>X-eGroups-Return: >[EMAIL PROTECTED] >X-Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED] >X-Apparently-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] >Organization: University of Minnesota >From: Jessica Sundin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > Colombia Action Network http://www.freespeech.org/actioncolombia > Contact us at [EMAIL PROTECTED] > To subscribe to this newslist, send a message to > [EMAIL PROTECTED] > >1. Colombia Rebels Set Sights on U.S. Troops >2. The Price of War I: Beyond Colombia >3. The Price of War II: Colombia And the Russian Connection >4. The Price of War III: America�s Risks in Colombia >5. Oil and the Coming Global Economic Slowdown > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >Friday September 29, 2000 >Colombia Rebels Set Sights on U.S. Troops > >BOGOTA (Reuters) - Marxist rebels issued a warning on Friday to U.S. >soldiers based in Colombia, saying they will be declared a ``military >target'' if they take any front-line combat role in the nation's >long-running war. > >``The FARC declares United States soldiers a military target,'' said the >headline of a statement distributed via the Internet by the >Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia. > >The 17,000-strong rebel army, known by its Spanish-language acronym, is >Latin America's largest and oldest guerrilla force. It has a dominant >presence in roughly 40 percent of Colombia, a country a U.S. military >spokesman described on Friday as among the most treacherous places >anywhere around the globe. > >``All Colombian or foreign military personnel in combat zones will be a >military target of the FARC,'' said the statement, quoting senior rebel >commander Andres Paris. > >``At the moment FARC guerrillas do not wish to reveal if there are >concrete plans to attack United States military bases in the country,'' >it said. > >But it added that several such bases, where U.S. military personnel are >located, were ``very close to regions where guerrillas recently staged >intense combat that caused government forces important casualties.'' > >U.S. and Colombian officials have said repeatedly that American troops >will not be involved directly in the Andean nation's escalating war >against the drug trade and the leftist guerrillas they accuse of >protecting and profiting from the trafficking. > >In Miami, a spokesman for the U.S. Southern Command -- which oversees >U.S. military operations across most of Latin America -- reiterated that >American forces were ``limited strictly to counter-drug and training >activities'' in Colombia. > >But the spokesman, Steve Lucas, acknowledged U.S. troops were in ``an >inherently dangerous business'' in Colombia and said the FARC threat >would not be ignored. > >``We try to take the security and protection of our people very >seriously, try to ensure that they are doing their training activities >and other support activities in only the safe regions,'' Lucas said. > >``But the entire nation of Colombia and its border regions have become >the most dangerous places in the Western Hemisphere if not the world, >because of the actions of these extralegal organizations so we're >sharing the risks.'' > >--- Train Special Battalions >Under a $1.3 billion U.S. aid package for Colombia approved by the U.S. >Congress in July, lawmakers opened the way for the number of American >advisers in Colombia to be doubled to about 500 at any one time, to >train special battalions in fighting drugs, and indirectly, guerrillas. > >But the package contains a clause that would allow the U.S. president to >wave the cap for 90 days in the event of an ''imminent involvement'' of >U.S. forces in hostilities. > >The FARC has branded the aid package, consisting of mostly military aid, >as counterinsurgency assistance thinly disguised as anti-drug aid, and >warned repeatedly of Washington's slide into a military quagmire. > >The latest FARC statement was similar to several others the group has >issued over the past year, warning U.S. military advisers against a >deeper, Vietnam-style involvement in an internal conflict that has taken >35,000 lives over the past decade. > >America's involvement in Vietnam began with the dispatch of military >advisers and led to the deaths of about 58,000 U.S. troops. > >A Gallup poll published last month in a leading Colombian weekly news >magazine, Semana, said 56 percent of Colombians favored U.S. military >intervention to resolve the country's armed conflict. > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ > >[Stratfor is a right-wing, private, intelligence agency based in Texas.] > >27 September 2000, www.stratfor.com >The Price of War I. Beyond Colombia > >--- Summary >Marxist guerillas battling to control Colombia threaten to escalate the >country�s civil war when more than $1 billion in U.S. military aid >begins to flow into the country in October. After 36 years, Colombia�s >civil war is at a turning point, its impacts about to flood across its >borders into neighboring nations. Washington is inadvertently gambling >with its interests in Colombia and much of the rest of the region. > >--- Analysis >Plan Colombia is a U.S. $7.5 billion strategy to eradicate the cocaine >trade in Colombia -- the world�s largest producer of the drug. The aid >package involves military force to combat drug traffickers and programs >to encourage crop-substitution that will wean peasant farmers from >growing coca and poppies. > >Over the next several years, the United States will spend $1.3 billion >to train and equip three anti-narcotic battalions, made up of 3,000 >Colombian soldiers, who will fly into combat aboard 60 helicopters. With >this added reach, Colombian forces will destroy coca plantations, >laboratories and distribution networks in joint operations with the >Colombian National Police. The United States also will provide >logistics, intelligence and unified command-and-control support to >Colombian forces deployed on anti-drug missions. > >These missions will put Colombian troops face-to-face with Marxist >guerillas, known as Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), who >control a substantial part of the drug trade and who have battled for >control of Colombia for more than 30 years. To what degree will Plan >Colombia escalate the war and trigger a flood of refugees? How will the >plan impact the security and stability of the entire Andean region of >South America? > >In fact, the U.S. "cure" for what White House Drug Czar Barry McCaffrey >calls "a cancer, not a war," will fail. The drug trade and FARC will >suffer losses, but both will survive as they have for decades. Loss of >life and civilian displacement, however, will increase significantly. >Many refugees and some fighting will spill over borders into Ecuador and >Peru. U.S. relations with Colombia�s neighbors will suffer, and >Americans will be targets, as a result. > >The first phase of Plan Colombia�s drug eradication strategy will focus >on southern Colombia, particularly the departments of Putumayo, Caqueta >and Guaviare. In the south, German Briceno, also known as "Mono Jojoy," >commands 11 FARC fronts, of some 2,000 fighters. Briceno is the top >warlord in the entire organization and its best battlefield commander. >Under him, the organization grows, processes and ships cocaine all along >the San Miguel and Putumayo rivers that form part of the borders with >Ecuador and Peru. > >Within this complex of jungles and rivers, FARC trades cocaine for >weapons with Brazilian and Russian organized crime elements. A key >target of government forces is FARC�s 14th front, which controls coca >labs in the Peruvian jungle between the Napo and Putumayo rivers. These >rivers flow directly into Brazil, allowing FARC to ship cocaine down the >Amazon River to ports on the Atlantic Ocean and on to the United States >and Europe. > >Early next year, when a second battalion completes its training, >government troops will begin to destroy crops, particularly in Putumayo, >and Colombia�s neighbors will quickly feel the effects. > >Ecuador is at greatest risk of fighting and refugees spilling across the >border. The United Nations has warned Ecuador to expect an influx of >between 25,000 and 30,000 refugees, but Ecuadorian officials believe the >total could exceed 40,000. Thousands more will flee into nearby Peru to >escape the fighting and aerial defoliation of their coca crops. > >The border is too porous to control and FARC sympathizers fill the area. >The FARC has used the province of Sucumbios in Ecuador as a base for >rest and re-supply for more than three decades and says it plans to >continue doing so when the fighting begins in Putumayo. The Ecuadorian >daily, El Universo, reports that FARC leaders have warned the government >in Quito to maintain "strict neutrality" when FARC units cross the >border. > >Already, FARC threatens to attack targets in Ecuador. FARC has >criticized Ecuador�s government for letting the United States operate >anti-drug flights out of the Pacific coastal town of Manta, one of the >new forward operating locations set up by the Pentagon�s Southern >Command when Howard Air Base, Panama, closed. According to CRE Satelital >radio, FARC leaders warn that if U.S. aircraft fly out of Manta to >eradicate crops, the guerrillas will strike targets in Ecuador. Buffeted >by political and economic crises, the country is significantly less >stable than other nations in the region. > >Anticipating trouble, Ecuador stationed more than 5,000 soldiers along >the Colombian border, in the Napos