From: CIEPAC <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Date: Fri, 31 Aug 2001 01:13:47 -0500 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: [Ciepac-i] English Chiapas al Dia 251 I BULLETIN �CHIAPAS AL DIA� No. 251 CIEPAC, CHIAPAS, MEXICO (July 11, 2001) A LECTURE OF THE NATIONAL AND CHIAPAN POLITICAL SITUATION In San Cristobal de Las Casas, Chiapas, on July 14, 2001, Services and Advisory for Peace (Servicios y Asesoria para la Paz [SERAPAZ]), a body of analysis and reflection made up of a group of people who formed the National Commission of Mediation (Comision Nacional de Intermediacion [CONAI]) and other similar advisory and collaboration groups, put together a document which was the result of internal reflection. The above document, entitled �Notes towards a new strategy�, was later released to the national press. We will now present and comment on this document to better understand its context. The parentheses are our comments and observations. The document proposes 8 points: 1.- �The national and local (in Chiapas) situations have increasingly changed since the passing of the (counter) reforms on indigenous rights in the Congress of the Union; this action marked the end of a period. (In this legislative counterreform, the initiative of the Cocopa Law was eliminated from the discussion in order to impose the initiative of the PRI and PAN senators: The Bartlett-Cevallos Act.) With the suspension of the process towards dialogue between the EZLN and the federal government, another more serious process has begun. This process is characterized by the inability to resolve the root problems of the conflict politically, and by the increasing tendancy towards the deterioration of political and social cooperation, along with deepening polarization of actors and positions. It is essential to reanalyze the current moment from a strategic perspective that allows for the establishment of necessary definitions and actions to stop these harmful tendencies and reorient the peace process. (What is the use of negotiating, coming to political agreements to build peace between the legislative power, the executive and the EZLN, if afterwards, arguing about independence in the decisions of those in power, they contradict the agreement of all parties and reformulate a proposal that contradicts that which was negotiated? The negotiation process that cost the country so much was erased, which could have been the the political solution of the conflict.) 2.-The success of the Alliance for Chiapas on August 20, 2000 and the behavior of the elected government of Pablo Salazar Mendiguchia with respect to the peace process; the strategic decision of the federal government to generate conditions that would permit the reinitiation of dialogue; the EZLN strategy of bringing to the political arena the debate of which conditions were necessary to solve the conflict, as well as the enormous social support for the March for Dignity (during February and March) for indigenous demands and for a peaceful route: were positive signs that generated great expectations in many sectors of national and Chiapan society in terms of advancing in: -The political solution to the causes of the conflict. -The push for a true process of democratization. -The conditions for generating and promoting economic and social alternatives which allow an increased standard of living and work in the communities. -A reinspired spirit and the hope for a better future. 3.- Nevertheless, the political class of society did not end up grasping the political moment, the link between the peace process and the reform of the state, nor did it assume its historical responsibility. Accordingly, on April 28 this context radically changed because of the failure to recover the credibility and conditions for the dialogue, and with that failure, the peace process entered a profound crisis. (The Congress of the Union passed the Bartlett-Cevallos Act with the consensus neither of all the parties nor of the society. On the contrary, social support for the Cocopa Law was shown during the zapatista march to Mexico City. The legislators of all the political parties that make up the Commission of Negotiation and Pacification-COCOPA-did not defend their proposal; and President Vicente Fox, just as Pilot, washed his hands clean of the matter and held the parties of the Congress responsible for not accepting the Cocopa Law which he had claimed as his own.) 4.-Some of the aspects of the new situation gathered from an extensive popular perception in Chiapas, are the following: -The increase of denunciations and protests by organizations and communities of the growing military and police presence in different regions. (The soldiers moved only a few kilometers away from the military checkpoints the EZLN had demanded be removed, and have continued their agressions and patrols of the indigenous communities. On the other hand, although Governor Pablo Salazar has removed some police stations from the communities, the repressive behavior of the police has continued unchanged during the first seven months of his term.) -The repeated denunciations of the reactivation of paramilitary groups, especially in the Northern Zone of Chiapas. (Moreover, paramilitaries of Paz y Justicia were granted their freedom during the present year.) -The perception that the state powers have not taken the necessary stpes to stop paramilitarization and carry out justice. (The federal government just as the state government claims that it is not their problem until the other body gives them instructions. Until then, there wont be any more paramilitary prisoners, and no weapons seized.) -The perception that the state structure has not taken the necessary measures of justice in order to stop polarization/marginalization, a product of paramilitarization and other abuses. -The application of politics and official programs with plans drawn up by the former government regime which contribute to the division and confrontation within and between organizations and communities. -The perception that the state government has put itself in agreement with the pro-corporation economic politics of the federal government, especially in relation to support for the Plan Puebla Panama which represents a threat to the rights of the indigenous people and in general, to production and social property/public property. (The declarations of the governor in favor of the Plan Puebla Panama has generated discontent in sectors and organizations which have formed criticisms and disagreements to the plan. Among them are the academic sectors, civil, peasant (campesino), and indigenous organizations.) -The lack of articulation and