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Friday, October 20, 2000
1. Kostunica Coalition Triples Prices & Blames...Milosevic
2. Croat President to Serbia: Cough Up and Pay Up!
3. The other Yugoslavian election
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Announcement
TARGETS, a Dutch monthly publication on international affaires, will
organize a public meeting to discuss the current developments in
Yugoslavia and the role of the Western powers.
The meeting will be adressed by:
� J�rgen Els�sser, editor of the German monthly publication KONKRET and
� Nico Varkevisser, editor-in-chief of TARGETS
Date: Sunday, October 29
Place: Akhnaton, Nieuwezijds Kolk 25, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Time: 15.00h
J�rgen Els�sser will present his new book: 'Kriegsverbrechen'. Die
t�tlichen L�gen der Nato und ihre Opfer im Kosovo-Konflikt. (including a
file on Srebrenica)
*************************************************************
Kostunica Coalition Triples Prices & Blames...Milosevic
by Michel Chossudovsky (10-19-2000)
"Immediately after taking the office, the new government shall abolish all
types of subsidies. This
measure must be implemented without regrets or hesitation, since it will be
difficult if not impossible to apply later, in view of the fact that in the
meantime strong lobbies may appear and do their best to block such
measures... This initial step in economic liberalization must be undertaken
as a "shock therapy" as its radical nature does not leave space for
gradualism of any kind." (G-1& program of radical economic reforms,
http://www.g17.org.yu/english/
The Kostunica government has already started to implement deadly IMF
'economic medicine'. The first
step consisted in lifting price controls on basic consumer goods, fuel and
services. Prices have increased, as much as three times, causing extreme
hardship for Yugoslav working people.
The country had been impoverished by years of economic sanctions, not to
mention the IMF reforms applied in 1989-90 before the break-up of federal
Yugoslavia. But a system of State subsidies and price controls nonetheless
prevented a total collapse in the standard of living, such as occurred in
neighbouring Bulgaria.
That system of price controls is now being disbanded by the DOS
semi-government on orders of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF):
"..when Kostunica supporters forced out most managers in state-owned shops
and factories and put their own people in charge, that system of controls
collapsed and prices immediately shot up. The cost of cooking oil has more
than tripled since last Friday, when Milosevic announced that he was
stepping aside.. The prices of sugar and cigarettes are about to jump
again. After Kostunica's supporters forced out
Milosevic-era factory directors, the new ones are moving quickly to make
their plants more profitable. ('Los Angeles Times', October 15, 2000)
Freezing the Money Supply
To make sure the government could not finance subsidies, the G-17
economists forcefully took control of the Central Bank and immediately
imposed a freeze on money creation ("printing of money"). This held up
the outflow of cash which the government needed to sustain price controls
on basic consumer goods.
At first, the DOS announced that 'removing controls' was a great
achievement. And the Western media
applauded Kostunica's determination, presented in sharp contrast to the
supposedly devious Milosevic:
"One of the ways Milosevic tried to buy support among his impoverished
people was by using price controls to keep down the cost of basic foods
such as milk and cooking oil." ('Los Angeles Times', October 15, 2000).
According to interviews we did with Belgrade residents today, the price of
milk has almost doubled from 8 to 14 dinars per liter, largely affecting
children; cooking oil has more than tripled, from 13.5 to 55 dinars; sugar
has gone from 8 to 45 dinars. These interviews confirm the earlier 'Los
Angeles Times' report.
Shoppers are commenting, "Ahh, democratic prices!" The Serbian use of black
humor masks rising anger among ordinary people.
Faced with this simmering rebellion, Kostunica supporters, including the
G-17 economists, have performed a dazzling flip:
"The new leadership [meaning Kostunica's DOS coalition] has accused
Slobodan Milosevic's supporters
of trying to causing chaos on the markets with a sudden liberalisation,
which they say could undermine
the fledgling democracy The Serb republic's government, still dominated by
Milosevic loyalists, has started allowing the liberalisation prices of
basic goods that had been state-controlled But reformists said the
liberalisation could cause suffering among a population used to state-fixed
prices, and some even called for the government to regain control of part
of the market." ." (AFP 16 October 2000)
The Western media, which just a few days earlier congratulated Kostunica
for removing price controls, now shamelessly parrots the line that's it's
all Milosevic's fault:
"This decision [of Milosevic supporters] is a kind of shock therapy.. These
measures will cause a lot of
suffering among the peopleG-17 director Mladjan Dinkic went further. The
move was an 'attempt to create chaos on the market and provoke anger among
the people directed at the DOS, he said.' (Ibid.)
