> >From: "Francisco Javier Bernal" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] >Date: Thu, 23 Nov 2000 12:02:27 -0000 >Subject: Stratfor on Palestine [STOPNATO.ORG.UK] > > >Egypt’s Stance Shifts From Talk to Action >001123, 0102 > >Summary > >Egypt withdrew its ambassador to Israel Nov. 21 following massive >Israeli attacks on Palestinian National Authority facilities in the >Gaza Strip. With domestic and international pressure increasing on >Egypt to act against an Israeli show of force, Cairo’s action >indicates the regional dynamic of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is >once again shifting. > >Analysis > >Israeli attack helicopters launched rockets into targets in the Gaza >Strip Nov. 21, while Israeli warships in the Mediterranean Sea fired >artillery as well. The bombardment focused on facilities of the >Palestinian police, naval service, military intelligence service, >Yasser Arafat’s personal security force and Fatah headquarters. >Israel’s recent attacks on Gaza were the heaviest since the violence >began several weeks ago. Egypt’s recall of its ambassador directly >resulted from the attacks. > >Egypt’s move holds enormous significance for the current regional >dynamic, which is on the verge of shifting from rhetoric against >Israel to military posturing. Egypt is the key to containing the >current crisis; No other Arab nation has the means, motive or >opportunity to strike independently against Israel. Despite making a >strategic choice for peace, however, Egyptian President Hosni >Mubarak’s ability to act moderately is constrained by domestic >troubles. In Cairo, a strong anti-Israeli opposition, led by Islamic >fundamentalists, is pressuring the government to sever ties with >Israel and abrogate the 1979 peace treaty. > >Egypt functions as the center of gravity for the Arab world due to >its >military superiority and senior leadership. Cairo took a moderate >stance against Israel at the Oct. 21-22 Arab summit, clearly choosing >the path of peace. Back in Egypt, however, a strong anti-Israeli >opposition grows and gains power. Representatives of the Muslim >Brotherhood, violently opposed to Egypt’s peace treaty with Israel, >recently gained a handful of seats in parliament by running as >independent candidates. > >If Mubarak feels he is strong enough to withstand the >fundamentalists’ >threat to his power, then anti-Israeli rhetoric will remain rhetoric. >If Mubarak buckles under pressure to abrogate the peace treaty, war >is >imminent. Mubarak most likely withdrew Egypt’s ambassador to >marginalize his domestic enemies. By adopting a harder line, he >undercut the opposition and took the wind out of its sails. In doing >so, however, he also appeared to bow to pressure and altered Egypt’s >previously moderate stance. > >The danger lies in the limited number of steps Egypt can take between >the withdrawal of an ambassador and a military response. Cairo can >sever ties and cease bilateral communication, but Israel would >consider such additional actions to be threatening. Moreover, if >Israel even perceives Mubarak is likely to go further and revoke the >peace treaty, it will be compelled to attack its neighbor in >accordance with its first-strike military doctrine. > >For a while, the crisis was largely limited to an Israeli-Palestinian >affair. But the escalation of Israeli attacks and Egypt’s responses >indicates the entire region is a step closer to being pulled into the >conflict. Arab nations, regardless of peace agreements, oppose >Israel’s existence on what they perceive as Arab homeland. That the >Israelis bombarded Gaza, formerly Egyptian territory, only increases >anti-Israeli sentiment in Cairo and brings additional pressure on >Mubarak. > >Events have overtaken the key players: Mubarak, Palestinian leader >Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak are reacting to >events rather than controlling them. Therefore, the hard-liners on >all >sides – Likud leader Ariel Sharon in Israel, Hamas in the Palestinian >territories and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt – now have the >advantage and are forcing the hands of key players. > >Indeed, the situation is escalating. Arafat ordered a cease-fire Nov. >16, yet attacks have continued and grown more fierce. The violence >has >transformed from rock throwing to terrorist attacks. A bomb exploded >in Gaza Nov. 20 near an Israeli school bus. A car bomb exploded Nov. >22 in Hadera, in northern Israel, killing at least two and injuring >dozens. > >Threats are also emerging from within the Palestinian National >Authority. Palestinian