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Data: Sexta-feira, 20 de Outubro de 2000 13:58
Assunto: Kostunica Coalition Triples Prices & Blames...Milosevic
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>******************************************************
>Friday, October 20, 2000
>
>1. Kostunica Coalition Triples Prices & Blames...Milosevic
>2. Croat President to Serbia: Cough Up and Pay Up!
>3. The other Yugoslavian election
>
>*****************************************************
>Announcement
>
>TARGETS, a Dutch monthly publication on international affaires, will
>organize a public meeting to discuss the current developments in
>Yugoslavia and the role of the Western powers.
>
>The meeting will be adressed by:
>
>� J�rgen Els�sser, editor of the German monthly publication KONKRET and
>� Nico Varkevisser, editor-in-chief of TARGETS
>
>Date: Sunday, October 29
>Place: Akhnaton, Nieuwezijds Kolk 25, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
>Time: 15.00h
>
>J�rgen Els�sser will present his new book: 'Kriegsverbrechen'. Die
>t�tlichen L�gen der Nato und ihre Opfer im Kosovo-Konflikt. (including a
>file on Srebrenica)
>
>*************************************************************
>
>Kostunica Coalition Triples Prices & Blames...Milosevic
>
>by Michel Chossudovsky (10-19-2000)
>
>"Immediately after taking the office, the new government shall abolish all
>types of subsidies. This
>measure must be implemented without regrets or hesitation, since it will be
>difficult if not impossible to apply later, in view of the fact that in the
>meantime strong lobbies may appear and do their best to block such
>measures... This initial step in economic liberalization must be undertaken
>as a "shock therapy" as its radical nature does not leave space for
>gradualism of any kind." (G-1& program of radical economic reforms,
>http://www.g17.org.yu/english/
>
>The Kostunica government has already started to implement deadly IMF
>'economic medicine'. The first
>step consisted in lifting price controls on basic consumer goods, fuel and
>services. Prices have increased, as much as three times, causing extreme
>hardship for Yugoslav working people.
>
>The country had been impoverished by years of economic sanctions, not to
>mention the IMF reforms applied in 1989-90 before the break-up of federal
>Yugoslavia. But a system of State subsidies and price controls nonetheless
>prevented a total collapse in the standard of living, such as occurred in
>neighbouring Bulgaria.
>
>That system of price controls is now being disbanded by the DOS
>semi-government on orders of the
>International Monetary Fund (IMF):
>
>"..when Kostunica supporters forced out most managers in state-owned shops
>and factories and put their own people in charge, that system of controls
>collapsed and prices immediately shot up. The cost of cooking oil has more
>than tripled since last Friday, when Milosevic announced that he was
>stepping aside.. The prices of sugar and cigarettes are about to jump
>again. After Kostunica's supporters forced out
>Milosevic-era factory directors, the new ones are moving quickly to make
>their plants more profitable. ('Los Angeles Times', October 15, 2000)
>
>Freezing the Money Supply
>
>To make sure the government could not finance subsidies, the G-17
>economists forcefully took control of the Central Bank and immediately
>imposed a freeze on money creation ("printing of money"). This held up
>the outflow of cash which the government needed to sustain price controls
>on basic consumer goods.
>
>At first, the DOS announced that 'removing controls' was a great
>achievement. And the Western media
>applauded Kostunica's determination, presented in sharp contrast to the
>supposedly devious Milosevic:
>
>"One of the ways Milosevic tried to buy support among his impoverished
>people was by using price controls to keep down the cost of basic foods
>such as milk and cooking oil." ('Los Angeles Times', October 15, 2000).
>
>According to interviews we did with Belgrade residents today, the price of
>milk has almost doubled from 8 to 14 dinars per liter, largely affecting
>children; cooking oil has more than tripled, from 13.5 to 55 dinars; sugar
>has gone from 8 to 45 dinars. These interviews confirm the earlier 'Los
>Angeles Times' report.