G-17 economist Dinkic is worried about "suffering"? But isn't a tolerance
for mass suffering the very basis of the IMF program which Mr. Dinkic
negotiated in secret meetings with the IMF in Bulgaria, shortly after the
elections of 24 September?
While in Bulgaria, Dinkic also met with representatives of NATO countries.
He was told that Yugoslavia would have to eliminate price controls as a
first step towards establishing 'a free market'. This is called 'price
liberalization' and it is always an IMF precondition for loan negotiations.
"'This revenge by the [pro-Milosevic] government will not succeed, but if
an interim expert government is
not formed soon we will have a lot of trouble controlling prices,' he said.
To counter this 'sabotage' Dinkic said he favored a 'return to regulations
of prices for certain basics as well as imports of cheaper equivalents from
abroad to tackle unjustified price hikes.' (Ibid.)
Note that under the guise of lowering prices Dinkic is talking about
shipping in cheap 'equivalents'. In other words, dumping. This practice has
destroyed local businesses and farms in Bulgaria and other countries. The
previous (i.e., legally constituted) government made sure that producers
survived and the poor got enough to eat. This new improved (illegal)
government has abolished price controls and will now use the suffering it
thus created to justify dumping low priced (often inferior) food and
products, thus destroying small producers. Excellent work.
If Dinkic really wanted to go back to the price controls in existence prior
to the elections why did the ''democratic" gangs who illegally seized state
stores abolish all the price controls? In fact, Dinkic wants to have it
both ways: get rid of the controls and try to blame the legal government
for this action, taken by his men and himself. For it is Dinkic himself who
has seized control of the Central Bank, and quite illegally. (See:
"Yugoslav Central Bank Tries to Stabilise Public Finances", By Gordana
Filipovic, 'Reuters.', Oct 12, 2000)
Concerning the rapid increase in prices, the program drafted by Mr.
Dinkic's G-17 Plus is rather explicit:
"Immediately after taking the office, the new government shall abolish all
types of subsidies This measure must be implemented without regrets or
hesitation, since it will be difficult if not impossible to apply later, in
view of the fact that in the meantime strong lobbies may appear and do
their best to block such measures... This initial step in economic
liberalization must be undertaken as a "shock therapy" as its radical
nature does not leave space for gradualism of any kind(G-17 Program of
Radical Economic Reforms, http://www.g17.org.yu/english"
The program they wrote attacking Milsoevic said they would do it.
They have driven Milosevic out and begun to do it.
Naturally it is Milosevic's fault.
Further reading
For more on the IMF-G-17 connection see "The IMF and the Yugoslav
Elections" by Michel Chossudovsky and Jared Israel at
http://emperors-clothes.com/analysis/1.htm
For details on the funding and cration of a U.S/German proxy apparatus in
Yugoslavia, see 'How the U.S. has Created a Corrupt Opposition in Serbia'
By Jared Israel, Prof. Michel Chossudovsky, Karen Talbot, Nico Varkevisser
and Prof. Petar Maher. http://emperors-clothes.com/analysis/scam.htm
For independent verification of this funding process, see ''NY Times'
Confirms Charge: U.S. Gov't Meddles in Yugoslavia' with comments by Jared
Israel. "Suitcases full of cash" says the 'Times.'
http://emperors-clothes.com/news/erlang.htm
'Emperor's Clothes Interviews Radio B292' Revealing interviews by Jared
Israel with two staff members at the U.S. "independent" radio station in
Belgrade. http://emperors-clothes.com/interviews/emperor.htm
'Criticism of Emperor's Clothes on the Yugoslav Elections, with Reply'
Prof. Robert Hayden & Jared Israel
http://emperors-clothes.com/letters/yugoltr.htm
'U.S. Law Passed by House of Representatives on Funding Yugo Opposition and
Harsh Terms for Lifting
Sanctions' http://emperors-clothes.com/news/HR.htm
www.tenc.net [Emperor's Clothes]
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Croat President to Serbia: Cough Up and Pay Up!
