On Sat, 2 Apr 2005 00:35:16 -0800 Wayne Jr <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
[r.e. rfid chips in passports] > The data will not be encrypted or protected in any way. This reckless > plan could put Americans traveling overseas at risk of attack by > thieves, muggers, kidnappers, and even terrorists who could use > portable reader devices to zero in on the radio signals emanating from > our passports. Don't let the federal government put a spychip in > *your* pocket! It's not clear to me that *access* to the data will "...not be ... protected..." in any way. While the data broadcast is "in the clear", one part of 22 CFR Part 512, RIN 1400-AB93 does mention PKI & electronic shielding in regard to readers at ports of entry. Unfortunately the detail provided is not specific enough to determine if they really mean machine readable zone (MRZ) technology. If so, it means a thief would have to steal the key from the government to get the RFID to talk, or eavesdrop in the protal of entry. However, Even if the data is encrypted, and MRZ PKI technology is used to restrict access, nothing is going to stop big brother from tracking you as long as you are carrying you passport. Clearly, this is the reason the DHS doesn't want any kind of user "PIN" or button incorporated (the simplest anti-theft provision), as they want to be able to track foreign visitors in the US without (or even against) any volitional component. > NOTE: While the maximum legal read range of the passport chips is only > a few inches, criminals can eavesdrop on official reader devices to > capture your data from across a room or potentially even down the > block. I think 30' was the maximum distance in the tests in the references. Dave Looney -- I don't want to achieve immortality through my work; I want to achieve immortality through not dying. - Woody Allen
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