>
>Shoppers are commenting, "Ahh, democratic prices!" The Serbian use of black
>humor masks rising anger among ordinary people.
>
>Faced with this simmering rebellion, Kostunica supporters, including the
>G-17 economists, have performed a dazzling flip:
>
>"The new leadership [meaning Kostunica's DOS coalition] has accused
>Slobodan Milosevic's supporters
>of trying to causing chaos on the markets with a sudden liberalisation,
>which they say could undermine
>the fledgling democracy The Serb republic's government, still dominated by
>Milosevic loyalists, has started allowing the liberalisation prices of
>basic goods that had been state-controlled But reformists said the
>liberalisation could cause suffering among a population used to state-fixed
>prices, and some even called for the government to regain control of part
>of the market." ." (AFP 16 October 2000)
>
>The Western media, which just a few days earlier congratulated Kostunica
>for removing price controls, now shamelessly parrots the line that's it's
>all Milosevic's fault:
>
>"This decision [of Milosevic supporters] is a kind of shock therapy.. These
>measures will cause a lot of
>suffering among the peopleG-17 director Mladjan Dinkic went further. The
>move was an 'attempt to create chaos on the market and provoke anger among
>the people directed at the DOS, he said.' (Ibid.)
>
>G-17 economist Dinkic is worried about "suffering"? But isn't a tolerance
>for mass suffering the very basis of the IMF program which Mr. Dinkic
>negotiated in secret meetings with the IMF in Bulgaria, shortly after the
>elections of 24 September?
>
>While in Bulgaria, Dinkic also met with representatives of NATO countries.
>He was told that Yugoslavia would have to eliminate price controls as a
>first step towards establishing 'a free market'. This is called 'price
>liberalization' and it is always an IMF precondition for loan negotiations.
>
>"'This revenge by the [pro-Milosevic] government will not succeed, but if
>an interim expert government is
>not formed soon we will have a lot of trouble controlling prices,' he said.
>To counter this 'sabotage' Dinkic said he favored a 'return to regulations
>of prices for certain basics as well as imports of cheaper equivalents from
>abroad to tackle unjustified price hikes.' (Ibid.)
>
>Note that under the guise of lowering prices Dinkic is talking about
>shipping in cheap 'equivalents'. In other words, dumping. This practice has
>destroyed local businesses and farms in Bulgaria and other countries. The
>previous (i.e., legally constituted) government made sure that producers
>survived and the poor got enough to eat. This new improved (illegal)
>government has abolished price controls and will now use the suffering it
>thus created to justify dumping low priced (often inferior) food and
>products, thus destroying small producers. Excellent work.
>
>If Dinkic really wanted to go back to the price controls in existence prior
>to the elections why did the ''democratic" gangs who illegally seized state
>stores abolish all the price controls? In fact, Dinkic wants to have it
>both ways: get rid of the controls and try to blame the legal government
>for this action, taken by his men and himself. For it is Dinkic himself who
>has seized control of the Central Bank, and quite illegally. (See:
>"Yugoslav Central Bank Tries to Stabilise Public Finances", By Gordana
>Filipovic, 'Reuters.', Oct 12, 2000)
>
>Concerning the rapid increase in prices, the program drafted by Mr.
>Dinkic's G-17 Plus is rather explicit:
>
>"Immediately after taking the office, the new government shall abolish all
>types of subsidies This measure must be implemented without regrets or
>hesitation, since it will be difficult if not impossible to apply later, in
>view of the fact that in the meantime strong lobbies may appear and do
>their best to block such measures... This initial step in economic
>liberalization must be undertaken as a "shock therapy" as its radical
>nature does not leave space for gradualism of any kind(G-17 Program of
>Radical Economic Reforms, http://www.g17.org.yu/english"
>
>The program they wrote attacking Milsoevic said they would do it.
>
>They have driven Milosevic out and begun to do it.
>
>Naturally it is Milosevic's fault.
