4_01BFD8BF.B2083A20 >Content-Type: text/html; > charset="iso-8859-1" >Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable > ><!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN"> ><HTML><HEAD> ><META content=3D"text/html; charset=3Diso-8859-1" = >http-equiv=3DContent-Type> ><META content=3D"MSHTML 5.00.2614.3500" name=3DGENERATOR> ><STYLE></STYLE> ></HEAD> ><BODY bgColor=3D#ffffff> ><DIV style=3D"FONT: 10pt arial"> ><DIV> </DIV></DIV> ><DIV><BR></DIV> =20 ><CENTER><BR><B><FONT color=3D#006600><FONT size=3D+2>British Counter = >Insurgency=20 >Strategy</FONT></FONT></B> <BR><B><I><FONT color=3D#006600><FONT = >size=3D+2>from The=20 >Sovereign Nation, May/June 2000</FONT></FONT></I></B></CENTER><B><FONT=20 >face=3D"Times New Roman,Times"><FONT color=3D#000000></FONT></FONT></B> ><P><B><FONT face=3D"Times New Roman,Times"><FONT color=3D#000000>The = >following are=20 >extracts from a paper by the late Pat Mc Geown entitled "British = >Counter=20 >Insurgency Strategy". This paper was written at the time of the Brooke = >talks in=20 >1991. Much of Mc Geown's analysis has proved prophetic in relation to = >how the=20 >British state went about defeating the Provisionals. More importantly it = >is an=20 >aid to Republicans today in learning from past mistakes and eliminating = >them=20 >from our strategies.</FONT></FONT></B><B><FONT=20 >face=3D"Times New Roman,Times"><FONT color=3D#000000></FONT></FONT></B>=20 ><P><B><FONT face=3D"Times New Roman,Times"><FONT color=3D#000000>In = >essence=20 >Britain's counter-insurgency strategy, which at present dates from the = >arrival=20 >of British forces, their generals and experts in 1969 to the present = >day. It is=20 >best described as a political/military strategy co-ordinating = >governmental,=20 >judicial, economic, social and psychological agencies and dimensions, = >and aimed=20 >at containing, isolating and destroying identifiable=20 >resistance.</FONT></FONT></B><B><FONT face=3D"Times New = >Roman,Times"><FONT=20 >color=3D#000000></FONT></FONT></B>=20 ><P><B><FONT face=3D"Times New Roman,Times"><FONT color=3D#000000>Let's = >remind=20 >ourselves of the five essential elements that compose the substance of = >British=20 >counter-insurgency strategy in Ireland, not only at the high points but = >on a day=20 >to day working basis: a. Identify the enemy and its reasons for = >existence. b.=20 >Co-ordinate the resources and personnel of all sections of the = >establishment=20 >against it. c. Contain the enemy and wear it down tactically. d. Isolate = >and=20 >frustrate it is every way, politically and militarily. e. Destroy it. = >This=20 >sectionalising of the process should not be taken as meaning that each = >is=20 >separate, or that one follows from the other in clear cut form as there = >is much=20 >overlapping.. While the 'counter-insurgency' expert starts by = >'identifying', he=20 >is already 'co-ordinating' and so on, while he is 'containing and = >isolating' he=20 >is continually trying to identify new faces and approaches etc. They are = > >continuous processes only finished when he has = >'destroyed'.</FONT></FONT></B>=20 ><BR><B><FONT face=3D"Times New Roman,Times"><FONT=20 >color=3D#000000></FONT></FONT></B> <B><FONT=20 >face=3D"Times New Roman,Times"><FONT color=3D#993300><FONT=20 >size=3D+1></FONT></FONT></FONT></B>=20 ><P><B><FONT face=3D"Times New Roman,Times"><FONT color=3D#993300><FONT=20 >size=3D+1> (a)...Identifying the enemy and it's reasons for=20 >existence..</FONT></FONT></FONT></B><B><FONT face=3D"Times New = >Roman,Times"><FONT=20 >color=3D#000000></FONT></FONT></B>=20 ><P><B><FONT face=3D"Times New Roman,Times"><FONT = >color=3D#000000> Right from=20 >the start British strategy had political and military dimensions. . The = >Labour=20 >government of the day appeared to veer on the side of appeasement of the = > >rebellious nationalist population, buying them off with reform in an = >attempt to=20 >control them again. They actively encouraged the setting up of the SDLP = >(Social=20 >Democratic and Labour Party), a Catholic middle class party set up = >around John=20 >Hume in an effort to take politics off the street, where the = >constitutional=20 >nationalists had little control, and back into the safe corridors of = >power in=20 >Westminster and Stormont (Northern Ireland's local=20 >parliament).