BUDAPEST, Oct. 18 - It didn't take long for the vultures to start circling
over the heads of the new Yugoslav government. During his two-day visit to
Hungary, Croatian President, Stipe Mesic, urged Yugoslavia's new
authorities to strengthen democracy, allow war criminals to be brought to
justice and to pay war damages, the Agence France Presse reported on
Wednesday (Oct. 18).
"For us the war with Serbia is over. Now it is Serbia's turn to answer the
questions that interest us," Mesis told reporters in Budapest.
Serbia has to be committed to cooperating with ex-Yugoslav states, and it
has to make it clear that it did not see the Serbian minorities beyond its
borders as means of conquering foreign territories, he added.
"We cannot speak about normal relations if war criminals who are
responsible for the bloodbaths of Vukovar or Srebrenica, are walking free
in Serbia," Mesic said. Croatia wants Yugoslav war criminals to be tried
individually before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) individually.
---
TiM Ed.: Way to stir up Kostunica/DOS pot! Cough up the alleged "war
criminals" to the Hague, and pay up war reparations to Croatia! Not only
is Washington presenting the new Yugoslav government with its diktats, now
even its satellites in the Balkans are trying to dictate to Belgrade what
it shall do.
Meanwhile, no one is talking about the much more significant amount (about
$30 billion) of war reparations that are due to Serbia, as a result of the
NATO 1999 bombing. And to the Bosnian Serb Republic and the Republic of
Serb Krajina, because of both the NATO 1995 bombing, and the
American-assisted Croat-Muslim "Storm" operation the same year, in which
over 250,000 Serbs were driven from their ancestral homes.
Will the real Kostunica please stand up again, and start bringing up these
issues, instead of sweeping them under the rug, as he is supposedly
bringing Serbia "back to Europe" - evidently with a noose around her neck?
TiM
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SERBS BOYCOTT THE KOSOVO POLLS
The other Yugoslavian election
_________________________________________________________________
History was made in Yugoslavia with the fall of Slobodan Milosevic on
5 October. His successor, Vojislav Kostunica, has been hailed as a man
the west can do business with. But he also a nationalist. So the world
will be watching his handling of Kosovo, where the avid demand for
independence is the only common thread among the various Albanian
parties competing for power in local elections on 28 October.
by JEAN-ARNAULT DERENS *
_________________________________________________________________
United Nations administrator Bernard Kouchner had serious misgivings
about allowing polling in Kosovo for the Yugoslav federal elections on 24
September. In the event, the Serbs in the province were able to cast their
votes. The Kosovar Albanians took no part in the poll. It served only
served to remind them that, under UN Resolution 1244, Kosovo is still part
of the Yugoslav Federation. Conversely, the Serbs are extremely unlikely to
vote in Kosovo's municipal poll on 28 October, when the province will elect
its own local authorities.
In any case, over 200,000 displaced Serbs, Montenegrins and Muslim
Slavs will be unable to vote, while the 100,000 or so still living in the
province support a boycott. And the election campaign itself has been
marred by violence. On 18 August a powerful explosion rocked a building in
the centre of Pristina belonging to the Organisation for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which houses several ethnic minority parties.
The prime target was the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), representing the
province's Muslim Slavs. They feel increasingly under threat. And so do the
Turks, who have been told to identify with the Albanians or get out.
Some members of ethnic minorities have registered to vote despite
these threats. They make no secret of their support for the Democratic
League of Kosovo, led by Ibrahim Rugova, which they hope will counter the
influence of the Albanian extremists. Some Albanian-speaking Gypsies,
particularly among the Ashkali minority, share this view. But most Roma
still in Kosovo have not registered. In any case, the vast majority of the
province's Roma, Serb and Montenegrin communities have been forced to flee
to Montenegro or Serbia (1). In Serbia, the Belgrade regime has prevented
OSCE officials from encouraging displaced persons to register as voters.
But even in Montenegro, where the authorities facilitate the work of the
OSCE, only a tiny minority of refugees have bothered to register.
In Kosovo itself, almost the whole Serb community is behind the
boycott. Despite the deep political divides among its 100,000 members,
almost all Serb leaders agree they cannot go to the polls as long as the
Serbs in Kosovo have no guarantee of their security. Oliver Ivanovic, head
of the Serb National Council in Mitrovica, took this position from the
start. He advocates the establishment of a tiny Serb republic of Kosovska
Mitrovica under his control. But moderate Serbs who support the Serb
National Council in Gracanica and the Orthodox Church have taken the same
line.