>
>Further reading
>
>For more on the IMF-G-17 connection see "The IMF and the Yugoslav
>Elections" by Michel Chossudovsky and Jared Israel at
>http://emperors-clothes.com/analysis/1.htm
>
>For details on the funding and cration of a U.S/German proxy apparatus in
>Yugoslavia, see 'How the U.S. has Created a Corrupt Opposition in Serbia'
>By Jared Israel, Prof. Michel Chossudovsky, Karen Talbot, Nico Varkevisser
>and Prof. Petar Maher. http://emperors-clothes.com/analysis/scam.htm
>
>For independent verification of this funding process, see ''NY Times'
>Confirms Charge: U.S. Gov't Meddles in Yugoslavia' with comments by Jared
>Israel. "Suitcases full of cash" says the 'Times.'
>http://emperors-clothes.com/news/erlang.htm
>
>'Emperor's Clothes Interviews Radio B292' Revealing interviews by Jared
>Israel with two staff members at the U.S. "independent" radio station in
>Belgrade. http://emperors-clothes.com/interviews/emperor.htm
>
>'Criticism of Emperor's Clothes on the Yugoslav Elections, with Reply'
>Prof. Robert Hayden & Jared Israel
>http://emperors-clothes.com/letters/yugoltr.htm
>
>'U.S. Law Passed by House of Representatives on Funding Yugo Opposition and
>Harsh Terms for Lifting
>Sanctions' http://emperors-clothes.com/news/HR.htm
>
>www.tenc.net [Emperor's Clothes]
>
>********************************************************
>
>Croat President to Serbia: Cough Up and Pay Up!
>
>BUDAPEST, Oct. 18 - It didn't take long for the vultures to start circling
>over the heads of the new Yugoslav government. During his two-day visit to
>Hungary, Croatian President, Stipe Mesic, urged Yugoslavia's new
>authorities to strengthen democracy, allow war criminals to be brought to
>justice and to pay war damages, the Agence France Presse reported on
>Wednesday (Oct. 18).
>
>"For us the war with Serbia is over. Now it is Serbia's turn to answer the
>questions that interest us," Mesis told reporters in Budapest.
>
>Serbia has to be committed to cooperating with ex-Yugoslav states, and it
>has to make it clear that it did not see the Serbian minorities beyond its
>borders as means of conquering foreign territories, he added.
>
>"We cannot speak about normal relations if war criminals who are
>responsible for the bloodbaths of Vukovar or Srebrenica, are walking free
>in Serbia," Mesic said. Croatia wants Yugoslav war criminals to be tried
>individually before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
>Yugoslavia (ICTY) individually.
>---
>TiM Ed.: Way to stir up Kostunica/DOS pot! Cough up the alleged "war
>criminals" to the Hague, and pay up war reparations to Croatia! Not only
>is Washington presenting the new Yugoslav government with its diktats, now
>even its satellites in the Balkans are trying to dictate to Belgrade what
>it shall do.
>
>Meanwhile, no one is talking about the much more significant amount (about
>$30 billion) of war reparations that are due to Serbia, as a result of the
>NATO 1999 bombing. And to the Bosnian Serb Republic and the Republic of
>Serb Krajina, because of both the NATO 1995 bombing, and the
>American-assisted Croat-Muslim "Storm" operation the same year, in which
>over 250,000 Serbs were driven from their ancestral homes.
>
>Will the real Kostunica please stand up again, and start bringing up these
>issues, instead of sweeping them under the rug, as he is supposedly
>bringing Serbia "back to Europe" - evidently with a noose around her neck?
>
>TiM
>
>**********************************************************
>
> SERBS BOYCOTT THE KOSOVO POLLS
>
> The other Yugoslavian election
> _________________________________________________________________
>
> History was made in Yugoslavia with the fall of Slobodan Milosevic on
> 5 October. His successor, Vojislav Kostunica, has been hailed as a man
> the west can do business with. But he also a nationalist. So the world
> will be watching his handling of Kosovo, where the avid demand for
> independence is the only common thread among the various Albanian
> parties competing for power in local elections on 28 October.