Cabinet Secretary Ahmed Abdel Rahman said Nov. >21 Palestinian security forces have a right to use guns against >Israeli aggression. Palestinians in the streets, jubilant over the >ambassador recall, waved Egyptian flags and shouted, “Oh, Mubarak, >oh, >my love, go strike Tel Aviv,” Agence France-Presse reported. > >Israel’s hands are tied as well. Israel cannot respond to the recall >of Egypt’s ambassador without further escalating the regional crisis. >“We are not going to retaliate. We are not going to recall our own >ambassador from Egypt,” said Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman Noam >Katz. Meanwhile, Sharon pressures Barak to respond to Palestinian >violence. > >Barak, Arafat and Mubarak all have stated publicly they do not want a >war. Yet each is being pressured by an empowered domestic faction to >react sharply or violently. If Barak ordered no more attacks on >Palestinians, he would lose his position as prime minister. His >government coalition has already fallen apart, and the opposition is >calling for new elections. > >If Arafat ordered his security services to attack Palestinian >protesters, he could lose his leadership position or worse, his life. >A breakaway Fatah leader, Marwan Barghouthi, has said that the >intifada will continue even if Arafat orders a halt to the popular >uprising. Mubarak is now beginning to feel similar pressure, as >evidenced by the ambassador recall. > >Thus, events unfolding in Cairo in the coming days will have enormous >gravity. Mubarak is unsure he is strong enough to remain in power and >honor the peace agreement with Israel. He will do all he can to >prevent a regional war, but he will only go as far as his domestic >situation allows > > >Hamas Broadcast Calls for Armed Intifada >2225 GMT, 001114 > >Summary > >The leader of Hamas, an Iran-backed Islamic militia opposed to the >Middle East peace process, used a radio station controlled by the >Palestinian Authority to issue terrorist threats against Israel and >broadcast a call to “transform the intifada into an armed struggle,” >according to Haaretz. It now appears Palestinian Authority Chairman >Yasser Arafat faces not only a rift in Fatah, but also a potential >fracture among the officials of the Palestinian Authority. If true, >Arafat is more marginalized than previously expected. More >importantly, Hamas – with at least tacit support of elements in the >Palestinian Authority – is upping the stakes of the conflict and may >be attempting to draw in Arab neighbors for a region-wide conflict. > >Analysis > >Hamas leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin aired his message on Radio Palestine >Nov. 12. Although Radio Palestine has a history of Hamas sympathy, it >has previously refrained from broadcasting Hamas messages. Yassin’s >words were broadcast throughout the day on the station, which is >under >the Palestinian Authority’s direct supervision. During his message, >Yassin promised “selective attacks” by Hamas militants against >Israeli >targets were “coming soon.” > >A growing fracture in Arafat’s Fatah is now compounded by collusion >with Hamas. Moreover, Yassin’s use of Radio Palestine indicates some >elements in the Palestinian Authority are now at least tacitly >supporting Hamas. Arafat claims he is still interested in >negotiating, >but it will become increasingly difficult for him to control Fatah >and >Hamas while keeping the Palestinian Authority in line. A greater >problem is once again on the horizon: The conflict, if it spirals out >of Arafat’s control, may draw neighboring countries into a region- >wide >battle. > >Since the crisis began, Arafat – who favors peace negotiations – has >been losing support to Hamas, which claims independence will be >achieved only through violent struggle. Factions of Fatah, Arafat’s >party, have openly cooperated with Hamas and renounced Arafat. >Elements within the Palestinian Authority, which Arafat chairs, are >also reportedly cooperating with Hamas, making it difficult to >discern >whether Arafat is cooperating with Hamas or if he has lost the >support >of some of his officials. If the latter is true, then Arafat’s >ability >to control events in the territories is more marginalized than >previously thought. > >Yassin’s call on Radio Palestine is the latest example of Palestinian >Authority-Hamas cooperation. On Oct. 17, Lt. Col. Levy of Israel’s >Counter-Terrorism Bureau said senior Palestinian Authority officials >are aiding Hamas in the preparation of terrorist attacks against >Israel. The Jerusalem Post reported Oct. 26 Hamas and Fatah >representatives were meeting daily and cooperating to orchestrate the >uprising, or intifada. A Hamas spokesman added relations with the >Palestinian Authority have improved considerably. > >Marwan Barghouthi, who leads the Fatah faction dissociated from >Arafat, echoed Yassin’s statement. Barghouthi said Nov. 13 that >Palestinians would engage in “special activities” Nov. 15. The >Palestinian Central Council pledged to declare statehood Nov. 15, but >has since delayed the date, claiming it conflicted with the >Organization of Islamic Conference summit in Doha, Qatar. Barghouthi >called on Palestinians to block Jewish settlers and Israeli soldiers >from entering Palestinian territories. One of Barghouthi’s associates >said that “at a time when the PA’s official leadership refrains from >making a declaration about Palestinian sovereignty, the people will >do >so in its own way,” reported Haaretz. The calls clearly are not in >tandem with Arafat’s policies. > >Conflict in the territories is heating up; Israel is taking the >threats seriously. The Israel Defense Force (IDF) Nov. 14 imposed a >closure on areas under full Palestinian control. The closure, which >has no time limit, cuts off Palestinian communities from one another >and bars all vehicles from entering or leaving cities except for >humanitarian reasons. Israel recently used artillery and heavy >machine >guns to shell areas in Jericho and Hebron. According to Israeli >Radio, >Col. Gal Hirsch, commander of the West Bank region around Ramallah, >accused Palestinians Nov. 13 of shifting strategy to turn their >“guerrilla war” against Israel into a terrorist campaign focused on >road attacks. > >Indicating the magnitude of the situation, IDF Chief of Staff Shaul >Mofaz, speaking at a Nov. 14 press conference, reassured the public >that the army has no plans to call up large numbers of reservists. >Mofaz added a large call-up would panic the public and also would be >misinterpreted by the Palestinians. Since the clashes erupted, Israel >has stepped up reserve training to enhance readiness. > >In a more alarming development, recent events indicate attempts by >the >international community to keep the crisis isolated may be faltering. >Syria’ s President Bashar al-Assad lashed out at Israel at the OIC >summit. Subsequently, Israeli warplanes flew over much of Lebanon >Nov. >14, breaking the sound barrier over Baalbeck in the Bekaa Valley – >Syria’s main area of military control in the country. Iran-backed >Hezbollah threatened retaliation, and the Lebanese president declared >the flights an act of war. > >Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, after leaving the United States, >canceled a meeting with British Prime Minister Tony Blair in order to >return home for an emergency Cabinet session. > >Hamas is actively courting international support for an escalation of >the conflict. It may be trying to pull Jordan into the fray or at >least pressure Amman to allow Hamas back into the country. Jordan’s >prime minister met with an expelled senior leader of Hamas while in >Qatar for the OIC conference, Jordan’s al-Dustour reported Nov. 14. >Iranian leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said Nov. 14 Palestinians will >not be content with using stones in their uprising against Israel, >rather they will take up firearms to defend themselves. > >Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, who is the key to preventing or >instigating a regional war, also has recently increased his >involvement. Arafat met with Mubarak before traveling to Washington >for talks that ended without progress. Mubarak skipped the OIC >summit, >because he wanted to stay at home for parliamentary elections, >according to the government daily Al-Ahram. But he may have avoided >the conference in order to keep the current crisis in a holding >pattern, since Arab nations will refrain from acting in concert >against Israel without Egyptian support. Arafat met Mubarak again >Nov. >14 after he left Qatar. > >Israel and the United States have not yet given up on Arafat. U.S. >President Bill Clinton reportedly told Barak during their meeting >that >Arafat is interested in resuming negotiations based on understandings >reached at Camp David. Communications Minister Binyamin Ben Eliezer, >who assumed the functions of prime minister while Barak was in the >United States, called on Arafat to make a dramatic change in >attitude. > >Regardless of his desires, Arafat’s ability to control the situation >in the streets is becoming more tenuous every day. Hamas is chipping >away at Arafat ’s power base, and