and Sucumbio provinces. The troops >comprise three battalions, a special forces unit, a jungle regiment and >a helicopter regiment. Ecuador�s government will spend $150 million to >$200 million over the next three years to build a security buffer zone >on its border. The United States reportedly put up $30 million and is >supporting the border build-up from Manta and the Coca Jungle School >training facility. Ecuador also has appealed for international help to >set up camps for the anticipated influx of Colombian refugees. > >Other governments in the region are bracing themselves. Peru will also >see refugees spill over from Colombia. Raul Reyes, FARC�s chief >negotiator with the Pastrana government, says FARC has no military or >other interests in Peru. FARC also wants to avoid provoking Brazil, the >region�s loudest critic of Plan Colombia. Guerrilla leaders have >repeatedly assured the Cardoso government that FARC forces will stay out >of Brazilian territory. > >But Brazil will face problems because of its river routes for cocaine. >Units of the Brazilian Army�s Solimoes Frontier Command�s 8th Jungle >Infantry Battalion are in Tabatinga, directly across the Amazon River >from its sister-city of Leticia at the southern tip of Colombia. Both >cities have about 57,000 inhabitants. > >Tabatinga and Leticia lie along a major route for shipping drugs to >Brazilian organized crime elements and for smuggling in precursor >chemicals, weapons and explosives. Drug trafficking and arms smuggling >are the dominant economic activities and FARC units in the area >frequently rest and re-supply in Leticia. While FARC will try to avoid >provoking the Brazilian government, guerrilla operations in the area >will complicate relations. > >The Brazilian government fears the U.S. aid plan will ultimately force >the drug trade increasingly into the Brazilian Amazon. The government >openly worries that river-borne toxic chemical runoff from aerial >defoliation in Colombia will enter river systems, poisoning the regions� >waters, while thousands of Colombian refugees push into the Brazilian >state of Amazonas. The state is only about the size of Pennsylvania, >with 130,000 inhabitants. > >In Colombia, the guerrillas are bracing for a dramatically widened >conflict. FARC has been preparing for all-out war since President Andres >Pastrana conceded to FARC a demilitarized zone in southern Colombia, an >area roughly the size of Switzerland. FARC has consolidated control over >the cocaine trade in southern Colombia and its ranks now include more >than 17,000 full-time fighters who range freely across more than half >the country, supported by an estimated 36,000 civilian militia members. > >FARC also has stockpiled a huge arsenal of weapons and explosives, some >from Central America and Brazil, but many more from Russian organized >crime syndicates. FARC negotiator Reyes says the organization�s >political goal has always been to achieve power, either peacefully or by >force. But with peace talks stalled in Bogota, the fighting will only >escalate. > > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------ >www.Stratfor.com 9/28/00 >The Price of War II. Colombia And the Russian Connection > >--- Summary >As Washington prepares to release the first of $1.3 billion in aid to >Colombia, the country�s leftist guerrillas are preparing for a wider >war. In the last 18 months, they have stockpiled huge amounts of weapons >with the assistance of a global arms network, particularly from Russian >organized crime. The major guerrilla armies are set to take the >battlefield with some 45,000 weapons in their arsenals. > >--- Analysis >As the United States ratchets up its role in helping Colombia fight drug >traffickers and insurgents, the fingerprints of Russian organized >criminals appear more frequently. > >For nearly a decade, the Russian mafia, or mafiya, has been trading >weapons and cash to Colombian drug cartels in exchange for cocaine and >heroin. In recent months, however, several discoveries suggest Colombian >narcotics-for-weapons trade deeply involves Russian criminals, motivated >by profit. > >Indicators also suggest Russian gangs in Colombia are getting some help >from officials in the Russian government. These gangs operate with >tremendous freedom and resources and use Russian airspace, facilities >and large transport aircraft with impunity. > >In the last several months, a clear route of trafficking has emerged, >encircling half the globe, from Russia to Jordan and Israel, and >culminating in parachute drops and jungle airstrips in Colombia. In >exchange, these aircraft leave with cocaine bound for Russia and >eventually Europe. > >In May, Colombian intelligence agents captured two Israelis in Cali, >Colombia, who were arranging delivery