diferentiation of the social and civil organizations (indigenous, campesino) in turn, in the relation they ought to establish with the state government in terms of collaboration and resistence, generating a new space of confrontation and marginalization/polarization. -That in these conditions of division and uncertainty, there is a great risk that in the next electoral campaign, the most conservative positions and actors will regain their control of the local Congress and the local governments, blocking the process of democratic change and the conditions for peace. (This is the case of the groups or families of local plantation owners(caciques) and cattle ranchers who demand the recuperation of their lands from Pablo Salazar, for which they have formed a special group of police to evict campesinos and indigenous people from the land they have reclaimed. This has also brought about a marginalization/polarization between the above organizations and their leaders who are now officials in the new government.) -That the passing of the indigenous reform generates a growing distance and lack of trust of society towards the institutional political framework and favors a radicalization of the forms of struggle. -That the politics of reconciliation pushed by the state government so far have not focused on the solution of root causes of the conflict and the application of justice. On the contrary, these politics have generated new open and latent conflict situations the communities. (A supposed politics of reconciliation which neglects the application of justice for the victims and the punishment of the guilty, would leave the problem unsolved in the regions. If the former government of Albores Guillen offered amnesty to the paramilitaries, money and seeds in exchange for them giving up their weapons, the present government official of reconciliation offered the same but without collecting the weapons. This politics of reconciliation did little to help create credibility in the actions and promises of the new government.) -That the suspension of the dialogue and the polarization of the parties at the national level (EZLN and federal government) have returned to the local level the tensions of the conflict, creating a growing process of deterioration. -That the present situation of weakness/inability of the federal government before the political society, whose priorities are in other agendas (such as the fiscal reform for the increase of taxes and other measures of privatization which the World Bank and IMF require of Vicente Foxs government because of its external debt), has led it to renew its alliance with the Mexican army, which is planning a dangerous return to the strategy used during the six year term of Ernesto Zedillo: collusion with local violent actors and the push for �development without negotiation and without peace�, making the state government a direct player and principal part of the conflict. A new state strategy of working towards peace is urgent, based in a just evaluation of the conflict, its threats and risks. 5.-The definite passing of the constitutional (counter) reform (of the indigenous law) by 16 local legislatures would be the last straw through which that which has been fermenting since April 28 would be openly expressed: a total crisis. Among the facts of a coming viable scenario stand out: * The radicalization of the EZLN, of diverse social sectors and of other armed groups (in many other states of the country), faced with evidence of the failure of institutional spaces in solving the causes of the conflict. * The inability of the social and civil actors of peace to create new initiatives capable of halting the deterioration and the escalation of the conflict, and of opening new alternatives to the peace process. * The delegitimization of the actors of different political parties and, in general, of political society, such as the lack of political leadership and links with the social processes. (This would definitely effect the next electoral process of October 7, when new authorities will be selected in Chiapas 111 counties, more than 80 in the hands of the PRI, and the total of the Local Congress composed of 40 senators, of which the majority of seats are now held by the PRI.) *New forms of expression and struggle of the indigenous movement through the push for true autonomies. *In synthesis, the features/traits that have been identified for the new stage are of: *Growing political and social polarization *Loss of trust in the local government and the project of political, economic, and social transformations. *New elements of dispute and spaces of confrontation. *Radical and violent expressions of struggles to change the present conditions. *Lack of articulation, fragmentation, and division of the political, social, and civil forces which have contributed to the onstruction of peace. ! nbsp ; *The renewal of the governmental strategy to attend to causes, without dialogue and without channels for the peace process. 6.-With these perspectives various strategic options are opened, however, without possibilities for the short term. Presently, it is hard to imagine that the parties will modify their strategy, or that other actors might have the clarity, cohesion, and strength to change the scenario. For this reason, the state government can and should be the factor that immediately generates a new and better situation in the political rechanneling of the peace process. The state government could and should be a factor to quickly generate a new situation that lends itself to a political rechanneling of the peace proecess. The political time and the options have decreased. The polarization begins to choke expectations. The increasing loss of credibility and hope bring to mind the urgency of a new public position on the process of bringing groups together. The qualitative change/leap of the governor would not suffice, but would be necessary to position the maturation and change of other actors, including the federal government. 7.