From: Miroslav Antic <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>

Subject: Fighting the Wrong War

HTTP://WWW.STOPNATO.ORG.UK
---------------------------


Published on Tuesday, December 11, 2001 in the Guardian of
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/guardian> London

Fighting the Wrong War
Afghans Have Paid a High Price for a Campaign That Has Failed to Meet
Its Original Aims


by Jonathan Steele 
     
The toppling of the Taliban may eventually prove to be the best thing to
have happened in Afghanistan for a decade. But it was not an initial aim
of the US-led war. In the wake of their departure from Kandahar, that
point cannot be stressed enough, before the drumbeat of triumphalism
deafens us all. Victory over the wrong opponent is not much of a
victory. It sounds more like "collateral benefit" - provided we are sure
the benefit outweighs the costs.


Remember the war's stated purpose: to bring to justice those who had
helped to mastermind the atrocities of September 11, and eliminate the
bases where the terrorists had learned their skills. All the information
available (and it was known before the first missile was launched
against Afghanistan) suggests that the 19 hijackers trained for their
mission in Europe and the United States, and entered the US with legal
visas. Evidence that they personally had any connection with Afghanistan
has been minimal, verging on nil. No suggestion has ever been made that
any of the al-Qaida network were Afghans.


That Osama bin Laden, the founder of al-Qaida, had lived in Afghanistan
for over five years was well known. That he had inspired the concept of
a high-profile attack on US targets of symbolic national significance -
without necessarily choosing the methods, the timing or the men - was a
reasonable suspicion. But where does that put the Taliban? There has
been much indignant talk about "people who harbor terrorists". Unload
the emotion, and this is not much more useful than describing European
states which decline to deport murder suspects to the US as "people who
harbor killers". 


More importantly, the Taliban had no way of enforcing their will on Bin
Laden. If Donald Rumsfeld, with his infrared laser-guided heat-seeking
cave-buster bombs, cannot find Bin Laden after nine weeks on the job,
how does he expect the Taliban to have done better? As Ahmed Rashid's
excellent book on the Taliban makes abundantly clear, Mullah Mohammed
Omar is no Saddam Hussein or Slobodan Milosevic. He did not run a "war
machine" or a "police state". Afghanistan was an impoverished and
destroyed society with minimal infrastructure, in which the concept of
governance meant nothing more than the use of a few satellite telephones
to issue social edicts which the so-called religious police enforced.
Almost every urban service, from education to health to food, was
provided by outside aid agencies or privately by Afghans on their own.
Villages had to fend for themselves.


To imagine that in such a vacuum of government the Taliban could arrest
Bin Laden was laughable, although Mullah Omar did, of course, ask a
shura of religious leaders to consider the problem and they did
recommend Bin Laden leave Afghanistan and be tried before an Islamic
court elsewhere. If toppling the Taliban arrived late as a war aim (Tony
Blair only stated it unequivocally on October 30, three weeks into the
bombing campaign), it seems to have emerged through desperation and
cynicism. Realizing that finding Bin Laden might prove impossible, the
war leaders turned their sights on the Taliban instead. Politically,
they were easy meat. Few in the western world, women or men, would
grieve to see them go. Commie-bashing was never as simple as this.


I hold no brief for the Taliban, but I also hold no brief for an
approach to politics which consists of demonizing your opponents,
over-personalizing issues and evading nuanced judgments. The Taliban
were not monsters. They were a wild mixture of religious fundamentalism,
puritan ideology, Pashtun nationalism and the social norms of the Afghan
village, common to every Afghan ethnic group. Go to the Afghan districts
of Quetta in Pakistan, or watch the TV pictures of "liberated" Kabul,
and you will see the burka everywhere. The total veiling of women did
not begin with the Taliban, and has not ended with their demise.


In an earlier war western governments and compliant journalists
demonized Afghanistan's communists, ignoring the fact that their social
and gender policies throughout the 1980s were enlightened. In those days
the west armed and aided the fundamentalists and those who wanted to
deny women's rights. So demonizing the Taliban came naturally. Yet, as
aid agencies have testified, the Taliban produced order in place of
civil war. "With the Taliban there was a certain amount of security in
the areas they controlled. I wouldn't say the Taliban were supportive,
but a lot of aid went in - there was acceptance," says John Fairhurst,
Oxfam's program director for Afghanistan. "Now we have local commanders
looking to take advantage of the collapse. You also have bandits
thinking they have more freedom to operate".


Legally, it is doubtful whether the two UN resolutions which preceded
the military strikes permitted an attack on the Taliban, as opposed to
al-Qaida. What of the costs of the bombing? Perhaps around 1,500
innocent people have been killed, if one assumes an accident rate of
about 150 a week. (America's anti-Taliban allies in Jalalabad reported
as many as 300 civilian victims in that one area last week.) The air
strikes have driven at least 600,000 people from their homes. This is
comparable with Milosevic's deportations from Kosovo during the NATO
bombardment. But while he committed his crimes in springtime, with a
host of agencies to help the refugees as they crossed the border, the US
launched its Afghan assault in winter, in a situation where neighboring
countries would only grudgingly open their gates.


Half the population of Kandahar, a third of Kabul, and thousands more
from the north, fled the terror and were left wandering inside
Afghanistan in cold and hunger. Not much of this has reached the world's
attention. Two years ago the remote town of Kukes in Albania was host to
hundreds of reporters and film crews sending daily interviews with
refugees to eager editors. In this war the comparable town of Chaman in
Pakistan produced few such dispatches, barely one a week per paper - the
refrain became: "My desk just glazes over if I suggest another refugee
story". 


Finally, there is the time lost in delivering food, blankets and
medicine to the hundreds of thousands people displaced by drought before
the bombing started. For three months very little aid has been going in.
"The politics have changed dramatically but the humanitarian situation
remains dire," says Tim Pitt of Medecins sans Frontieres. "Before
September 11 we were reaching upwards of one million people. Now it's
less than that". 


With the fall of the Taliban, Tony Blair talks of "total vindication"
and supporters of the war call for apologies from those who opposed it.
OK, I was wrong. On October 6, I wrote: "Missile strikes will just be
the hors d'oeuvre. The main meal will be a sustained campaign to arm the
Taliban's opponents, the Northern Alliance, so that they can seize Kabul
and take power." I am truly sorry - I never thought the air war would be
so off target, and bring so much misery to so many innocent Afghans.


Toppling the Taliban may eventually give Afghanistan the chance of good
government. Many of those in the interim authority are modernizers,
rather than jihadis; there is an ethnic balance; foreign governments may
send in an efficient peacekeeping force to keep the warlords at bay; aid
flows may be restored to pre-September levels. But these possible
benefits are in the future. The costs have already been paid.


C Guardian Newspapers Limited 2001

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