>
> by JEAN-ARNAULT DERENS *
> _________________________________________________________________
>
> United Nations administrator Bernard Kouchner had serious misgivings
>about allowing polling in Kosovo for the Yugoslav federal elections on 24
>September. In the event, the Serbs in the province were able to cast their
>votes. The Kosovar Albanians took no part in the poll. It served only
>served to remind them that, under UN Resolution 1244, Kosovo is still part
>of the Yugoslav Federation. Conversely, the Serbs are extremely unlikely to
>vote in Kosovo's municipal poll on 28 October, when the province will elect
>its own local authorities.
>
> In any case, over 200,000 displaced Serbs, Montenegrins and Muslim
>Slavs will be unable to vote, while the 100,000 or so still living in the
>province support a boycott. And the election campaign itself has been
>marred by violence. On 18 August a powerful explosion rocked a building in
>the centre of Pristina belonging to the Organisation for Security and
>Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which houses several ethnic minority parties.
>The prime target was the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), representing the
>province's Muslim Slavs. They feel increasingly under threat. And so do the
>Turks, who have been told to identify with the Albanians or get out.
>
> Some members of ethnic minorities have registered to vote despite
>these threats. They make no secret of their support for the Democratic
>League of Kosovo, led by Ibrahim Rugova, which they hope will counter the
>influence of the Albanian extremists. Some Albanian-speaking Gypsies,
>particularly among the Ashkali minority, share this view. But most Roma
>still in Kosovo have not registered. In any case, the vast majority of the
>province's Roma, Serb and Montenegrin communities have been forced to flee
>to Montenegro or Serbia (1). In Serbia, the Belgrade regime has prevented
>OSCE officials from encouraging displaced persons to register as voters.
>But even in Montenegro, where the authorities facilitate the work of the
>OSCE, only a tiny minority of refugees have bothered to register.
>
> In Kosovo itself, almost the whole Serb community is behind the
>boycott. Despite the deep political divides among its 100,000 members,
>almost all Serb leaders agree they cannot go to the polls as long as the
>Serbs in Kosovo have no guarantee of their security. Oliver Ivanovic, head
>of the Serb National Council in Mitrovica, took this position from the
>start. He advocates the establishment of a tiny Serb republic of Kosovska
>Mitrovica under his control. But moderate Serbs who support the Serb
>National Council in Gracanica and the Orthodox Church have taken the same
>line.
>
> The Church itself is in a tricky position. Oscillating between
>participation and boycott of the co-management institutions set up by the
>international administration, it has confused Serb public opinion and can
>no longer rely on grassroots support. Ivanovic, however, is solidly backed
>by almost all the 50,000 Serbs living in northern Mitrovica and the
>neighbouring towns of Zvecan, Zubin Potok and Leposavic.
>
> Yet Leposavic, a town in the far north of Kosovo with an exclusively
>Serbian population, is something of an exception. It is the only place
>where there has been an explicit call for Serbs to take part in the October
>elections. It came from the Coalition for Leposavic, an alliance of Serbian
>parties opposed to Milosevic, which argued that only cooperation with the
>international institutions could ensure a future for Serbs in Kosovo.
>According to unofficial figures released by the OSCE in July, only 400
>Serbs had registered on the electoral roll for the whole of Kosovo, and 300
>of them live in Leposavic.
>
> Father Sava, spokesman for the Orthodox diocese, makes no attempt to
>conceal his despair. "International troops have been deployed in Kosovo for
>over a year, yet Serbs are still being attacked every day. The inability to
>deal with Albanian extremism is a bonus for Serb extremists." After the
>Serb boycott of the elections, fresh talks on the constitutional status of
>the Serbian people are inevitable. While the enclaved villages seemed
>doomed in the near future, the north Mitrovica region is rapidly moving
>away from the rest of Kosovo.