The Church itself is in a tricky position. Oscillating between
participation and boycott of the co-management institutions set up by the
international administration, it has confused Serb public opinion and can
no longer rely on grassroots support. Ivanovic, however, is solidly backed
by almost all the 50,000 Serbs living in northern Mitrovica and the
neighbouring towns of Zvecan, Zubin Potok and Leposavic.
Yet Leposavic, a town in the far north of Kosovo with an exclusively
Serbian population, is something of an exception. It is the only place
where there has been an explicit call for Serbs to take part in the October
elections. It came from the Coalition for Leposavic, an alliance of Serbian
parties opposed to Milosevic, which argued that only cooperation with the
international institutions could ensure a future for Serbs in Kosovo.
According to unofficial figures released by the OSCE in July, only 400
Serbs had registered on the electoral roll for the whole of Kosovo, and 300
of them live in Leposavic.
Father Sava, spokesman for the Orthodox diocese, makes no attempt to
conceal his despair. "International troops have been deployed in Kosovo for
over a year, yet Serbs are still being attacked every day. The inability to
deal with Albanian extremism is a bonus for Serb extremists." After the
Serb boycott of the elections, fresh talks on the constitutional status of
the Serbian people are inevitable. While the enclaved villages seemed
doomed in the near future, the north Mitrovica region is rapidly moving
away from the rest of Kosovo.
On the Albanian side, 25 parties have officially entered the election.
But the contest will be between the three largest groups: the Democratic
League of Kosovo (LDK), led by Ibrahim Rugova; the Democratic Party of
Kosovo (PDK), led by Hashim Thaci, comprising many former members of the
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), and the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo
(AAK), set up by Ramush Haradinaj, a former KLA commander.
Since returning to Kosovo in July, Rugova has confined himself to
participating in the institutions created by the international
administration and condemning political violence. For the rest, he has said
nothing. His party seems struck by political paralysis, and leading members
like Milazim Krasniqi have left in disgust. Some commentators, however,
think Rugova may be playing a waiting game, allowing the former KLA
guerrillas to make the running and hoping to cash in on their mistakes at
the elections.
In fact, the opinion polls show the LDK clearly in the lead. Rugova
can reasonably expect mass endorsement of his role as a leader symbolising
years of struggle against Serbian authority. But he has very little room
for manœuvre. In a number of towns in Kosovo, the LDK has practically
been forced underground. In Decani, in the west of the province, its
premises have been bombed several times and the party seems unable to
maintain a public existence despite the presence of Nato troops. Worse
still, Haki Imeri, the head of the LDK branch in Srbica, was assassinated
last November. Local LDK activists say they are being terrorised and
deprived of humanitarian aid by KLA sympathisers, who hold all the key
positions on the municipal council, although it is theoretically controlled
by the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (Unmik) (2).
Former KLA members - including those who rushed to join its ranks at
the last minute - have imposed a reign of intolerance on the province.
Officially, the KLA dissolved itself last year. But the power of the group
of ultra-nationalist ideologists who controlled it is undiminished. Its
basis is both political and military.
Politically it rests on the PDK and the "provisional government"
proclaimed by Hashim Thaci in Albania last April, which appointed local
authorities in towns throughout Kosovo. Unmik's civilian administrators
often had no choice but to come to terms with the former guerrillas, who
have succeeded in eliminating potential competitors and hold a virtual
monopoly of power in the municipalities. Officially, the PDK condemns
political violence. But its leaders are frequently implicated in physical
liquidation of former supporters deemed to be "collaborators" and in the
harassment of national minorities.
The KLA's main military prop is the Kosovo Protection Corps (TMK),
which is officially a civilian body. In fact, it consists of 5,000 former
KLA guerrillas and is organised along military lines. Its six regional
commands correspond exactly to the former operational zones of the KLA, and
it misses no opportunity to advertise its continuity with the former
guerrilla army. The KLA's intelligence services do not appear to have been
disbanded either, and the TMK maintains close links with the Presevo,
Medvedja and Bujanovac Liberation Army (UCPMB), which conducts sporadic
operations in three towns in southern Serbia.
The KLA has paid no more than lip-service to disarmament. A number of
tough operations by international troops have resulted in the seizure of
whole arsenals of weapons, notably in Drenica. The international
administration refused to incorporate former KLA fighters into the new
Kosovo Police Service (KPS) en bloc, but many managed to join as
individuals. They are clearly cooperating with the former KLA's military
police (PU), another organisation that has been officially dissolved but
remains in operation. In rural areas, in particular, its members willingly
undertake the more sordid tasks, such as enforcing payment of the illegal
taxes levied by the Thaci "government".