-(The governor of Chiapas) Pablo Salazar is faced with the last opportunity and the delicate responsibility of changing his government strategy in terms of effectively contributing to the establishment of new conditions, the opening of spaces, and channels to direct the social and political conflict that is brewing. For this it is necessary to assume a clear position on the options of: -On the part of the government, convert itself into a local actor, defined within the framework of the federal strategy. -Or propose an alternative strategy from a complete/integral and national vision of the conflict which would be clearly expressed in the framework of its capabilities and local competence. We only see the second option as a real possibility, a strategic change that implies: -Retaking in an unquestionable way, the discourse and its various actions regarding the previously planned criteria of the campaign and at the beginning of the new government. That is, a politics of reconciliation and development that contributes to the creation of actors and conditions that are necessary for peace. Ending actions that polarize, that fail to contribute to peace. That all social and reconciliation politics focus on coming up with solutions for the root causes of the conflict, based on reconstructing the social fabric and on encouraging participation and political articulation, etc. -Restoring the leadership of hope with social trust, assuming a series of substantial political definitions around the vital questions of the social agenda which in a clear way, categorize the action of the government at all levels. It is important to give precise signs that a democratic project of justice and with full respect for human rights, especially for the rights of indigenous people, is being undertaken. The best service to the people is to remake the way to peace, avoiding the inertias, provocations and the traps along the way. -Promoting new spaces of communication and mediation in various dimensions: community, regional and state, which permit multiple mediators and alliances with the actors of the democratic change. Prioritizing, in this sense, the alliance with the social and indigenous sectors of the state. Etc. 8.-Finally, we confirm our willing service to a just and dignified peace, and we also prepare ourselves to make the adjustments from the bottom up that the new situation requires.� Here the analysis of Serapaz ends. It should be mentioned that for governor Pablo Salazar the challenge is complicated. He finds himself in the crossfire between the political and economic plan of Vicente Fox and the demands of the indigenous people, the campesinos and other sectors of the population. Apparently, Salazar can take actions to bring about political changes in Chiapas. He has firmly confronted the majority of the means of communication that previously lived off of public funds and corruption. He has altered the politics and content of the television and radio news agencies. He has confronted the PRIistas of the local congress to prevent them from continuing their corruption or corrupting the judicial power. He freed Zapatista prisoners, though some are still behind bars. Nonetheless, the social demands and promises of his campaign about the solution of the problem of the paramilitaries, land, the repressive actions of the police since the beginning of this year and the return of displaced people, weigh heavily on him; the reforms necessary to improve the system of justice, put an end to impunity and the misconduct of the courts. Pablo Salazar also finds himself in the dilemma of solving problems of a federal nature, such as economic problems, and the negotiation with the EZLN. That is, the present conflict of the sugar cane producers in Chiapas is a reflection of the national crisis. The corruption of the CEOs and the open market that the federal government offered for importation of high fructose transgenic corn sweetener from the United States is leading to a destruction of the sugar cane market. Even though there are other political problems related to the exploitation of the sugar cane producers by the plantation owners of the Pujiltic region, such as the Orantes family, the demands that the sugar cane producers have made to the Salazar government that been ignored. Another serious problem is the fall in the prices of coffee which have put thousands of producers and indigenous people in Chiapas in a crisis. The commercial opening and the liberalization of the prices for the international market have not only effected coffee but also corn. The federal government liberalized the prices of corn and of the tortilla and privatized the warehouses of Conasupo, and verified and distributed basic grains in the framework of NAFTA. It also allowed for the unchecked introduction of millions of tons of corn from the United States into the Mexican countryside, in violation of a limit that was part of NAFTA on imports that was meant to decrease over a 12 year period in order to protect Mexican corn growers and not submit them immediately to the international market. Nonetheless, Pablo Salazar can give himself a pat on the back for the fact that in some regions of the state, the corn farmers are reaching a production of between 8 and 10 tons per hectare. What perhaps Salazar doesnt know, is that the transnational corporations like Monsanto, Novartis, Pionner, and others, that control the seeds and the agrochemical market in the world, are offering technological packets with their patented seed and more agrotoxics, so that the producers turn out more tons of corn per hectare to the private company Maseca, with lower relative profits for the producer. This high level of production is not sustainable and only lasts for several years due to the lower quality of soil from so much use of agrochemicals. In these regions, the campesinos have already lost the native �criolle� seed, and food sovereignty that the indigenous and campesinos are leaving by not protecting their seeds. On the other hand, the company Maseca, located in Chiapas, buys up to three times more tons of corn from the United States than from producers in Chiapas. The Governor of Chiapas jumps on board with President Vicentes Fox to support the Plan Puebla Panama, on whom he depends for support and channeling of federal resources for various projects. He also cant control the presence of the World Bank and other mulitlateral organizations. In the media, Vicente Fox appearing dressed in indigenous dress with the authorities of some ethnic groups is reminiscent of the old actions of ex president Ernesto Zedillo and the former governor Albores Guillen. Or with the embassador of Israel or of countries in the European Union. We see him less in the assemblies of indigenous and campesino organizations who also have proposals they have formed for a long time that are not new. The demands, the proposals, the alternatives have appeared in declarations in newspapers, in declarations, letters, and in the streets when society has protested. In the demand for freedom of indigenous prisoners unjustly imprisoned. These dont come from nowhere. The voices have spoken for a long time. Gustavo E. Castro Soto. Center of Economic and Political Investigations of Community Action, A.C. CIEPAC. 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