>
> On the Albanian side, 25 parties have officially entered the election.
>But the contest will be between the three largest groups: the Democratic
>League of Kosovo (LDK), led by Ibrahim Rugova; the Democratic Party of
>Kosovo (PDK), led by Hashim Thaci, comprising many former members of the
>Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), and the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo
>(AAK), set up by Ramush Haradinaj, a former KLA commander.
>
> Since returning to Kosovo in July, Rugova has confined himself to
>participating in the institutions created by the international
>administration and condemning political violence. For the rest, he has said
>nothing. His party seems struck by political paralysis, and leading members
>like Milazim Krasniqi have left in disgust. Some commentators, however,
>think Rugova may be playing a waiting game, allowing the former KLA
>guerrillas to make the running and hoping to cash in on their mistakes at
>the elections.
>
> In fact, the opinion polls show the LDK clearly in the lead. Rugova
>can reasonably expect mass endorsement of his role as a leader symbolising
>years of struggle against Serbian authority. But he has very little room
>for manœuvre. In a number of towns in Kosovo, the LDK has practically
>been forced underground. In Decani, in the west of the province, its
>premises have been bombed several times and the party seems unable to
>maintain a public existence despite the presence of Nato troops. Worse
>still, Haki Imeri, the head of the LDK branch in Srbica, was assassinated
>last November. Local LDK activists say they are being terrorised and
>deprived of humanitarian aid by KLA sympathisers, who hold all the key
>positions on the municipal council, although it is theoretically controlled
>by the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (Unmik) (2).
>
> Former KLA members - including those who rushed to join its ranks at
>the last minute - have imposed a reign of intolerance on the province.
>Officially, the KLA dissolved itself last year. But the power of the group
>of ultra-nationalist ideologists who controlled it is undiminished. Its
>basis is both political and military.
>
> Politically it rests on the PDK and the "provisional government"
>proclaimed by Hashim Thaci in Albania last April, which appointed local
>authorities in towns throughout Kosovo. Unmik's civilian administrators
>often had no choice but to come to terms with the former guerrillas, who
>have succeeded in eliminating potential competitors and hold a virtual
>monopoly of power in the municipalities. Officially, the PDK condemns
>political violence. But its leaders are frequently implicated in physical
>liquidation of former supporters deemed to be "collaborators" and in the
>harassment of national minorities.
>
> The KLA's main military prop is the Kosovo Protection Corps (TMK),
>which is officially a civilian body. In fact, it consists of 5,000 former
>KLA guerrillas and is organised along military lines. Its six regional
>commands correspond exactly to the former operational zones of the KLA, and
>it misses no opportunity to advertise its continuity with the former
>guerrilla army. The KLA's intelligence services do not appear to have been
>disbanded either, and the TMK maintains close links with the Presevo,
>Medvedja and Bujanovac Liberation Army (UCPMB), which conducts sporadic
>operations in three towns in southern Serbia.
>
> The KLA has paid no more than lip-service to disarmament. A number of
>tough operations by international troops have resulted in the seizure of
>whole arsenals of weapons, notably in Drenica. The international
>administration refused to incorporate former KLA fighters into the new
>Kosovo Police Service (KPS) en bloc, but many managed to join as
>individuals. They are clearly cooperating with the former KLA's military
>police (PU), another organisation that has been officially dissolved but
>remains in operation. In rural areas, in particular, its members willingly
>undertake the more sordid tasks, such as enforcing payment of the illegal
>taxes levied by the Thaci "government".
>
> Many members of the TMK and PU, as well as former KLA fighters
>employed in the international police force, have been directly implicated
>in political and ethnic violence. Rexhep Selimi, minister of public order
>in Thaci's provisional government, has kept control of the PU and of Shik,
>the KLA's civilian intelligence service. The latter is probably receiving
>technical support from Albania's national intelligence service, also called
>Shik, which remains loyal to former president Sali Berisha.