neighboring countries are becoming >jittery. The crisis is becoming more serious. If Arab neighbors can >resist internal pressures, the mess can still be contained. If not, >it >may again have potential to draw in the entire region. > > > > >In the Middle East, Russia Makes A Move >2337 GMT, 001123 > >By George Friedman > >On Nov. 3, four days before the election, the United States >negotiated >an agreement with Moscow in which the Russian government pledged to >halt the sale of weapons to Iran. > >At the time, opponents of the Clinton administration criticized the >pact because it permitted the Russians to fulfill existing contracts >with the Iranians, including the sale of a submarine and tanks. But >on >Nov. 22, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov informed the United >States that Russia would withdraw from the entire agreement by the >end >of November. > >This creates a substantial crisis in U.S.-Russia relations and >serious >complexities in the Middle East at a time when Washington does not >need any more complexities. The Russian government is deliberately >challenging the United States and a timeworn U.S. strategy: the >threat >of sanctions. > >Originally, the United States threatened to impose sanctions on >Russia >if it did not stop the sale of conventional weapons to the Iranians. >But the original agreement was riddled with loopholes and essentially >unenforceable. > >So why has the Putin government decided to deliberately provoke a >confrontation, essentially daring the United States to impose >sanctions? Two reasons emerge. First, the agreement was negotiated >under Vice President Al Gore, just days before the election. The >Russians may have decided they bet on the wrong horse in the election >and that it may be prudent to abrogate the agreement before Texas >Gov. >George Bush emerges as the winner. > >But a second explanation is more likely. The situation between Israel >and the Palestinians has deteriorated extraordinarily in the last few >weeks. As a result, the geopolitical reality is shifting in the >Middle >East and, along with it, the U.S. position in the region. >Increasingly >Arab governments – either out of genuine conviction or internal >political pressure – are downgrading their ties to Washington. > >Many of these countries are painfully aware that in a world with only >one superpower, there are few options for finding a balancing >counterweight to the United States. One of the critical issues is the >availability of weapons. During the Cold War, the Soviets were >prepared to provide weaponry to anti-Israeli and anti-American >regimes >in sufficient quantity. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, these >nations were either dependent on the United States for arms or >dependent on other major powers subject to American pressure. Serious >military options have been closed off for Arab states. > >In the current context, if the Russians subordinate their arms export >policy to Washington’s wishes, they lose tremendous leverage. The >threat of sanctions is to a great extent meaningless to Moscow; The >expectation of U.S. aid has evaporated. If anyone picks up the >economic slack, it will be the Europeans. > >On a deeper, geopolitical level, Russia is clearly pushing back into >the Middle East. Close relations with Iran make sense, weakening the >U.S. position in the region. It also creates allies that might be >able >to control fundamentalist Islamic movements in Russia, the Caucasus >and Central Asia. In this effort, Iranian cooperation rather than >confrontation is invaluable. Weapons sales are also profitable. If >sanctions are the price to be paid, then so be it. > >The Russian government clearly sees opportunities they didn’t see a >few weeks ago, and they are willing to challenge Washington to take >advantage of those opportunities. Given their relationship with Iraq >and their opening to Iran, the Russians can move into a position as a >broker between the two countries. If they manage to create some sort >of entente between Iran and Iraq, the Russians can become an >ascendant >power in the Persian Gulf. > >This would be something the Iranian and Iraq governments could live >with. But for the United States and Israel, the prospect is both >troubling and intolerable. > > >______________________________________________________________________ >To unsubscribe, write to [EMAIL PROTECTED] > >Start Your Own FREE Email List at http://www.listbot.com/links/joinlb _______________________________________________________ KOMINFORM P.O. 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