</FONT></FONT></B><B><FONT face=3D"Times New = >Roman,Times"><FONT=20 >color=3D#000000></FONT></FONT></B>=20 ><P><B><FONT face=3D"Times New Roman,Times"><FONT = >color=3D#000000> By giving the=20 >SDLP their patronage they effectively chose the nationalist leadership = >that they=20 >would deal with and they promoted them in the media and press. These are = >age-old=20 >tactics of counter-insurgents in the broadest sense. The Unionists saw = >the=20 >situation differently. They saw all disorder as resulting from IRA = >conspiracies.=20 >The way to put them down was by force and threat of force. The RUC = >(Royal Ulster=20 >Constabulary), the armed militia that simply reflected and defended = >political=20 >unionism, supported this view.</FONT></FONT></B><B><FONT=20 >face=3D"Times New Roman,Times"><FONT color=3D#000000></FONT></FONT></B>=20 ><P><B><FONT face=3D"Times New Roman,Times"><FONT color=3D#000000>The = >British Army at=20 >this juncture appear to have been content to just fulfill the first role = >of=20 >counter-insurgency, identify your enemy and the possible causes of = >discontent.=20 >Meetings held between senior British army personnel and IRA leadership = >at local=20 >level were an integral part of this process and also had the primary = >effect of=20 >keeping things quiet without having to actually initiate major political = >reform=20 >that could destabilize unionism. The IRA had of course their own agenda. = >But=20 >again it was an old Brit psychological 'counter-insurgency' tactic = >'making the=20 >opposition feel important, by structuring them into an institution of = >state'=20 >without handing them any real power. This was to be used again with even = >greater=20 >effect in the 1975 IRA cease-fire period.</FONT></FONT></B><B><FONT=20 >face=3D"Times New Roman,Times"><FONT color=3D#993300><FONT=20 >size=3D+1></FONT></FONT></FONT></B>=20 ><P><B><FONT face=3D"Times New Roman,Times"><FONT color=3D#993300><FONT = >size=3D+1>.=20 >(b)...Coordinate all resources and = >personnel...</FONT></FONT></FONT></B><B><FONT=20 >face=3D"Times New Roman,Times"><FONT color=3D#000000></FONT></FONT></B>=20 ><P><B><FONT face=3D"Times New Roman,Times"><FONT color=3D#000000> A = >'Joint=20 >Security Committee' had been established aimed at linking all the = >machinery of=20 >the state and its forces together into a powerful 'War Machine' capable = >of a=20 >co-ordinated and controlled politico/military response. However, those = >who sat=20 >on it had differing priorities or short-term objectives. The membership = >in early=20 >1972 was the unionist Prime Minister, two unionist Cabinet ministers. = >the=20 >British Army GOC, the RUC Chief, and one British government = >representative. It's=20 >make-up demonstrates a heavy imbalance towards unionist phobias and = >paranoia. It=20 >was to cause much friction between Brit army counter insurgency experts = >and the=20 >Stormont administration and local forces. As British military 'counter=20 >insurgency' experts like Brigadier Frank Kitson began to arrive in the = >North=20 >carrying with them the experience of British counter-insurgency = >campaigns in=20 >Malaya, Kenya, Muscat, Oman and Cyprus, that tension would increase. = >Kitson at=20 >this time was at Oxford University, writing the British Army's=20 >counter-insurgency' bible, "Low Intensity Operations". He was = >undoubtedly=20 >brought to the North in 1970 with the dual brief; to attempt to = >structure a=20 >'counter insurgency' response and to gain experience of what was a = >relatively=20 >new 'counter-insurgency' situation.