of 50,000 assault rifles to >Colombia�s largest insurgent group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of >Colombia (FARC), which has about 17,000 fighters. > >In June, a combined operation by the governments of the United States, >Israel and Colombia smashed an arms-smuggling ring that investigators >said had ties to criminals in Russia and Israel. Investigators also said >the $100-million ring planned to sell to FARC 50,000 AK-47 automatic >weapons, made in the former East Germany. The ring was to ship the guns >from Austria to Ecuador and smuggle them into Colombia by sea. > >In August, a month before he provoked a crisis with his main >intelligence service, Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori announced the >capture of a gang of international smugglers. These smugglers allegedly >purchased 10,000 AK-47s from the Jordanian government by posing as >Peruvian military officials. > >The gang apparently flew the weapons from the Jordanian capital of Amman >to the Canary Islands and Guyana, airdropping them to FARC in southern >Colombia. Fujimori said the gang planned to ship another 40,000 AK-47s >to FARC. The Jordanian government insists the deal was a legitimate >government-to-government transaction, despite Fujimori�s claim. The U.S. >government doubts both explanations. > >The Russian connection to the guerrillas began to grow two years ago, >when Colombian President Andres Pastrana gave FARC a demilitarized zone >in southern Colombia. Ever since, Russian cargo planes have delivered >small arms and ammunition to guerrillas there. > >Aircraft fly from airstrips in Russia and Ukraine, stop in Amman, >Jordan, to refuel and then deliver cargo to FARC at remote landing >strips, sometimes dropping the loads by parachute. FARC�s 16th Front, >which operates in southeastern Colombia, coordinates deliveries of the >arms. On the return flight, FARC loads the planes with cocaine. > >Russian organized crime has long operated in Colombia, alongside the >drug cartels. In the 1990s, criminals tried to sell surface-to-air >missiles, helicopters and even a Russian Navy submarine. In many cases, >authorities broke up these sales and imprisoned gang members; some now >sit in U.S. prisons. > >On Sept. 7, Colombian anti-drug authorities seized a 100-foot submarine >under construction in a warehouse near Bogota along with assembly >manuals printed in Russian and Spanish. The submarine was designed to >carry 200 tons of cocaine over long distances. According to the >Colombian news magazine Semana, Stalisnar A. Osipov, an intelligence >officer with the Russian embassy in Bogota, said the submarine could not >have been built without Russian technology. > >But as the large Colombian drug cartels broke up ? into as many as 200 >smaller organizations ? the FARC increasingly took control of the lion�s >share of the drug trade. And the Russians appear to be doing more >business with the dominant force in the narcotics trade. > >Supported by so much help from abroad, the guerrillas will be able to >turn a heavy arsenal on freshly trained battalions of government troops >eradicating drugs in southern Colombia. The FARC and the National >Liberation Army (ELN), a smaller Marxist guerrilla group, have about >22,000 fighters and more than 45,000 weapons, according to the Colombian >Army. These include heavy machine guns, mortar tubes and >rocket-propelled grenades. Each month, 1 ton of weapons and explosives >enter the country via sea from ports in nearby Ecuador. > >This arms-for-drugs trade could benefit some in the Russian government >who wouldn�t mind a major insurgency in America�s backyard. Arming FARC >is profitable and makes good business sense for Russian criminals who >want to protect their trafficking interests. Many Russian criminals are >ex-KGB agents who still have close ties with Russia�s intelligence >services. > >The situation that unfolds in southern Colombia in the coming months >will not yield a quick and clear-cut victory for the government forces >Washington supports. Of three U.S.-trained battalions -- some 3,000 men >-- only two battalions will begin to operate in the south, probably >early next year. > >While they will enjoy tremendous intelligence support, government forces >will not yet have all 60 helicopters Washington has promised. And > _______________________________________________________ KOMINFORM P.O. Box 66 00841 Helsinki - Finland +358-40-7177941, fax +358-9-7591081 e-mail [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.kominf.pp.fi _______________________________________________________ Kominform list for general information. Subscribe/unsubscribe messages to [EMAIL PROTECTED] Anti-Imperialism list for anti-imperialist news. 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