Many members of the TMK and PU, as well as former KLA fighters
employed in the international police force, have been directly implicated
in political and ethnic violence. Rexhep Selimi, minister of public order
in Thaci's provisional government, has kept control of the PU and of Shik,
the KLA's civilian intelligence service. The latter is probably receiving
technical support from Albania's national intelligence service, also called
Shik, which remains loyal to former president Sali Berisha.
Crime syndicates at work
In terms of ultra-nationalism, the PDK faces competition from the
National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo (LKCK), a small group that
has not officially renounced the Albanian version of Marxism-Leninism. But
the main threat to its unity comes from conflict between the crime syndicates.
In February fire raged for days in the huge Ramiz-Sadiku sports
complex in Pristina, whose basement level houses prosperous shopping malls
controlled by "Commander Remi" (real name Rustem Mustafa). Remi is
suspected of running rackets in Pristina and is said to be in conflict with
Thaci over control of the petrol stations springing up on all Kosovo's main
roads (3).
Ramush Haradinaj, commander of the Dukagjin sector in western Kosovo
during the fighting, has also kept control of his native region, though he
has since become deputy to Agim Ceku, commander in chief of the TMK.
Haradinaj controls the borders with Albania and Montenegro from Prizren to
Pec. From this strategic position, he supervises the illegal traffic in oil
and cigarettes. The origin of the political rift that prompted him to set
up the AAK may well lie in conflict between the crime syndicates. Both
Haradinaj and Mustafa have narrowly escaped assassination attempts in
recent months.
The spread of organised crime, and the carving up of the province by
"patriots" applying Stalinist methods, is facilitated by the total absence
of political debate. Not a single Albanian intellectual, newspaper or party
dares criticise the former KLA, condemn the persecution of minorities, or
call nationalist dogma into question. Rugova and Thaci have no ideological
differences. They are simply engaged in a power struggle. They share the
declared aim of independence for Kosovo and continue hypocritically to
condemn violence while refraining from the slightest gesture that would
loosen the ideological straitjacket in which Kosovo is held fast. Even the
courageous condemnation of violence by journalist Veton Surroi last August
failed to provoke a change of heart.
As for the international administration, it has come to terms with
"reverse ethnic cleansing" and allowed crime syndicates and clandestine
networks trained in the Enver Hodja school of maoism to take control of the
province. For years Kosovo lived in the strange world of an "official "
society controlled by the authorities in Belgrade and a "parallel" Albanian
civil society. It is now experiencing a new cleavage between the "official"
society administered by Unmik, abounding in fine phrases about democracy
and the protection of minorities, and the real society controlled by the
political and criminal mafia.
The international protectorate has freed Albanian political parties
from responsibility for formulating policies, since Unmik takes all the
important decisions. Their only platform is independence. Consequently,
they can stand out only by being more demagogic than their opponents. As
the editor-in-chief of the independent daily Koha Ditore realistically
observes, "the UN troops are trapped between two illusions: that of the
Serbs, who are certain they will return to the province, and that of the
Albanians, who are convinced they will obtain independence" (4).
______________________________________________________________
* Journalist, Cetinje (Montenegro). Author of Balkans, la crise (Folio
Actuel, Paris, 2000) and co-author, with Catherine Samary, of Conflits
yougoslaves (Editions de l'Atelier, Paris, October 2000).
(1) See Llazar Semini, "Rugova Comeback?", Institute for War and Peace
Reporting, London, 23 June 2000, http://www.iwpr.net/
(2) See "Elections in Kosovo: Moving Toward Democracy?", International
Crisis Group, Brussels, 7 July 2000, http://www.intl-crisis-group.org/
(3) See "What happened to the KLA?", International Crisis Group, Brussels,
3 March 2000, http://www.intl-crisis-group.org/
(4) Emmanuelle Rivi�re, "Rencontre avec Baton Haxhiu", Le Courrier des
Balkans, Paris, June 2000, http://bok.net/balkans/
Translated by Barry Smerin
Le Monde diplomatique, October 2000
<http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/en/2000/10/07kosovo>
Global Reflexion - Amsterdam - The Netherlands