</FONT></FONT></B><B><FONT=20 >face=3D"Times New Roman,Times"><FONT color=3D#000000></FONT></FONT></B>=20 ><P><B><FONT face=3D"Times New Roman,Times"><FONT color=3D#000000>There = >were things=20 >that could be done in the far off obscure ends of the 'Empire', which = >could not=20 >be done under the watchful eye of the mass media, in a so-called liberal = > >democratic society so close to Britain and Western Europe. The=20 >'counter-insurgency' strategy for Ireland in the 70's would require a = >degree of=20 >sophistication and subtlety that the unionists were certainly showing = >themselves=20 >incapable of. It would have more to do with propaganda than physical = >show of=20 >strength. This is reflected in the Brit understanding that right from = >the start=20 >they needed to dictate how others saw the essence of the problem in the = >North.=20 >Their first propaganda victory was in getting acceptance for the = >explanation=20 >that the North's 'troubles' had sectarian roots and that British = >soldiers were=20 >the 'peace-keepers'. This is not to say that Kitson advocated a 'softly = >softly'=20 >approach, and his use of a curfew' on the Falls Road in his first days = >here=20 >adequately demonstrates this. Rather, what Kitson saw as important was = >that all=20 >the institutions of state be co-ordinated to provide a disciplined and=20 >controlled politico/military response.</FONT></FONT></B><B><FONT=20 >face=3D"Times New Roman,Times"><FONT color=3D#000000></FONT></FONT></B>=20 ><P><B><FONT face=3D"Times New Roman,Times"><FONT color=3D#993300><FONT=20 >size=3D+1>(c)...Contain the Enemy: Wear it down=20 >tactically.</FONT></FONT></FONT></B><B><FONT face=3D"Times New = >Roman,Times"><FONT=20 >color=3D#000000></FONT></FONT></B>=20 ><P><B><FONT face=3D"Times New Roman,Times"><FONT = >color=3D#000000> By 1972=20 >nationalist Ireland was almost completely alienated from the British and = >it was=20 >recognized that--as opposed to 'containing' the situation, and allowing = >it to=20 >evolve towards a climate in which a political settlement could be = >initiated to=20 >isolate the 'insurgents'--another cornerstone of 'counter insurgency' = >strategy,=20 >the opposite was happening. Even with the mass internment arrests the = >IRA had no=20 >shortage or recruits and apparently unlimited support and sympathy = >within the=20 >nationalist community, while the possible 'appeasement nationalists' the = >SDLP=20 >had been forced almost completely out of the system through which reform = >could=20 >be initiated. There was a serious imbalance in the politio/military = >strategy=20 >towards the military solution. Through the suspension of Stormont, the=20 >institution of direct British government rule and the short-lived IRA = >truce the=20 >British initiated a new political climate which would allow them to = >rebalance=20 >their strategy towards bringing in the reformers (SDLP) and 'isolating' = >the=20 >revolutionaries (IRA). Or at least ensure that the situation didn't = >deteriorate=20 >further, beyond an 'acceptable level of violence.' The climax of this = >phase of=20 >Brit 'counter insurgency' strategy would be the attempted political = >settlement,=20 >and subsequent failure, of Sunningdale in = >1974.</FONT></FONT></B><B><FONT=20 >face=3D"Times New Roman,Times"><FONT color=3D#000000></FONT></FONT></B>=20 ><P><B><FONT face=3D"Times New Roman,Times"><FONT color=3D#000000>." As = >for Special=20 >laws and powers they were progressively introduced; the Emergency = >Provisions=20 >Act, (a refined version of the Special Powers Act),--reforms are often = >little=20 >more than refined versions of repressive methods--the Prevention of = >Terrorism=20 >Act, and the introduction of juryless Diplock courts. A further = >important tactic=20 >in use during this phase, and with lasting effects, was the use of Brit=20 >'counter-insurgency' operatives in the 26 Counties to attempt to isolate = > >Republicans and allow more pro-Brit elements in the government to have = >their=20 > __________________________________ KOMINFORM P.O. 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