>
>Crime syndicates at work
>
> In terms of ultra-nationalism, the PDK faces competition from the
>National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo (LKCK), a small group that
>has not officially renounced the Albanian version of Marxism-Leninism. But
>the main threat to its unity comes from conflict between the crime
syndicates.
>
> In February fire raged for days in the huge Ramiz-Sadiku sports
>complex in Pristina, whose basement level houses prosperous shopping malls
>controlled by "Commander Remi" (real name Rustem Mustafa). Remi is
>suspected of running rackets in Pristina and is said to be in conflict with
>Thaci over control of the petrol stations springing up on all Kosovo's main
>roads (3).
>
> Ramush Haradinaj, commander of the Dukagjin sector in western Kosovo
>during the fighting, has also kept control of his native region, though he
>has since become deputy to Agim Ceku, commander in chief of the TMK.
>Haradinaj controls the borders with Albania and Montenegro from Prizren to
>Pec. From this strategic position, he supervises the illegal traffic in oil
>and cigarettes. The origin of the political rift that prompted him to set
>up the AAK may well lie in conflict between the crime syndicates. Both
>Haradinaj and Mustafa have narrowly escaped assassination attempts in
>recent months.
>
> The spread of organised crime, and the carving up of the province by
>"patriots" applying Stalinist methods, is facilitated by the total absence
>of political debate. Not a single Albanian intellectual, newspaper or party
>dares criticise the former KLA, condemn the persecution of minorities, or
>call nationalist dogma into question. Rugova and Thaci have no ideological
>differences. They are simply engaged in a power struggle. They share the
>declared aim of independence for Kosovo and continue hypocritically to
>condemn violence while refraining from the slightest gesture that would
>loosen the ideological straitjacket in which Kosovo is held fast. Even the
>courageous condemnation of violence by journalist Veton Surroi last August
>failed to provoke a change of heart.
>
> As for the international administration, it has come to terms with
>"reverse ethnic cleansing" and allowed crime syndicates and clandestine
>networks trained in the Enver Hodja school of maoism to take control of the
>province. For years Kosovo lived in the strange world of an "official "
>society controlled by the authorities in Belgrade and a "parallel" Albanian
>civil society. It is now experiencing a new cleavage between the "official"
>society administered by Unmik, abounding in fine phrases about democracy
>and the protection of minorities, and the real society controlled by the
>political and criminal mafia.
>
> The international protectorate has freed Albanian political parties
>from responsibility for formulating policies, since Unmik takes all the
>important decisions. Their only platform is independence. Consequently,
>they can stand out only by being more demagogic than their opponents. As
>the editor-in-chief of the independent daily Koha Ditore realistically
>observes, "the UN troops are trapped between two illusions: that of the
>Serbs, who are certain they will return to the province, and that of the
>Albanians, who are convinced they will obtain independence" (4).
> ______________________________________________________________
>
> * Journalist, Cetinje (Montenegro). Author of Balkans, la crise (Folio
>Actuel, Paris, 2000) and co-author, with Catherine Samary, of Conflits
>yougoslaves (Editions de l'Atelier, Paris, October 2000).
>
>(1) See Llazar Semini, "Rugova Comeback?", Institute for War and Peace
>Reporting, London, 23 June 2000, http://www.iwpr.net/
>(2) See "Elections in Kosovo: Moving Toward Democracy?", International
>Crisis Group, Brussels, 7 July 2000, http://www.intl-crisis-group.org/
>(3) See "What happened to the KLA?", International Crisis Group, Brussels,
>3 March 2000, http://www.intl-crisis-group.org/
>(4) Emmanuelle Rivi�re, "Rencontre avec Baton Haxhiu", Le Courrier des
>Balkans, Paris, June 2000, http://bok.net/balkans/
>
> Translated by Barry Smerin
>
> Le Monde diplomatique, October 2000
><http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/en/2000/10/07kosovo>
>
>
>
>Global Reflexion - Amsterdam - The Netherlands
>
>
